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People deserve better. They deserve the truth. They deserve honesty. The
best music, you can seek some shelter in it momentarily, but it's essentially
there to provide you something to face the world with.
--Bruce Springsteen
God have mercy on the man who doubts what he's sure of.
“Brilliant Disguise”
Tunnel of Love (1987)

As great admirers of The Boss and as fans of live entertainment, we share in the popular
dismay over rising ticket prices for live performances. But we have been asked as
antitrust scholars to examine the proposed merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and
we do so with the objectivity and honesty called for by The Boss’s quotes above. The
proposed merger has been the target of aggressive attacks from several industry
commentators and popular figures, but the legal and policy question is whether the
transaction is at odds with the nation’s antitrust laws.
One primary source of concern to critics is that Ticketmaster and Live Nation are two
leading providers of ticket distribution services, and these critics argue that the merged
entity would have a combined market share that is presumptively anticompetitive. We
observe, however, that this transaction is taking place within a rapidly changing industry.
The spread of Internet technologies has transformed the entertainment industry, and along
with it the ticket distribution business such that a reliance on market shares based on
historical sales is misleading. A growing number of venues, aided by a competitive
bidding process that creates moments of focused competition, can now acquire the
requisite capabilities to distribute tickets to their own events and can thus easily forgo
reliance upon providers of outsourced distribution services. If self-distribution is an
available and attractive option for venues, as it appears to be, then it is unlikely that even
a monopolist provider of fully outsourced ticketing services could exercise market power.
Ultimately, a proper assessment of the horizontal effects of this merger would have to
weigh heavily the emerging role of Internet technologies in this dynamic business and the
industry-wide trend towards self-distribution.
The second category of arguments by critics opposing the merger rests on claims that
vertical aspects of the transaction would produce anticompetitive effects. Indeed,
*
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Ticketmaster’s and Live Nation’s core businesses are in successive markets, and thus the
proposed transaction is primarily a vertical merger, but there is broad agreement among
economists and antitrust authorities that vertical mergers rarely introduce competitive
concerns and are usually driven by efficiency motivations. This wealth of academic
scholarship, which is reflected in current antitrust law, has not—from our vantage
point—been properly incorporated into the public dialogue concerning the proposed
merger. To the contrary, critics articulate concerns, including the fears that the merger
would lead to the leveraging of market power and the foreclosure of downstream
competition, that are refuted by accepted scholarship. Moreover, there are a number of
specific efficiencies that, consistent with economic and organizational theory, are likely
to emerge from a Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger and would be unlikely but for the
companies’ integration. For these reasons, we submit this analysis in an effort to inform
the debate with current economic and legal scholarship.
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Executive Summary

On February 10, 2009, Live Nation, Inc. and Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc.
announced their intentions to merge and create Live Nation Entertainment. The proposed
merger is one of several recent and significant developments in a rapidly changing
industry, and it reflects the search for new business models that capitalize on Internet
technologies and respond to disruptions to previously reliable revenue flows. The
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has been investigating whether the merger is
permissible under the nation’s antitrust laws, and the parties have asked us to examine the
legality and competitive consequences of the merger in light of public criticism. Our
analysis reflects our own views, not those of the parties or their counsel, and is based
only on publicly available information.
Live Nation and Ticketmaster both provide multiple services that contribute to the
production of live entertainment. Live Nation, the world’s largest producer of live
concerts, engages in the promotion of concerts and other events, the operation and
management of live entertainment venues, various forms of entertainment-related
merchandising, and the sale of tickets for events at venues it owns or operates.
Ticketmaster, the world’s leading live entertainment ticketing and marketing company,
sells tickets in the primary and secondary markets, licenses technology that facilitates the
self-distribution of tickets for assorted venues, and manages entertainment talent.
Because Live Nation’s primary business is in live entertainment promotion and
Ticketmaster’s primary business is in primary ticket sales distribution, the proposed
transaction is chiefly a vertical merger and leads to the integration of successive stages in
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the value chain for producing and delivering live entertainment. Economic theory
instructs that such vertical arrangements are usually motivated by efficiency
considerations, and antitrust law accordingly has adopted a very permissive approach to
such mergers. Nonetheless, Live Nation is also engaged in primary ticket sales
(primarily for venues it owns or operates), and some have argued that it is poised to
compete vigorously with Ticketmaster to distribute tickets for venues with which it has
no affiliation. We therefore examine both the horizontal and the vertical consequences
of the transaction.
Horizontal Analysis. Our horizontal analysis focuses on how a Live NationTicketmaster merger would impact the market for primary ticket distribution. Following
the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, it includes a discussion of market
definition, market participants, and approximation of market shares; the likelihood of any
coordinated or unilateral adverse effects caused by the merger; any potential competition
that is foreclosed by the merger; and any horizontal efficiencies created by the merger.
Our main conclusions are as follows:
x

Venues (rather than ticket purchasers, i.e., concert-goers) are the principal
purchasers of ticket distribution services. Defining the relevant market
requires evaluating how venues would respond to a non-transitory price
increase by providers of these services.

x

Venues pursue many different methods of distributing tickets. Many enter
into contracts with ticket distributors that serve as outsourced agents, but an
increasing number have pursued vertical integration strategies, in which
venues self-distribute tickets to the events they host. Some pursue vertical
integration strategies by developing in-house technology to self-distribute
tickets, and some purchase “enabling” technology and services from ticketing
technology companies that support ticket self-distribution. This “enabling”
option has become increasingly common, indicating that the technology
underlying Internet ticketing has become widespread and has measurably
contributed to major organizational changes in the marketing of live
entertainment.
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x

Many venues consider vertical integration to be a reasonable substitute for
outsourced ticket distribution. If self-distribution technology is widely
available, then venues would self-distribute in response to a significant price
increase by a hypothetical monopolist of outsourced ticket distribution
services. Thus, a critical question in evaluating the competitiveness of the
proposed merger—one that overrides the significance of calculating market
shares and most other determinations required by the merger guidelines—is
whether the ease and attractiveness of self-distribution strategies would offset
any possibility of supracompetitive pricing. For this reason, criticism of the
proposed merger that rests on the parties’ historical market shares fails to
recognize the market’s technological dynamism and is unlikely to accurately
identify market power.

x

The widespread possibility of self-distribution, heterogeneity of ticket
distribution contracts, and concealment of contractual terms mitigate the
likelihood that the merger would encourage any collusion among remaining
market competitors. Moreover, the competitive bidding process that venues
adopt when ticket distribution contracts expire creates moments of focused
competition in which outsiders can gain entry and small firms can increase
market share, with the result that collusion among market participants appears
unlikely.

x

An analysis of the merger’s unilateral competitive effects will also require a
determination of the attractiveness and ease of self-distribution. If selfdistribution technology is widely available, then the market’s many providers
of enabling technology would promptly respond to any unilateral increase in
price by the merged entity. A number of assorted providers have responded to
recent invitations by venues for bids to provide or support ticket distribution
services. These experiences suggest that current market participants have the
capabilities to meet the needs of venues that seek alternatives to a merged
Live Nation Entertainment. It additionally confirms that historical market
sales belie the current level of competitiveness in the ticket distribution
market.

x

Competitive entry into, and competitive expansion in, the ticket distribution
market could either come from the many companies that distribute and tailor
Internet ticketing technologies for venues, such as Veritix, or from large
venue operators and promoters, such as AEG. These firms are at least as
likely to sustain a competitive threat to the merged company as Live Nation
was to pose a threat to Ticketmaster if the merger were not consummated.
Moreover, if enablement technologies have become as attractive and
widespread as they appear to be, then the ready availability of these
technologies could alone deter a merged Live Nation-Ticketmaster from
charging supracompetitive prices.
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x

It is possible that horizontal efficiencies could result from the proposed
merger, perhaps if one company can provide ticket distribution services at a
lower cost than the other, but we have not encountered any evidence
suggesting that horizontal efficiencies will be more than modest.

Vertical Analysis. There is broad consensus among economists and legal scholars
that vertical mergers only very rarely pose competitive risks and instead generally reflect
procompetitive efforts to minimize transaction costs. The substantial vertical elements of
the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger therefore suggest that many efficiency
motivations underlie the transaction. Nonetheless, critics of the proposed Live NationTicketmaster merger persist in expressing opposition to vertical components of the
merger. Such criticisms were common in antitrust decisions several decades ago, when
the “inhospitality tradition” directed antitrust policy to be suspicious of most vertical
arrangements, including vertical integration, but advances in economic theory have
revealed deep flaws in those suspicions. Current antitrust law has evolved accordingly,
becoming much more accepting of vertical mergers, and nearly all such transactions
survive antitrust scrutiny.
In addition to posing little risk of competitive harm, vertical mergers also have the
potential to generate many efficiencies that would be unattainable through contractual or
market organization. Recent developments in the live entertainment industry and
statements made the management of both Live Nation and Ticketmaster suggest that the
proposed merger has the potential to generate the following efficiencies:
x

Investments in promotion and information. Internet technologies have
presented lucrative opportunities to generate new content, consumer data, and
promotional strategies for fans of live entertainment. Creating the platforms
for these strategies, however, requires investments that are difficult to specify
and monitor by contract. When activities such as these are hard to observe
and are therefore noncontractible, yet are important in creating value, vertical
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integration is a common efficiency response. Vertical integration strategies
could help providers of live entertainment invest in promotion (for example,
to reduce excess capacity in concerts) and develop Internet content and
marketing strategies.
x

Meeting Artist Demands and Market Changes. The Wall Street Journal has
described the world of live entertainment as “an industry undergoing seismic
shifts.” Adjusting to a changing market environment is additionally difficult
when different players contribute at each stage in the value chain. One of the
hallmarks of vertical integration, however, is the ability to pursue cooperative
adaptation. Vertically integrated strategies such as the Live NationTicketmaster merger could facilitate innovations that would organize the
assorted inputs to live entertainment into an effective business model.

x

Linking Venues, Entertainers, and Fans. The many market segments required
to produce live entertainment in today’s mostly non-integrated industry create
distance between artists and their fans, and establishing direct linkages
between artists and fans is perhaps the most oft-stated justification for the
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger. One of the attributes of vertical integration
is the ability to facilitate the sharing of knowledge. It is thus no surprise that
artists and venues are seeking vertically integrated mechanisms to
communicate with fans. Moreover, vertical integration facilitates the creation
and dissemination of information that could serve as a platform for better
artist-fan communication and the marketing of additional content and
merchandise.

Efficiencies such as these are likely to follow from a Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger,
and we suspect that they also account for the broader industry-wide trend towards vertical
integration.
Critics of the proposed merger have expressed fears that the merged entity would
foreclose entry in both the ticket distribution and the promotion markets, and that the
merged entity would leverage its market power in one market for anticompetitive gain in
the other. We conclude that neither available evidence nor economic theory support
these fears. To be sure, the merged company would contribute to the changing face of
the live entertainment industry, and industry players will need to continue searching for
innovative business models. But the merger does not change market concentration or
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entry possibilities in the promotion market, and we suspect that the spread of Internet
technologies has greatly removed the possibility of obtaining or leveraging market power
in the ticket distribution market. To the degree that the merger generates competitive
advantages to the merged firm, these appear to be procompetitive adaptations that the
antitrust laws should encourage and not condemn.
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I. Introduction
On February 10, 2009, Live Nation, Inc. and Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc.
announced their intentions to merge and create Live Nation Entertainment. This “merger
of equals” would combine the nation’s leaders in ticket distribution services and live
entertainment promotion, creating by all accounts an industry leader in live
entertainment. 1 Not surprisingly, smaller competitors have raised concerns about their
ability to compete with Live Nation Entertainment, 2 and public figures—including Bruce
Springsteen, a particular favorite to one of the instant authors—have decried the
economic and artistic consequences of such a combination. 3 Political attention was

1

Press Release, Live Nation and Ticketmaster Entertainment to Combine in Merger of
Equals to Create World's Premier Live Entertainment Company (Feb. 10, 2009),
available at http://mediacenter.ticketmaster.com/Extranet/
TMPRArticlePressReleases.aspx?id=8080&fragment=0&SearchType=OR&terms= (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009).
2
See, e.g., The Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger: What Does it Mean for Consumers
and the Future of the Concert Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009) (written testimony of Jerry Mickelson, Chairman and Executive Vice President of
Jam Productions, Ltd. [hereinafter Mickelson Testimony] and Seth Hurwitz, Co-Owner
of I.M.P. Productions and 9:30 Club Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Hurwitz Testimony];
National Association of Ticket Brokers, Press Release – Consumer Protection, Industry
Groups Joint Statement on Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger Investigation, http://www.
natb.org/MediaCenter/index.cfm?article=42.
3
See Bruce Springsteen "Furious" at Ticketmaster, Rails Against Live Nation Merger,
ROLLING STONE, http://www.rollingstone.com/rockdaily/index.php/2009/02/04/brucespringsteen-furious-at-ticketmaster-rails-against-live-nation-merger/ (last visited Sept. 9,
2009) (publishing letter from Bruce Springsteen and his tour team to fans stating that
“[t]he abuse of our fans and our trust by Ticketmaster has made us as furious as it has
made many of you . . . . [T]he one thing that would make the current ticket situation even
worse for the fan than it is now would be Ticketmaster and Live Nation coming up with a
single system, thereby returning us to a near monopoly situation in music ticketing.”).
Joel Rose, Ticketmaster, Live Nation Merger Investigated, NPR, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId =100616154 (last visited Sept. 9,
2009) (reporting statement by Senator Charles Schumer, following the Live NationTicketmaster merger announcement, that , “[t]he last thing we should do is give
Ticketmaster more influence… If these two entities were to merge, control of concert
1

recently directed at the proposed merger as Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust, and Congressman Bill Pascrell each sent letters to Assistant
Attorney General Christine Varney requesting the Antitrust Division to scrutinize the
merger with skepticism and care. 4
Although such popular backlash against economic giants is a common refrain in
American antitrust law, these concerns do not reflect what antitrust law is designed to
achieve. The Sherman and Clayton Acts “were enacted for the protection of competition,
not competitors,” 5 and it is not uncommon for certain resentments and intuitions to
channel anger at what actually is procompetitive and economically desirable conduct. As
scholars of antitrust law and institutional economics, we have been asked by the parties to
examine the legality and the competitive consequences of the proposed merger. We
should state upfront that, while we are being compensated, we are writing in our capacity
as experts in antitrust law and policy, and we are presenting only our own views and not
those of the parties or their counsel. We accordingly apply our analysis relying on
publicly available information and our understanding of the legal and economic
methodologies that guide merger analysis in the U.S.

venues and representation of artists in those venues would be controlled by one
organization, having profound and far-reaching implication for consumers, promoters and
artists alike.”).
4
Letter from Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition
Policy and Consumer Rights to Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, United States Dep’t of Justice (July 27, 2009) [hereinafter Kohl Letter]; Letter
from Congressman Bill Pascrell, et. al to Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, United States Dep’t of Justice (July 27, 2009) [hereinafter
Pascrell Letter].
5
See Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
2

This memorandum first describes the industry structure and emerging trends and
then assesses the merger’s likely horizontal and vertical impact on competition. We
observe that both ticket distribution and the entire business of live entertainment are
technologically dynamic and rapidly evolving industries, and each has been undergoing
substantial structural changes in recent years. It is within this changing landscape that the
proposed merger reflects a broader industry trend towards vertical integration, wherein
creators of live entertainment are generating efficiencies and valuable new markets by
interacting directly with fans.
Because Ticketmaster and Live Nation are both in the ticket distribution business,
with Live Nation having recently entered, there is a horizontal element to the proposed
merger, requiring analysis of how it might affect both actual and potential competition.
We conduct a full horizontal analysis, beginning with market definition and proceeding
through calculation (or approximation) of market shares, assessment of possible adverse
effects, prospect of post-merger entry, and consideration of horizontal efficiencies. The
merger also has vertical dimensions, with Live Nation having been until recently
Ticketmaster’s largest client. We begin a vertical examination by reviewing
developments in institutional economics and antitrust law regarding vertical integration
and briefly review the results of an earlier Department of Justice investigation into
Ticketmaster’s use of exclusive contracts. We then discuss the potential for mergerspecific efficiencies and assess arguments made by some of the merger’s critics,
including Senator Kohl and Congressman Pascrell, who have warned that the merger may
have anticompetitive consequences.

3

We do not have access to the same confidential information possessed by the
enforcement agencies or the parties. Our information is thus incomplete and our
conclusions can only be preliminary. Nonetheless, we find reason to believe that a Live
Nation-Ticketmaster merger is likely to produce certain efficiencies that commonly
accompany vertical integration. We observe that the technology to distribute tickets is
becoming increasingly widespread, that several technology companies have emerged
with platforms that can cater to clients’ specific needs, that there is a competitive bidding
process in which these offerings are presented to potential clients, and that an increasing
number of venues are now pursuing self-distribution strategies. Given this rapid
emergence of new technologies and the evident attractiveness of self-distribution
strategies, concentration calculations based on historical market shares likely do not
accurately reflect the transaction’s propensity to facilitate the exercise of market power.
A proper determination of the merger’s horizontal competitive consequences instead
rests, above all, on how easily venues can pursue self-distribution strategies and how
many providers of ticket distribution services would be available to offer alternatives to a
merged Live Nation and Ticketmaster.
Although the results of this dispassionate antitrust analysis might be more
supportive of the merger than many critics would hope, we offer this analysis echoing the
Boss’s admonition to seek truth and maintain an appropriate amount of self-doubt.

4

II. Background on Live Entertainment: Industry Structure and Trends 6
Overview
The market for live entertainment events generated roughly $21 billion in ticket
sales in 2007, with $14.3 billion generated by sporting events, $6.7 billion generated by
concerts, and a small remainder generated by theatre performances, art exhibits, and other
events that utilized ticketing services. 7 Participants in the live entertainment industry
also rely on revenue from ancillary products, such as sales of merchandise, concessions,
and music. Although the industry is becoming increasingly vertically integrated, most
concerts and performances require contractual arrangements among a number of different
and otherwise independent parties.
Artists contract with promoters to arrange live concert performances. Artists
often contract through a manager that handles the artists’ performance and business
needs, and many of these managers further contract with booking agents to arrange an
agreement with a promoter for individual performances or a tour. The promoter is then
responsible for securing a venue for the performances, and the venue is accompanied by
other revenue-producing services such as parking, concessions, sponsorship, and bandrelated merchandise. The venue, or sometimes the promoter, contracts with ticket

6

This section relies heavily on Krueger, infra note 9, and Barclays Capital, infra note

70.
7

The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Combination of Ticketmaster
Entertainment Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Hearing on Competition in the Ticketing and
Promotion Industry Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. 7-8 (2009) [hereinafter Doyle Testimony]
(written testimony of Robert W. Doyle, Jr., Partner, Doyle, Barlow & Mazard, PLLC).
Secondary ticket sales, which for 2007 totaled $2.6 billion, are brokered by agents who
purchase performance tickets from the primary sales agents or initial purchasers and then
resell to end-consumers either with a mark-up above the sales price or through auction
mechanisms.
5

distributors that administer ticket sales to performances through Internet, retail, telephone
and box office sales.
Contracts between artists (via their managers and agents) and promoters have
been likened to book contracts between authors and publishers in that they allocate serial
revenues and often involve upfront payments. Although contractual agreements vary
significantly based on the popularity of the band, the record of the promoters, and other
circumstances, the typical contract distributes the revenue generated by concert tours
sequentially. The first-dollar revenues generated by the performances go to the band in a
“guaranteed advance,” and then subsequent revenue secures for the promoter a
“guaranteed profit,” which includes expenses (including advertising, rent for the venue,
labor, etc) and a negotiated profit. The promoter and band then share additional revenues
(if any) that exceed both the guaranteed advance and guaranteed profit, with the band
typically recovering around 85%. These contracts allocate other revenues as well, with
the band typically receiving revenue from merchandise sales and the venue receiving
revenue from parking and concessions. Live Nation has recently experimented with
some “360” contracts with certain marquee performers that give the artist a lump sum
guarantee for an entire tour, with Live Nation recovering all of the residual revenues, 8 but
most contracts divide such residual revenue between promoters and artists. This means
that promoters and artists tend to share (though not equally) the economic risks and
benefits of ticketed performances, and both suffer from lost revenue when venues are
unfilled.

8

Ethan Smith, Deal to Rock Music Industry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at B10.
Record labels, such as Warner Music Group and Sony Music Entertainment have also
experimented with 360 deals, though with lesser-known artists. Id.
6

The contracts between artists and promoters also set the face value of concert
tickets—i.e., the price of the ticket excluding any service fees, credit card fees, or taxes.
Although face value ticket prices have been rising faster than the rate of inflation over the
past decade, 9 many purchased tickets are later resold at significantly higher prices on a
secondary market. Some suggest that the persistence of the secondary market is evidence
of underpricing by bands in the primary market (and there are various explanations for
such underpricing), 10 but others describe the secondary market as a more flexible
distribution mechanism that can cater to fans who are less able to purchase on the
primary market. 11 Scholars and industry commentators have offered varying
characterizations of the secondary market, with different characterizations offering
alternative implications for how much social value players in the secondary market
create. 12
Many venues and promoters contract with ticket distribution service companies,
such as Ticketmaster, to handle all their ticketing needs. These contracts tend to be
exclusive agreements, in which the ticket distributor agrees to handle all services for a
venue for a period of time in exchange for the right to charge service fees that are

9

Alan B. Krueger, The Economics of Real Superstars: The Market for Rock Concerts
in the Material World, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2005).
10
See, e.g., id. at 13.
11
Pascal Courty, Some Economics of Ticket Resale, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 86 (2003)
(suggesting that ticket resale is a function of heterogeneous consumer preferences, in that
some consumers prefer to plan ahead while others prefer delay scheduling decisions,
even if it requires paying higher prices).
12
Although an assessment of the secondary market is beyond the scope of this paper,
some commentators on the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger have expressed concern for
how the merger would affect the secondary market. Any such assessment would first
have to articulate what services the secondary market provides, whether those services
enhance social welfare, and whether direct competition between the primary and
secondary markets enhances social welfare.
7

negotiated between the ticket distributor and the venue. 13 Most such agreements run for
several years, with typical contracts lasting at least three and running for an average of
six, and approximately 20 percent of all ticket distribution contracts expire in any given
year, 14 and as these contracts approach their expiration dates, competing ticket
distributors place bids with venues to compete for a subsequent exclusive contract. 15
These distribution agreements appoint ticket distributors as agents for venues,
establish whatever putative “processing fees” (alternatively called handling, convenience,
or service fees) that are charged to ticket purchasers, and allocate processing fee revenues
between the distributor and the venue. 16 Such processing fees usually are fixed by a
schedule agreed to by the parties and can vary from event to event. In many cases, the
ticket distribution agreement will require the distributor to provide the venue with an
upfront payment, which might help the venue to finance certain physical improvements
to the venue or even construction of the venue itself. The upfront payment amounts to a
discount to the effective price the venue pays for distribution. 17 The allocation of these
fees, along with the length of the contract and any other payments or discounts,
determines the effective price charged by the ticket distributor for the services it provides
to venues. There is evidence that the ticket distribution services industry has become

13

See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶74,013, at
96,239-40 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (describing process of “arms length” bargaining between
venues and ticket distribution companies and resulting price structure).
14
See id. at 96,240-41 (reporting that at least 20 percent of such contracts expire each
year).
15
Id. (describing this bidding process).
16
This should dispel the misconception, implicit in some critiques of the transaction,
that the ticket distributor is solely responsible for, and retains all of, the processing fees.
Typically, none of the processing fee revenues go to the artists.
17
See Ticketmaster Corp, 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240.
8

increasingly competitive in recent years, resulting in a larger percentage of the processing
fees (or larger upfront payments) allocated to venues and promoters. 18
There are other mechanisms available to venues to administer ticket sales, in
addition to outsourcing this task to a distributor. An increasing number of venues have
chosen to “make” instead of “buy” their ticket distribution, either by operating their own
ticket distribution services with technology they have purchased from others or
developed themselves or, more frequently, by licensing software from technology
companies. Many venues have pursued a hybrid strategy, outsourcing their ticket
distribution services while engaging in some self-distribution, for example, by selling
directly to season ticket holders or purchasers at the box office. Larger venues may
demand more sophisticated software than smaller venues, to handle the demands of
responding to a high volume of simultaneous ticket purchases (this is particularly
demanding for events where demand exceeds supply, such as playoff sporting events and
marquee concerts). Several technology companies, such as Paciolan (acquired by
Ticketmaster in 2008), Veritix, Front Gate, ShoWare, Tessitura, TicketReturn, and
AudienceView, have developed and made available for licensing ticket distribution
technologies that enable individual venues to distribute tickets on their own behalf in lieu
of outsourcing this task to agents such as Ticketmaster. 19 These firms offer

18

The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Combination of Ticketmaster
Entertainment Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Hearing on Competition in the Ticketing and
Promotion Industry Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Froeb Testimony]
(written testimony of Luke Froeb, Oehmig Associate Professor of Management at
Vanderbilt University).
19
See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets). See also
Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (explaining that the option of self9

technologically sophisticated support for venues’ efforts to gather, synthesize, and
interpret information about their ticket buyers, fans, and in some cases, donors,
information that can facilitate targeted promotion and more rational pricing strategies. 20
A growing number of venues have recently internalized their ticket distribution
operations relying on these technologies. For example, Kroenke Sports Enterprises based
in Denver, numerous universities, International Speedway Corporation, ComcastSpectacor (“Comcast”), and many others currently employ internal mechanisms to
distribute tickets over the Internet. 21 Live Nation itself recently received a software
license from CTS to power the self-distribution of tickets to venues that it owns and
manages. Moreover, ticket distribution is being implemented through a diverse range of
vertical arrangements. Tickets.com, for example, is owned by a subsidiary of Major
League Baseball and distributes tickets to MLB games, yet each MLB team is permitted
to develop (and many have) their own ticket distribution capabilities. Other venues
pursue hybrid strategies for separate clienteles, such as season ticket holders versus
single-ticket purchasers. For example, many universities with large sports programs
(including Maryland, Georgia Tech, West Virginia, North Carolina State, and the

distribution via reliance on outside technology providers prevents Ticketmaster from
exercising market power).
20
See Veritix, www.veritix.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (“By applying dynamic,
client-branded technologies—like exclusive digital ticketing delivery tools—Veritix
enables its partners to develop rich behavioral profiles that maximize the lifetime value of
their ticket buyers and fans. With the use of advanced Veritix applications, clients have
the unique capability of understanding the nature of the true attendees at every event . . . .
Never before has a single ticketing and live entertainment company delivered such
advanced digital ticketing services and tools that empower clients to truly understand
their customers’ habits, improve fan relationships and drive more revenue.”).
21
See, e.g., infra notes 79-88, 103-110. Note also that the University of Michigan, the
University of Tennessee, and various other universities both self-distribute as well, using
Paciolan technology.
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University of Virginia) use technologies “powered by Paciolan” to distribute tickets to
the public but maintain separate systems for student ticketing supported by TicketReturn.
These multi-pronged strategies illustrate the many organizational solutions that providers
of live entertainment are currently pursuing for ticket distribution as well as the many
ancillary profit opportunities that can become available through integrated ticket
distribution systems.
The emergence of varied vertical integration strategies also illustrates how much
the industry has changed in a relatively short period of time. Just eleven years ago,
appellate courts and the enforcement agencies could describe the ticket distribution
industry without mentioning the Internet. 22 Now, it would be unfathomable for
professional ticket distribution to exclude substantial Internet distribution, or perhaps
even to have anything but Internet distribution as the primary sales vehicle. The
centrality of Internet sales has called into question the requirement of establishing retail
booths or call centers, both of which were necessary channels for ticket distribution not
long ago, and it has drastically reduced the costs and complexity for venues that decide to
distribute their own tickets. Internet technologies have leapfrogged the once-prevalent
model of telephone and retail distribution and have enabled many venues to selfdistribute tickets over the Internet. 23

22

See Campos v. Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998); Brief Amicus Curiae for
the United States and Federal Trade Commission, Campos v. Ticketmaster, No. 98-127
(Dec. 1998).
23
See United States v. SunGard Data Sys., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 188-89 (D.D.C. 2001)
(noting that recent technological advances had significantly reduced the cost of vertical
integration by customers who might otherwise suffer at the hands of a hypothetical
monopolist. Invoking prior decision for the proposition that “the market definition
should be expanded because the ability of a substitute product to compete ‘will be
enhanced in the future because of further technological and market developments.’”).
11

There are similarly many variations in how promoters administer venues.
Promoters may merely rent a site for a particular event, but many promoters have longterm commitments to certain venues. Promoters may own venues (and may lease them
occasionally to others) and may have additional exclusive arrangements with others that
preclude competing promoters from the venue. Promoters such as Live Nation also are
providing services that traditionally have remained under the control of booking agents,
where they not only organize and promote live performances but also coordinate and
arrange lengthy tours at many venues.
Figure 1, created by Barclay’s Capital, does a reasonably good job of
characterizing the different contractual relationships that enable live performances. The
chart understates the variation in both the extent of integration between venues and
promoters as well as the extent of integration between venues and ticket distributors. It
also suggests that ticket distributors contract directly with venues, whereas sometimes
they instead contract with promoters. But the chart effectively conveys the several
vertical relationships and multiple inputs that are required to deliver live entertainment
and associated products to consumers.
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Parties to Proposed Merger
The parties to this proposed merger, Live Nation and Ticketmaster, are leaders in
several of the market segments described above. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc.,
includes Ticketmaster, “the world’s leading live entertainment ticketing and marketing
company,” 24 Front Line Management Group, “the world’s leading artist management
company,” 25 TicketsNow, a secondary ticket seller, and a handful of other business

24

See About Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/about_
us.html?tm_link=tm_homeA_i_abouttm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
25
Id.
13

interests. 26 Ticketmaster’s central asset, and its primary mechanism for distributing
tickets, is its signature Website, Ticketmaster.com, but it was not always so. Before
Internet commerce became routine, Ticketmaster’s sales over the telephone and at retail
outlets dominated the firm’s business. Currently, however, Internet sales account for
more than 73 percent of the company’s worldwide sales, a growing percentage that
reflects the rapidly evolving nature of the industry. Sales from 6,700 retail locations (not
including those at the locations of the venues themselves) account for just 16 percent of
overall transactions, a proportion that is falling, and its 19 call centers account for 11
percent.
Ticketmaster.com attracts more Web traffic and enjoys more ticket sales than any
other Internet sales site. According to TicketNews’ power rankings (which are based on
Web traffic received by a ticket seller’s Web site, not actual sales, though TicketNews
claims that Web traffic “has been shown to be a good estimator of the number of
transactions made by a seller” 27 ), Ticketmaster.com is the leading seller both among
primary and overall ticket sellers, with about 60 percent and 31 percent of recorded sales
respectively. 28 Some sources indicate that Ticketmaster’s share for large-scale popular

26

See Ticketmaster Businesses & Interests, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/businesses.
html (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
27
See TicketNews, http://www.ticketnews.com/ticket_industry_rankings (last visited
Sept. 9, 2009).
28
For the week ending August 22, 2009, TicketNews reports the following power
scores for primary and combined ticket sellers:
Top Primary Sellers
1 Ticketmaster.com
2 LiveNation.com
3 Telecharge.com
4 TicketWeb.com
5 ETix.com

Score
60.29
16.11
4.89
3.50
3.16

Top Combined Sellers
1 Ticketmaster.com
2 StubHub.com
3 LiveNation.com
4 TicketsNow.com
5 TicketLiquidator.com
14

Score
30.68
20.14
8.17
5.48
3.33

music events might be even higher, approaching 75-90 percent. 29 Other full service
ticket distributors appear to have much smaller market shares, with most below 5 percent.
Unfortunately, public data regarding ticket sales do not distinguish between outsourced
distribution, on the one hand, and self-distribution, on the other, a distinction we find to
be of great competitive significance, as discussed in Part III, below. 30
Ticketmaster Entertainment’s Front Line Management occupies a significant
position in the market for talent management and “is widely regarded as the music
world's most powerful artist-management company.” 31 Front Line’s roster includes close

6
7
8
9
10

BrownPaperTickets.com
Tix.com
Tickets.com
Wantickets.com
SmithsTix.com

1.82
1.80
1.20
0.96
0.44

6
7
8
9
10

Telecharge.com
TicketCity.com
TicketWeb.com
ETix.com
CoasttoCoastTickets.com

2.48
2.31
1.77
1.60
1.16

Id. (last visited Aug. 31, 2009) These figures apparently include self-distributed tickets, a
fact that explains LiveNation.com’s inclusion on the list.
Data sources for ticket sales conflict slightly with each other, and we have no
knowledge suggesting that one source is superior to others, but all the sources we consult
generate similar results. For example, Nielsen Online Netview offers a slightly different
comparison of Ticketmaster and LiveNation.com that perhaps indicates that
LiveNation.com has a less significant Web presence. Indeed, its figures from January
2009 reveal that Ticketmaster attracts roughly 12.1 million monthly unique visitors,
almost four times LiveNation.com’s, and 53 percent of LiveNation.com’s audience also
visited Ticketmaster in January 2009, whereas only 14 percent of Ticketmaster’s
audience visited LiveNation.com. See http://www.nielsen-online.com/emc/btn/0902_
indnews/indnews_0902.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). The New York Times reported
data from Forrester Research indicating that Ticketmaster had 30 percent of the $21
billion events market in 2008 and data from Stifel Nicolaus suggesting that
Ticketmaster’s market share for music concert tickets was closer to 70 percent. Andrew
Ross Sorkin, ed., Ticketmaster Merger Plan Could Touch on Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2009, at B3.
29
Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241.
30
We anticipate that the ultimate fact finder will have superior data that both
distinguishes between outsourced and self-distribution and is not derived from proxy
information, such as TicketNews’s power rankings.
31
Ethan Smith, Ticketmaster to Acquire Star Power in Azoff Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23,
2008, at B1.
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to 200 artists, including many who perform in large venues. Ticketmaster’s purchase of
Front Line in October 2008 was characterized by The Wall Street Journal as an effort “to
find a new business model for an industry undergoing seismic shifts.” 32 The merger of
Ticketmaster Entertainment with Live Nation appears to be a continuation of
Ticketmaster’s new business model, in which it is integrating its ticketing operations with
other elements of live entertainment.
Live Nation, Inc. describes itself as “the largest producer of live concerts in the
world, annually producing over 16,000 concerts for 1,500 artists in 57 countries.” 33 Live
Nation owns 18 venues in the US, has leases on 70 more, and operates many others in
which it organizes live events. 34 With its subsidiaries, it has booking rights for 159
venues, with 140 in the US, and has been responsible for organizing many of the
industry’s largest tours. 35 Live Nation events represent approximately 35 to 38 percent
of all live music concerts, although Live Nation owns or operates approximately 90
percent of the outdoor amphitheatres in the US. At congressional hearings, many smaller
venues have complained that they cannot offer marquee bands the revenues and venues
that would enable them to compete with Live Nation. 36

32

Id.
See About Live Nation, http://www.livenation.com/company/getCompanyInfo (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009).
34
The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Combination of Ticketmaster
Entertainment Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Hearing on Competition in the Ticketing and
Promotion Industry Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. 13 (2009) [hereinafter Rapino Testimony]
(written testimony of Michael Rapino, President & Chief Executive Officer, Live
Nation).
35
Live Nation, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 1 (Mar. 5, 2009) http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1335258/000119312509045320/0001193125-09-045320index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
36
See supra, note 2.
33
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Live Nation, like Ticketmaster Entertainment, also has been expanding into
vertically related segments of live entertainment in an apparent effort to implement a new
business model. In 2006, Live Nation acquired a controlling interest in MusicToday, an
online store for artist merchandise, and MusicToday became part of the company’s
“Artist Nation” division, which “was formed to partner with artists to manage their
diverse rights, grow their fan bases and provide a direct connection” in marketing music,
tickets, and merchandise. 37
In another recent effort to integrate downstream into consumer sales, and thus to
gain greater contact with consumer sales and preferences, Live Nation now internally
maintains its own ticket distribution operations. Previously a long-time Ticketmaster
client (and the source of 17% of Ticketmaster’s revenues in 2007), Live Nation ended
most of its dealings with Ticketmaster in December 2008 after it entered an agreement
with CTS Eventim, the largest ticketing company in Europe, to license CTS ticket
distribution technology. The agreement enabled Live Nation to create a technological
platform so the company could distribute tickets to events at the venues it owns or
operates, and the resulting (captive) sales account for all or most of the ticket sales
currently attributed to Live Nation. Live Nation also announced in September 2008 that
it had entered a strategic alliance with venue-operator SMG, currently a Ticketmaster
client. According to public reports, the agreement contemplates that Live Nation will sell
tickets to events at venues operated by SMG, regardless whether Live Nation promotes

37

Press Release, PRNewswire, Live Nation's Artist Nation Division Redefines the
Music Industry with Unified Rights Model, (Oct. 16, 2007),
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk /cgi/news/release?id=210077 (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
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such events, after SMG’s contract with Ticketmaster expires in December, 2010. 38
Currently, LiveNation.com, which distributes tickets to events at Live Nation venues, is
ranked a distant second in Internet primary ticket sales, behind Ticketmaster. 39 Some
industry observers expect Live Nation (if and until its merger with Ticketmaster is
consummated) to compete along with other distributors for Ticketmaster’s business as
Ticketmaster’s distribution contracts expire.
Recent Industry Developments
Both Ticketmaster Entertainment’s and Live Nation’s recent acquisitions, and
their respective pursuits of new business models, appear to be responses to a live
entertainment industry that is undergoing significant structural change.40 Accordingly,
the company’s proposed merger should be viewed within the context of a rapidly shifting
industry landscape.

38

See Live Nation Signs Ticketing deal with SMG, Reuters News Service (September
11, 2008); http://investors.ticketmaster.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=334097
(detailing Ticketmaster’s exclusive agreements with SMG that expire on December 31,
2010). Ticketmaster has argued that Live Nation would sell only a modest fraction of
tickets to SMG-operated venues by late 2009. See id. (“[L]ess than 250 thousand tickets
(of the 141 million we sold in 2007) are at possible risk with SMG in 2009.”). This is
because, in part, although events at SMG-operated venues account for up to 5 million
tickets annually, Ticketmaster suggests that the arrangement will not obligate all SMG
venues to rely upon Live Nation for ticket distribution. Ticketmaster contends that most
venues operated by SMG are in fact owned by municipalities that employ a “request for
proposal” or “competitive bidding” process for selecting their ticket distributors and that
Ticketmaster expects to compete for such business even after its current contract with
SMG expires on December 31, 2010. Id. See also Michael Peters, Ticketmaster
Responds to Live Nation/SMG Deal, BILLBOARD MAG., Sept. 11, 2008, available at:
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3ia6592177cf3e47ef913e13148
951ec2e (recounting Ticketmaster’s characterization of the deal and SMG’s response).
39
See supra, note 28.
40
See supra, note 31 (describing the music world as “an industry undergoing seismic
shifts”).
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Perhaps the most significant development in the music industry, one with effects
well beyond live entertainment, is the Internet-driven spread of digital music technology
and the concomitant rise of music piracy. Alan Krueger has observed that the emergence
of digital music coincided with a rise in concert ticket prices that was both significantly
faster than the rate of inflation and additionally faster than similar increases in ticket
prices to movies, theatre, and sporting events. 41 Krueger finds empirical evidence for a
“Bowie hypothesis” that suggests that “concert prices have soared because recording
artists have seen a large decline in their income from record sales, a complementary
product to concerts.” 42 In other words, whereas performers previously underpriced their
concert tickets in order to boost their record sales, they now are charging closer to what
the market will bear. Consistent with the economic theory underlying this hypothesis,
these ticket price increases have been associated with higher overall concert revenues,
fewer tickets sold, larger yet fewer concerts, and fewer sellouts. Krueger additionally
finds evidence for a predicted “superstar” effect that has channeled a disproportionately
large and growing share of concert revenues to the most popular bands. These popular
and established bands also seem to be engaging in more price discrimination, with the
prices for good concert seats rising faster than the price for the average seat.
In other words, data on concert ticket prices suggest that since 1997 concerts are
increasingly being priced like single-market monopoly products, rather than being
underpriced to boost popularity and record sales. They have accordingly become the

41

Krueger, supra note 9, at 7-10.
Id. at 25. Kruger calls this the “Bowie hypothesis” because of David Bowie’s
prescient remark in 2002 that “music itself is going to becomes like running water or
electricity,” which meant that performers “better be prepared for doing a lot of touring
because that’s really the only unique situation that’s going to be left.” Id. at 26.
42
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primary source of revenue for most top artists. 43 In turn, they have unleashed new
revenue opportunities for concert promoters and, especially when combined with the
“superstar effect,” have opened profitable opportunities for promoters who organize
events for the nation’s marquee performers.
Additionally, emerging Internet technologies are permitting a similar pursuit of
new revenue opportunities in other segments of the live entertainment value chain. Live
Nation’s development of MusicToday and Artist Nation reflect these new Internet
opportunities to sell merchandise and other goods. Meanwhile, Internet technologies—
including technologies to distribute tickets over the Internet—are becoming more
widespread and commoditized. As noted above, recent years have witnessed the
emergence of several technology companies that license or sell ticketing distribution
technologies to venues that choose to distribute their own tickets. 44 This spread of
Internet technologies for ticket distribution, along with the growing economic importance
of concerts, has meant that ticket platforms also have become important mediums to
market merchandise and related goods. Consequently, the locus of competition in ticket
distribution appears to be shifting. Whereas competition in the ticket distribution market
has historically taken the form of technological rivalry—Ticketmaster’s displacement of
Ticketron as the market leader was largely due to its superior technological capabilities—
competition now increasingly revolves around the ability of outsourced distributors or
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Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular
Music, at Table 1.1, NBER Working Paper No. W11282 (Apr. 2005).
44
See infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets). See also
Ticketmaster Corp 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (explaining that the option of selfdistribution via reliance on outside technology providers prevents Ticketmaster from
exercising market power).
20

firms that support self-distribution to assist venues in promoting and marketing content
and related products.
The growing importance of marketable content and ancillary products explain
what would otherwise appear to be an economic curiosity. Economic theory would
normally predict that the outsourcing of a particular service becomes more common when
its underlying technology becomes commoditized and thus subject to large-scale market
production. 45 If competition were truly over efficient ticket distribution, then the
industry would rely on outsourced services. In contrast to this prediction, however, the
spread of Internet ticketing technology and reduced costs in ticket distribution has given
rise to greater vertical integration, as venues are now increasingly pursuing selfdistribution strategies.
This trend in vertical integration is apparently driven by promoters and artists who
are pursuing new revenue sources by establishing greater contact with fans. For example,
revenue sources that traditionally accompany live entertainment, such as merchandise
sales and perhaps music sales, might accrue to venues and performers if they maintain
contact with consumers. The “superstar” effect additionally magnifies these profit
opportunities, especially for top-name performers. Similarly, acquiring and interpreting
information about the profile of ticket purchasers facilitates efforts by venues and
performers to develop targeted communications and marketing strategies designed to
respond to consumer preferences and maximize fan demand for live entertainment.
These opportunities are lost if independent ticket distribution firms lack the incentive to
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See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES (1975). Cf. George J.
Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185
(1951).
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develop such profiles and acquire a more thorough understanding, and a broader data set,
of performers’ fans. Accordingly, the value of ticket distribution services has become
less about technological capabilities and more about establishing direct linkages to, and
information about, fans and their interests in content. 46
Such trends comport with public statements by Ticketmaster and Live Nation
explaining their rationale for the merger. Ticketmaster has noted that it needs to integrate
away from the increasingly competitive market for ticket distribution, 47 and both
companies have argued that their integration would enable the production of more
content and more products. This industry-wide shift towards vertical integration, and the
accompanying opportunities to pursue additional revenue sources, explains both parties’
motivations for the transaction.
These industry-wide developments—the growing economic centrality of live
concerts and the economic opportunities afforded by vertical integration—not only might
explain Live Nation’s and Ticketmaster’s intentions to merge, but should also inform any
evaluation of how the merger might affect competition. In the following two sections, we
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Veritix.com, http://www.veritix.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (describing how
Veritix self-ticketing technology allows venues to “develop rich behavioral profiles that
maximize the lifetime value of their ticket buyers and their fans” and “empower clients to
truly understand their customers’ habits, improve fan relationships, and drive more
revenue”).
47
See Peter Kafka, Ticketmaster CEO Irving Azoff: How to Make Money While Music
Becomes “Demonetized,” ALL THINGS DIGITAL, May 27, 2009, http://d7.allthingsd.com/
20090527/irving-azoff/?mod=ATD_search (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (reporting that
Ticketmaster’s merger with Live Nation is motivated by Ticketmaster’s need to integrate
with promotion and marketing, without which Ticketmaster’s survival would be
jeopardized, and quoting Azoff as saying “[a]ny of you guys can write a program that
does what Ticketmaster does. . . . I’ve been there a couple of months and I have gripes
myself.”).
22

evaluate the probable consequences of this transaction on horizontal and vertical
competition while keeping these industry developments in mind.

III. Analysis of Merger’s Horizontal Consequences
An analysis of the horizontal consequences of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster
merger begins with identifying the market segments in which both companies compete.
The production of live entertainment involves a number of market segments, and
although both firms have core businesses that lie primarily in specific segments, each
now participates in multiple levels of the industry. Live Nation currently engages in the
promotion of concerts and other events, the operation and management of venues, various
forms of merchandising, and the distribution of primary tickets. Ticketmaster meanwhile
engages in the distribution of primary tickets, the secondary market for ticket sales, the
licensing of technology that facilitates the self-distribution of tickets for a venue’s own
events, and the management of entertainment talent.
Consequently, most of both firms’ business activities do not come into direct
competition with each other. However, on January 1 of this year, Live Nation, which
was previously an important Ticketmaster client, began to self-distribute tickets to events
at venues it owns or operates and has also sought to offer outsourced ticket distribution
services to other venues. Accordingly, the parties now appear to be competing for
contracts to provide ticket distribution services to venues that choose not to distribute
their own tickets. This recent competition has led some to criticize the transaction on the
ground that it purportedly reduces present and future competition in a market for ticket
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distribution services, and it impels us to examine the horizontal consequences of this
transaction.
By most publicly available accounts, Ticketmaster and Live Nation are numbers
one and two in ticket sales, 48 with combined sales approaching 80 percent of the industry
total. 49 Some critics decry the purported reduction of competition in such sales that this
merger would entail. A careful analysis of this market segment, however, suggests that
technological innovations have made this a very dynamic and rapidly changing market, in
which new products are facilitating vertical integration and easing entry. At the same
time, Live Nation’s ticket sales, nearly all of which entail distribution for events it
promotes or venues it owns or operates, significantly overstate its present or future
competitive significance in any properly defined market for ticket distribution.
Consequently, an appropriate evaluation of the merger suggests that it would have a
minimal effect on the market’s competitiveness.
The remainder of this section employs the law of horizontal mergers as the
framework for evaluating the probable horizontal consequences of the proposed
transaction. Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires courts and enforcement agencies to
ascertain the competitive impact of a transaction upon “any line of commerce or [line of]
activity affecting commerce in any section of the country.” 50 Such an analysis generally
involves the following steps: 1) defining the relevant market, 2) identifying market
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Live Nation is primarily considered a large ticket distributor on account of its selfdistribution of its own tickets. This qualification becomes meaningful in a horizontal
merger analysis, see infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
49
See, e.g., supra note 27 (attributing 60.3% and 16.1% of the market for ticket sales to
Ticketmaster, and Live Nation, respectively). Of course, TicketNews scores are only
approximations of relative sales.
50
15 U.S.C. §18 (2006).
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participants and calculating market shares, 3) analyzing “other factors” that bear upon
whether a transaction will produce anticompetitive effects; 4) examining possibilities for
entry in the market, assuming the possibility of anticompetitive effects, and 5)
determining whether the merger might create horizontal efficiencies. 51
Market Definition
To ascertain the relevant “line[s] of commerce” and “section[s] of the country,”
courts and the enforcement agencies must determine the relevant product market(s) and
geographic market(s) in which the merging parties participate. 52 Plaintiffs challenging a
merger, including the federal enforcement agencies, bear the burden of pleading and
proving the relevant product and geographic markets. Failure to discharge these burdens
dooms any challenge to a merger. 53
1. General Standards Governing Market Definition
The market definition inquiry does not involve identifying “markets” in a
colloquial sense or even in the sense that market participants or industry observers may
employ the term. 54 Instead, market definition in the merger context is a rigorous process
designed to identify markets that are “economically meaningful” in the sense that firms
51

See 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, § 0.2 [hereinafter 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines].
52
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
53
See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 1997) (government
challenge to merger fails for lack of proof of relevant product market); United States v.
Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1110 (N.D. Ca. 2004) (proof of market definition a
“necessary predicate” for a successful challenge to a merger); id. at 1152-68 (rejecting
challenge because of failure to establish a relevant market); SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at
181-93 (rejecting government challenge to a merger because of failure to prove relevant
market in which transaction would result in significant concentration).
54
2006 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 11-12 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Commentary on
Horizontal Merger Guidelines] (“Industry Usage of the Word ‘Market’ is Not
Controlling”).
25

participating in them could exercise market power. 55 If the participants in a proposed
market could not exercise market power, even when acting in concert, because a
sufficient number of consumers would turn to products outside the putative market, then
the “market” in question is not economically meaningful and cannot serve as the basis for
an evaluation of the competitive effects of the transaction. 56
At one time, market definition involved the consideration of various factors
(“practical indicia”) purportedly bearing upon the “reasonable interchangeability” of
potential substitutes. 57 More recently, the enforcement agencies have articulated a more
rigorous analytic process that has been embraced by an increasing number of courts. 58
Under this approach, the agencies seek to identify a category of products, including but
not necessarily limited to the type of products sold by the merging parties, with respect to
which a hypothetical monopolist of such products could profitably exercise market power
55

See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 1.0 (“The analytic process
described in this section [describing the standards governing market definition] ensures
that the Agency evaluates the likely competitive impact of a merger within the context of
economically meaningful markets, i.e., markets that could be subject to the exercise of
market power.”).
56
See id., § 1.0.
57
See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (identifying various “practical indicia” bearing upon
reasonable interchangeability and thus market definition).
58
See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 1.0; 1984 Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines, §§ 2.1, 2.11 [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines]. See also Oracle
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-13 (explaining that proof of relevant product market is
“necessary predicate” for successful merger challenge and invoking Joint Merger
Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist methodology); SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 181-82
(market definition is the “key to the ultimate resolution of this type of case, since the
scope of the market will necessarily impact any analysis of the anticompetitive effects of
the transaction"; invoking both “reasonable interchangeability” test and agencies’
hypothetical monopolist test); FTC v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151,
159-60 (D.D.C. 2000) (“practical indicia” are “not necessarily criteria to be rigidly
applied” in a “talismanic fashion”; explaining that 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines’
hypothetical monopolist test is one method for evaluating “price sensitivity” and thus
reasonable interchangeability) (quotations omitted); FTC v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp.
2d 34, 45, n.8 (D.D.C. 1998).
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because an insufficient numbers of purchasers would avail themselves of substitutes for
the category of products in question. 59
2. Identification of Relevant Consumers
Applying the hypothetical monopolist test requires the court or agency to identify
the class of purchasers of the product or products that comprise the provisional market.
As is detailed in Part II, ticket distributors are retained by venues (and sometimes
promoters) to provide ticketing services for a particular event or series of events.
Accordingly, even though concert goers purchase their tickets from these distributors,
who act as agents for venues, it is the venues who are the true purchasers of the ticket
distribution services.
Understanding this arrangement, in which a distributor is retained by a
manufacturer or service provider and acts as a liaison to the ultimate consumer, is often
central to a proper application of the antitrust laws. Numerous decisions in the merger
context have properly determined that business firms, and not individual downstream
purchasers, are the relevant consumers for the purpose of conducting the hypothetical
monopolist test, even if these businesses themselves sell a resulting product to ultimate
consumers. 60 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, on precisely this question
in a previous suit involving Ticketmaster, ruled that venues, and not fans, are the initial
and direct purchasers of services provided by Ticketmaster and similar providers of
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See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, §§ 1.0, 1.11.
See, e.g., Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (defining market of wholesale
warehousing and distribution of pharmaceuticals sold to retail pharmacies); Grumman
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1981) (approving product market of
“major airframe subassemblies” sold to manufacturers of civilian aircraft).
60
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ticketing distribution services. 61 Additionally, the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission jointly filed a Supreme Court brief in 1999 endorsing an Eighth
Circuit determination that venues, and not consumers, are the actual purchasers of
Ticketmaster’s ticket distribution services. 62 The joint DOJ and FTC brief is an
instructive interpretation of the economic relationship between Ticketmaster, the venues
it serves, and fans of live entertainment. As the brief pointed out, “[t]he typical contract
provides that the venue is the ‘Principal’ who grants to Ticketmaster a right ‘to sell
[tickets] as the Principal’s agent.’” 63 Thus, we think it likely that, for purposes of
applying the hypothetical monopolist test articulated by the Merger Guidelines, the
Department of Justice will examine whether a price increase by all ticket distributors
would cause enough venues to reduce their purchases of ticket distribution services so as
to render such a price increase unprofitable.
3. Geographic and Product Markets
Given the portability of Internet software and the ease with which ticket
distributors can provide services throughout the country, there are unlikely to be any
geographic boundaries to this market. In a related determination in 2003, before Internet
software became as widespread as it is now, a federal court found that Ticketmaster
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See Campos, 140 F.3d at 1171-72 .
See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission in
Campos v. Ticketmaster, No. 98-127 (Dec. 1998).
63
See id. at 9 (quoting plaintiff’s complaint) (emphasis in the brief). Like the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion, the joint brief of the DOJ and the FTC treated the allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint about the nature of the relationship between venues and ticket
distribution companies as true, given the procedural posture of the case, i.e., appellate
review of a decision to grant a motion to dismiss. We have no reason to believe that
these particular allegations were not well-grounded in facts about the industry at the time
or that these facts have changed.
62
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competed in markets throughout the United States,64 and a court is likely to similarly
define the market now.
Determining the product market is a more difficult task. Purchasers of ticket
distribution services range from large stadiums and arenas, with capacities of 20,000,
50,000 or even 100,000 fans, to amphitheaters and local clubs with much smaller
capacities. 65 In addition, ticket distributors can supply distribution efforts through any
combination of four different channels: the Internet, telephone call centers, sales from the
venue’s box office, and retail distribution outlets, the latter of which are generally located
in shopping malls or large department stores. 66 Venues’ and promoters’ needs for
distribution services can vary significantly, and they also can purchase different
assortments of services. For example, it is common for venues to retain ticket
distributors while also engaging in some self-distribution by, for instance, selling tickets
from their own box office and making group sales and/or selling season tickets.
Moreover, some venues and promoters rely upon distributors to support their box office,
season ticket, and group sales operations, while others require distributors to handle large
volumes of ticket orders in a short period of time, e.g., shortly after the announcement of
a popular concert or playoff schedule, and others expect distributors to assist in
promoting the venue’s events. Finally, venues increasingly expect distributors to assist
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See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (determining that the parties
compete in markets throughout the nation).
65
For example, Ticketmaster’s current clients include both Madison Square Garden,
“the world’s most famous arena,” http://www.thegarden.com/, and Mercury Lounge, a
Bowery Ballroom venue in New York City with a capacity of only 575. See Ben Sisario,
A Small Strategy for Selling Concerts, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/arts/music/07bowe.html?pagewanted=all
66
See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239-40 (describing these channels of
distribution).
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the venue in managing customer-related information, so as to better gauge fans’
preferences for live entertainment and ancillary products. Such services meaningfully
facilitate the venue’s subsequent targeted promotional efforts. 67 Individually negotiated
contracts between ticket distributors and venues memorialize the division of ticket
revenue and presumably the particularized service expectations for each particular
venue. 68
A prior court defined the product market (though only for the sake of argument)
as “the market for full service ticket distribution services purchased by major venues,” 69
thus separating distribution services for large venues from those designed for small ones.
Observers supporting this distinction claim that the technological and equipment needs of
67

Indeed, we understand that in many cases loyal fans of particular entertainers never
learn that their favorite performer is “in town,” despite vigorous promotional efforts. See
Michael Rapino, Transcript of Hearing of Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, CQ
Transcriptions, LLC (Feb. 24, 2009) (testifying that one of the top reasons given by fans
for not attending a concert is that they were unaware of the performance).
Note in this connection that a venue can reduce its expenses on broad-gauged
advertising and promotion if it can instead target its advertising toward those fans who it
believes will have a particular interest in attending the event in question. See infra Part
IV.3 (discussing efficiencies—specifically, the benefits of coordinated adaptation and
targeted promotion—that often accompany vertical integration).
68
Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240 (explaining that contracts with
venues are individually negotiated and allocate revenues between venue and distributor).
69
See id. at 96,239-40 (describing and adopting for the sake of argument relevant
product market including only ticket distribution for large venues). See also FTC v. PPG
Indus., 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (affirming preliminary injunction against merger
between firms that produced glass and acrylic transparencies for sales to aircraft
manufacturers); Grumman Corp., 665 F.2d at 13 (approving market defined as “major
airframe assemblies for large civilian aircraft” sold to Boeing and McDonnell Douglas).
In a different context, an economist has drawn a distinction between firms able to serve
large and small clients, on the one hand, and those only able to serve smaller clients, on
the other. See Mary W. Sullivan, The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Mergers on the
Market for Audit Services, 45 J.L. & ECON. 375, 396 (2002) (building model based upon
distinction between “Big Eight” accounting firms, on the one hand, and so-called “fringe”
firms, on the other); id. at 386 (“Fringe firms are reasonable alternatives to the Big Eight
for small audit buyers, and the fringe firms are fairly competitive.”).
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large venues are qualitatively distinct from those of smaller venues, so firms perfectly
capable of serving the needs of small venues may not be able to serve those of larger
ones. 70

At the same time, no precedent or economic principle compels such a

distinction. Moreover, any effort to define a relevant market around the size of venues
may fail to capture and account for the great diversity of needs that otherwise similar
venues might possess. For instance, some large venues may require relatively
straightforward Internet-based ticket distribution, without complex ancillary services,
while other large or even medium-sized venues may require (or believe they require)
ticket distribution in several channels, along with multifaceted services such as gate
control, management of season ticket sales, donor management (for universities and other
non-profit organizations), event promotion, and collection and synthesis of information
about fans. Adding to this complexity is the fact that many venues, both large and small,
serve numerous purposes and promoters organize a diversity of offerings. Popular
venues may host concerts, sporting events, auto shows, and horse shows within a short
period of time. As such, the venue might require a complex bundle of ticket distribution
services for some events, and a much more modest bundle for others. And, in fact, some
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As one neutral analyst has put it,
Large events are typically associated with ticket sales through multiple
distribution channels, including the Internet, call centers, retail outlets, and the
box office. Considering the potential for a high level of demand for tickets in a
short period of time for large events, ticket distribution service providers must be
able to handle large volumes and coordinate the distribution of tickets through all
channels using complicated software and centralized inventory systems.
See Evren Ergin, Barclays Capital, Ticketmaster-Live Nation Antitrust Analysis, Apr.
30, 2009, at 5.
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venues employ different ticket distribution companies to service different event or fan
categories. 71 Promoters also have varying needs for a similarly diverse set of events.
We therefore believe it would be difficult to articulate and prove with any
precision the existence of a market that includes some ticket distribution firms but not
others. There is no clear boundary separating one category of firm from another,
particularly in light of the ability of venues and promoters to take on various facets of the
distribution task themselves. 72 Thus, a legal challenge to this transaction could fail for
this reason alone, i.e., the inability to conceive of, articulate, and prove a tractable
distinction between some providers of ticket distribution services and others. 73 We may,
however, assume for the sake of argument that firms providing ticket distribution services
to large venues and promoters, or at least large venues and promoters with sophisticated
needs, offer a distinctive set of services that constitute an identifiable product market. 74

71

For example, the American Airlines Center in Dallas, TX uses Ticketmaster to sell
concert and NBA Mavericks tickets, but Tickets.com to distribute NHL Stars tickets. See
http://www.americanairlinescenter.com/events-and-tickets/purchase_tickets.php (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009) and NHL.COM Network, http://stars.nhl.com/club/page.htm?
id=39263 (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) ; Ticketmaster, http://www.ticketmaster.com/artist/
805932?brand=mavericks (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). Moreover, as noted in Part II,
several universities employ Paciolan software to power most of their ticket selfdistribution while at the same time relying upon TicketReturn software to power
distribution of tickets to their students.
72
For instance, some universities might require their ticket distributor to provide
integrated donor management software, while other universities may obtain such
software from independent vendors.
73
See Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (finding that government did not carry its
burden of proving market definition because government’s efforts to “delineate” the
boundaries of the product market could “[not] be expressed in terms to make a judgment
of the court have meaning” and noting that plaintiff’s expert witness had conceded that
there was no “quantitative metric” distinguishing products within the market from those
outside it); SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 181-83.
74
See Ticketmaster Corp. 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239-40.
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4. Applying the SSNIP Test
Assuming the demands of large purchasers of ticket distribution services are
distinct from their smaller counterparts, the operative inquiry for the sake of market
definition focuses on how such purchasers, what we will provisionally call “large
venues,” would react to a “small but significant and non-transitory increase” (SSNIP) in
the price of outsourced ticket distribution services, and whether this increase would be
profitable in light of that reaction. Key to answering this question is the recognition that
venues have increasingly turned to self-distributing tickets to their own events in lieu of
outsourcing this task to agents such as Ticketmaster. Some have done so in reliance on
software they have purchased or developed; more frequently such firms have licensed
such software from third parties. Indeed, in recent years numerous firms have developed
and offered for licensing Internet-based ticket distribution technologies that have enabled
many venues to engage in Internet-based self distribution. These developments reflect
the rapid spread of Internet-based technologies that can handle rigorous ticketing
demands, reduce the minimum viable scale of ticket distribution, and facilitate the
realization of the sort of efficiencies not available from outsourced distribution. Courts
have recognized that such technological dynamism should inform the exercise of market
definition. 75
Accordingly, the number of large venues that now distribute their own tickets,
with apparent success, relying upon software they own or license from third parties, has
75

See SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (noting that recent technological advances had
significantly reduced the cost of vertical integration by customers who might otherwise
suffer at the hands of a hypothetical monopolist, and invoking prior decision for the
proposition that “the market definition should be expanded because the ability of a
substitute product to compete ‘will be enhanced in the future because of further
technological and market developments.’”).
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grown significantly. 76 Indeed, one might even say that such self-distribution has become
an industry trend. 77 Ironically, many of these venues were at one time clients of
Ticketmaster, thereby suggesting that the firm’s exclusive contracts with venues do not
have the exclusionary impact that some have suggested. 78 Below we provide numerous
examples of venues that have taken on the task of distributing their tickets and, in the
process, highlight some of the firms that provide technological support for such vertical
integration.
1. Live Nation is itself a prime example, having recently received a software
license from CTS, the leading distributor of entertainment tickets in Europe, to
power its self-distribution of tickets to venues that it owns and manages. As
opponents of the transaction emphasize, Live Nation previously outsourced its
ticket distribution services, relying upon Ticketmaster to provide them. Relying
upon this license, Live Nation now distributes millions of tickets for events at
venues that it owns or manages.
2. The Houston-Toyota Center, owned by the Houston Rockets of the National
Basketball Association, has partnered with Veritix, another developer of ticket
distribution software, to facilitate self-distribution of tickets for events at the
venue, which seats up to 19,000 fans for basketball. 79 Formerly a client of
76

See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239 (noting that “there is a growing
portion of the [ticket distribution] market where the arena itself does its own ticketing
business using software sold or leased to it by Paciolan . . . or [the plaintiff].”).
77
See infra notes 79-111110 and accompanying text (discussing various examples of
recent vertical integration by venues); Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trad. Cas. at 96,239
(discussing “growing portion of the market” characterized by self-distribution).
78
See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (explaining that such exclusive
agreements do not prevent competitive entry into the ticket distribution marketplace).
79
See Ergin, supra note 70, at 10 (“Veritix offers professional sports teams, universities
and entertainment venues an electronic, integrated, primary and secondary ticketing
platform for managing ticket inventory and creat[ing] a relationship marketing database.
It features a paperless ticketing technology. The company seems capable of handling
large venues as it has had a partnership with the Houston Toyota Center since 2003.”).
See Toyota Houston Center, http://www.houstontoyotacenter.com/ about/atozguide.php
(last visited June 4, 2009) (reporting center’s seating capacity as “18,300 for basketball,
17,800 for hockey [and] up to 19,000 for concerts”);
http://www.nba.com/games/20090514/LALHOU/boxscore.html (last visited June 4,
2009) (reporting attendance of 18,501 in Houston playoff game against the Los Angeles
Lakers).
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Ticketmaster, 80 the Houston-Toyota Center also frequently hosts premier
entertainers, including, in 2009 alone, Beyonce, Brittany Spears, the Jonas
Brothers, Pink, Eric Clapton and Steve Winwood, Elton John & Billy Joel,
Nickelback, Celtic Woman, and Fleetwood Mac. 81 Veritix recently entered into a
similar agreement with Salt Lake City’s EnergySolutions Arena. 82
3. Kroenke Sports Enterprises owns Denver’s Pepsi Center arena (capacity up to
20,000), Dick’s Sporting Goods Park Stadium (capacity just over 18,000), and
Denver’s Paramount Theatre, capacity 1,870, which bills itself as “Denver’s best
intimate concert venue.” 83 In July, 2008, Kroenke and Veritix jointly announced
a partnership whereby the latter would “provide technology for the company’s
newly established ticketing services organization, TicketHorse.” 84 TicketHorse,
in turn, provides ticket distribution services for each of the venues listed above,
previously served by Ticketmaster, as well as Infinity Park, in the Village of
Glendale, Colorado. 85 The arrangement thus covers distribution of tickets for the
Denver Nuggets, the Colorado Rapids (professional soccer), Colorado Avalanche
(National Hockey League), the Colorado Crush (Arena Football), and Colorado
Mammoth (National Lacrosse League). 86
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See Jeff Bounds & Jennifer Dawson, Vertical Alliance in Houston Arena Deal,
DALLAS BUS. J., Sept. 19, 2003, available at: http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories
/2003/09/22/story3.html (last visited Sept.9, 2009) (describing Houston-Toyota/Vertical
Alliance deal as example of how “the emergence of the Internet has opened the door for
smaller rivals, some of whom are quietly stealing Ticketmaster’s business.”). Vertical
Alliance, it should be noted, is the predecessor of Veritix.
81
See supra note 80, http://www.houstontoyotacenter.com/events (last visited Sept. 9,
2009) (listing June through October 2009 events); http://www.ticketliquidator.com/tix/
toyota-center-vv-tickets.aspx (last visited June 19, 2009).
82
See Veritix Signs Exclusive Ticketing Contract for Utah Jazz, EnergySolutions
Arena, TicketNews (Sept. 9, 2009), available at: http://www.ticketnews.com/Veritixsigns-exclusive-ticketing-contract-for-Utah-Jazz-EnergySolutions-Arena9929188
83
See NBA, http//www.nba.com/nuggets/contact/faqs.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2009)
(“The capacity of the Pepsi Center for a Nuggets game is 19,155. Capacity is 18,129 for
Avalanche games and 17,600 for concerts with an end stage and 20,100 with a center
stage.”); http://www.dicksssportinggoodspark.com/Stadium/Facts.aspx (last visited Sept.
9, 2009) (“Dicks Sporting Goods Park is comprised of the 18,000-seat home stadium of
the Colorado Rapids and its surrounding 24-field, fully lit soccer complex.”); Paramount
Theater, http://www.paramountdenver.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
84
See Press Release, Veritix, Kroenke Sports Enterprises to Move Ticketing Operations
for Pepsi Center, Denver Nuggets and Colorado Avalanche to Veritix in 2009 (July 30,
0208), available at http://www.veritix.com/news/Veritix_&_Kroenke_Sports_Extend_
Partnership.pdf (last visited Sept.9, 2009).
85
See TicketHorse, http://www.tickethorse.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
86
Bounds & Dawson, supra note 81.
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4. Kroenke recently announced that it is partnering with AEG, a leading owner
and manager of venues, to manage the Broomfield event center in Broomfield,
Colorado. 87 The venue is publicly owned and has a capacity of 6,000 for hockey
and basketball and 7,500 for concerts. 88 If negotiations between the partners and
the city council are successful, TicketHorse will replace Ticketmaster as the
distributor of the venue’s tickets.
5. Lollapalooza relies upon software licensed from Front Gate Solutions to power
its self-distribution of tickets to the event, which takes place at Chicago’s Grant
Park In 2008, the event drew 225,000 fans over three days. 89 Front Gate also
recently announced a “long-term ticket selling deal” with Warehouse Live,
capacity 1,500, which bills itself as “one of Houston’s signature multipurpose
facilities.” 90 Warehouse Live is affiliated with AEG, and the agreement with
Front Gate displaced Ticketmaster as the distributor of tickets to Warehouse Live
events. 91 According to one neutral source, Front Gate Software powers the
platforms of 1,788 venues that have chosen to distribute tickets for events at their
respective venues. 92
6. The University of Minnesota relies upon software produced by AudienceView
to power its self-distribution of tickets to a wide variety of cultural and sporting
events, including Big Ten football games at its TCF Bank Stadium, which has a
capacity of 50,000, and basketball and hockey games at its Williams Arena,
which has a capacity of 16,000. 93 AudienceView also provides such enablement
87

See Michael Davidson, Broomfield Event Center to Get New Management, Name,
BROOMFIELD ENTERPRISE, Aug. 26, 2009, available at http://www.broomfieldenterprise.
com/ci_13204115.
88
See By the Numbers: Broomfield Event Center, BROOMFIELD ENTERPRISE, Apr. 14,
2008, available at http://www.broomfieldenterprise.com/ci_13140448.
89
See Front Gate Tickets, http://pages.exacttarget.com/page.aspx?QS=
c76003443ff9837dd4009700e262f1050f35994654bc7b06880d920a5ce5f38b (last visited
Sept. 9, 2009); Greg Kot, Turn It Up: A Guided Tour Through the Worlds of Pop, Rock
and Wrap, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://leisureblogs.
chicagotribune.com/turn_it_up/2008/11/parks-aim-to-ex.html.
90
See Front Gate Solutions, http://www.frontgatesolutions.com/index
.php?content=news&item=65 (last visited Sept.9, 2009). See also Warehouse Live,
http://www.warehouselive.com/index.php?content=home&section=1 (last visited [date]).
91
See AEG Live, http://aeglive.com/aboutus.php (last visited Sept.9, 2009) (listing
Warehouse Live as one of the venues “owned, managed and/or programmed by AEG.”).
92
See Ergin, supra note 70. It should be noted that Front Gate also maintains a
ticketing agency for venues that outsource their ticket distribution services. See Front
Gate Tickets, http://www.frontgatetickets.com/ (last visited Sept.9, 2009). Front Gate's
clients include the Austin Aztecs, who play at Nelson Field, which has a seating capacity
of 8,800.
93
See Audience View Ticketing, http://www.audienceview.com/customers/?t=6 (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009) (listing customers to include the University of Minnesota);
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software to several dozen other clients, including Dartmouth College, the Tribeca
Film Festival, the New York Red Bulls of Major League Soccer, and the ACC
Liverpool Arena in Liverpool, England. 94 Similarly, the Toronto Blue Jays of
Major League Baseball also employ software licensed from AudienceView to
power their self-distribution of tickets. 95 The Blue Jays play their home games at
Rogers Centre, which seats over 49,000 fans. 96
7. International Speedway Corporation (ISC), owns 13 automobile racing
speedways, including tracks with capacities of 168,000 (Daytona), 143,000
(Talladega), 137,000 (Michigan), and 107,000 (Richmond). 97 These venues host
numerous events, including automobile races sanctioned by NASCAR and the
Indianapolis Racing League (IRL), as well as the Grand Am and American Motor
Association leagues. Recently, ISC purchased software from Veritix that helped
create a ticket distribution platform centered around Racetickets.com.
8. Comcast Corporation employs Paciolan software to power its “New Era”
Ticketing Subsidiary, which distributes tickets for venues owned by Comcast,
such as Philadelphia’s Wachovia Center, which seats 21,600 for basketball and
18,000 for hockey. 98 The Center also hosts numerous concerts by premier
entertainers. In 2009 alone the following artists performed at the Wachovia
Center or are scheduled to do so later in the year: Beyonce, Eric Clapton, Keith
Urban, Miley Cyrus, the Jonas Brothers, Bruce Springsteen, and Pink. 99 New Era
also provides technological support for the distribution of tickets by various
venues not owned by Comcast, including the Dover International Speedway
(135,000); the Portland Rose Quarter, and Constant Center at Old Dominion
University of Minnesota, Buy Tickets, https://www.tickets.umn.edu/
AudienceViewSplash/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (“Shopping Cart for purchase of
Minnesota Gophers tickets states Powered By AudienceView Ticketing”) ; University of
Minnesota’s TCF Bank Stadium, http://stadium.gophersports.com/
about_the_stadium.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (report that capacity of new TCF
Bank stadium, will be 50,000) ; GopherSports.com: The Official Website of Minnesota
Athletics, www.gophersports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?&ATCLID=310102 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2009) (reporting current capacity of Williams basketball arena as 14,625).
94
See supra note 93 at http://www.audienceview.com/customers/customer_list.asp (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009).
95
Id.
96
See ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/travel/stadium/index?stadium=mlb_2790 (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009) (page providing information about Rogers Centre and its environs).
97
See ISC: A Motorsports Entertainment Co., http://ir.iscmotorsports.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=113983&p=irol-facilities (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
98
See Online Seats.com, http://www.onlineseats.com/venue/wachovia-center.htm (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009). Comcast also owned the famous Philadelphia Spectrum, which
was recently demolished.
99
See Wachovia Center, http://www.wachoviacenter.com/events/calendar_calendar
View.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
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University (capacity of 9,500). 100 The Rose Quarter is home to the Rose Garden,
which seats over 20,000 fans for basketball, and is home to the Portland
Trailblazers and Portland Winterhawks. The venue also hosts numerous concerts
and other events, including, in 2009 alone: The Jonas Brothers, Keith Urban, Bob
Dylan, Earth Wind and Fire, Killers, Miley Cyrus, Billy Joel and Elton John, the
Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus, religious figure Joel Osteen,
Disney on Ice, and “So You Think You Can Dance,” among others. 101
9. In 2005 Major League Baseball (“MLB”) purchased Tickets.com, then an
independent distributor of tickets. Tickets.com now powers the distribution of
tickets for several major league baseball teams and continues to distribute tickets
for numerous other sports and entertainment venues that outsource their ticket
distribution. The firm also offers its technology to venues that wish to distribute
their tickets in house. 102
10. More than fifty minor league baseball teams rely upon TicketReturn to power
their self-distribution of tickets. 103 These teams include the Durham Bulls, Akron
Racers, Kansas City T-Bones, Lexington Legends, Toledo Mudhens, Memphis
Redbirds, Charlotte Knights, and San Jose Giants. Numerous colleges and
universities also rely upon TicketReturn to support their ticket distribution,
including Appalachian State University, Western Carolina University, Liberty
University, Christopher Newport University, the University of San Francisco, and
William and Mary. 104 Several larger institutions employ a TicketReturn platform
to power their student ticketing operations, including the University of Maryland,
University of South Carolina, Georgia Tech, North Carolina State, and West
Virginia University. Like Veritix, Front Gate, AudienceView and others,
TicketReturn offers a wide variety of support to venues it serves, including the
ability to gather and synthesize data about individual fans and their entertainment
preferences. 105
100

See New Era Ticketing, http://www.neweratickets.com/our-clients/our-clients/clientlist/ (last visited Sept.9, 2009); http://www.rosequarter.com/Home/BoxOffice
/tabid/56/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2009); Rose Quarter,
http://www.rosequarter.com/Home/BoxOffice/tabid/56/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9,
2009). The Rose Quarter also lists fifty-six retail ticket outlets, most of them at Safeway
Supermarkets in the Portland area. See id. at
www.rosequarter.com/Home/TicketOutlets/tabid/58/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9,
2009). Although the Constant Center advertises that it is powered by “CoxTix,” the
website indicates that it is “Powered by Paciolan and New Era Tickets.”
101
See id. at http://www.rosequarter.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
102
See http://provenue.tickets.com/US/ticketing_solutions/index.shtml (discussing
“ProvenueMax, an in- house licensed ticketing system”).
103
See https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/customerspro.asp (listing the firm’s
Professional Sports clients).
104
See https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/customerscollege.asp.
105
TicketReturn’s Website claims:
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11. Over a decade ago the New York Metropolitan Opera developed and
launched its “Impresario” ticketing system de novo. 106 Shortly thereafter the Met
renamed the system “Tessitura” and formed a non-profit Limited Liability
Company to own the new ticketing platform and license the technology to
others. 107 By 2002, the LLC had evolved into a licensee-owned non-profit
corporation formed under Delaware law, with owner-licensees including the Met,
the Chicago Lyric Opera, the San Francisco Symphony, the Kennedy Center, the
Seattle and Santa Fe Operas and nineteen other licensees. Today the entity boasts
188 licensees and at least 80 sublicenses in the United States and five foreign
countries. The Tessitura system promises to provide “full no fee Internet
transactional capability for ticketing (including select your own seat)” as well as
support for “customer relationship management,” “fundraising, memberships,
sponsorships and contributions,” and “flexible reporting, executive information
and analysis tools.” 108 Although a “not for profit” enterprise, the firm apparently
considers itself a rival to commercial ticketing firms, as its Website includes a
chart comparing Tessitura’s attributes and capabilities to those of for-profit
technology firms. 109 Indeed, just recently, the firm won a significant client, the
Tennessee Performing Arts Center, from Ticketmaster, which had distributed
tickets for the Center for 29 years.110
12. Bloomberg.com recently reported that AEG, like Live Nation before it, is
exploring alternatives to Ticketmaster. The report indicates that AEG is
considering both distributors, such as Veritix and Tickets.com, as well as selfdistribution strategies. One industry analyst said of AEG’s move that AEG has
“the ability to instantly become a viable competitor” in the market for ticket
distribution services. 111
TicketReturn’s exclusive barcoding and Fanticket management systems put you
in touch with customers and their ticket usage habits. Sell and deliver print at
home e-tickets online; Target no-shows; Automate the return of unused seats;
Reward your most loyal fans; E-mail customers based on attendance history;
Develop qualified sales leads from pass-along ticket users; Automate attendance
counts with real time admission reporting; Eliminate audits of paper ticket stubs;
Track ticket ownership changes online; Create ticket usage profiles for every
customer.
See https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/customers.html.
106
See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/About/Timeline.aspx (providing a timeline of
the development and widespread adoption of the Tessitura ticketing platform).
107
See id.
108
See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/Products/Software.aspx.
109
See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/en/Products/~/media/Public Site/Tessitura
Software Industry Comparison_2008.ashx.
110
See TPAC Dumps Ticketmaster After 29 Years, NASHVILLE BUS. J., July 1, 2009,
available at: http://nashville.bizjournals.com/nashville/stories/2009/06/29/daily23.html.
111
Ticketmaster Client AEG Said to Explore new Partner, Bloomberg.com, Nov. 2, 2009.
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These various examples—and there are more—demonstrate, at a minimum, the
technological and commercial feasibility of a venue, whether large or more modest, to
vertically integrate into the self-provision of ticket distribution services. 112 Indeed, the
trend toward such integration strongly suggests that combining previously separate
functions produces efficiencies not realizable through market contracting. 113 Nor is
there any reason to believe that these examples are idiosyncratic or that the capacity for
such integration in the future is somehow limited. 114 The necessary technology for such
integration is more available now than just a few years ago, when a federal court—in the
course of rejecting an antitrust suit against Ticketmaster—all but predicted that selfdistribution would take on increased significance in the near future and discipline any
possible exercise of market power by firms like Ticketmaster. 115 We would expect this
trend to accelerate as more ticket distribution contracts expire over the next few years.
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See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,013, at
96,241 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (explaining that numerous colleges and universities rely upon
self-distribution).
113
See infra Part IV.3.
114
See generally SunGard, 172 F. Supp. at 190-91 (asking whether customers who
would switch in response to a hypothetical price increase were truly representative of the
customer population as a whole); Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 48-50 (holding that
vertical integration would not defeat a hypothetical price increase because most of the
hypothetical monopolist’s customers did not have the capacity to integrate in this
fashion); FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 37, vacated as moot, 850 F.2d
694 (D.D.C 1988) (fact that a trivial number of customers would not respond to SSNPI
did not establish relevant product market where numerous more representative customers
would).
115
It should be noted in this connection that contracts between software providers and
venues are generally non-exclusive, i.e., do not preclude the licensor from licensing the
same ticket distribution platform to other venues or, for that matter, preclude the venue
from employing that platform to distribute tickets to events at other venues. For instance,
New Era Tickets, a subsidiary of Comcast, both relies upon Paciolan technology to
distribute tickets for events at Comcast-owned venues and, in addition, licenses the same
technology to unrelated venues to facilitate their self-distribution. In any event, for the
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Indeed, the line between “outsourced” distribution, by agents such as
Ticketmaster, on the one hand, and “self distribution” supported and enabled by
independent technology providers, on the other, is by no means bright. For instance,
many venues that “outsource” ticket distribution to Ticketmaster or one of its rivals retain
the right and ability to distribute some tickets themselves, often from the box office
and/or to season ticket holders. At the same time, many venues purportedly engaged in
self-distribution nonetheless still outsource key aspects of the distribution function to
third parties, including technology providers themselves. 116 In truth, numerous firms —
Ticketmaster, Tickets.com, Veritix, AudienceView, and others—offer each venue a
cafeteria-style menu of distribution options and related services, and each venue selects
the particular bundle that suits its needs at the time of contracting, a bundle that may be
adjusted as a venue’s needs and/or capabilities evolve. Moreover, all such firms also
offer software options that empower venues—whether engaged in outsourcing or selfdistribution—to gather and synthesize data for the purpose of better understanding the
characteristics of fans and the preferences for entertainment and ancillary services.
Importantly, whether a firm offers to distribute tickets as a venue’s agent, as
Ticketmaster does, or instead enable a venue to distribute tickets itself, both services
achieve the same functions of distributing tickets to fans and collecting and managing
related information. It is therefore not surprising that firms that enable self-distribution
purpose of market definition, we assume, as do the Guidelines, that self-distribution is
infinitely available at current (per-merger) prices. See Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.11, n.
9.
116
For instance, firms such as Veritix that focus on facilitating self-distribution also
provide server capacity for venues that choose not to own and operate such capacity
themselves. Such firms may also provide or recommend equipment that scans barcoded
tickets, for instance, as well as assistance processing credit card transactions. See
https://www.ticketreturn.com/prod2/faq.html.
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effectively bid against firms like Ticketmaster when a distribution contract has expired
and a venue is tempted to forgo outsourcing in favor of self-distribution. 117 The overlap
and real world rivalry between the services provided by “firms that enable self
distribution,” on the one hand, and those that provide “outsourced ticket distribution
services,” on the other, itself militates in favor of a finding that both firms occupy the
same product market. 118
To be sure, it is unlikely that all venues would pursue self-distribution strategies
in response to a SSNIP by a hypothetical monopolist of outsourced ticket distribution
services. Nonetheless, the successful vertical integration by such a wide variety of
venues—large, small, and medium, sports, musical and mixed use, profit and not-forprofit—suggests that the option is in fact a realistic one for most if not all of those venues
that still outsource the distribution of most or all of their tickets. Moreover, we are not
aware of any particular types or categories of venue for which such integration would be
especially difficult or costly, thereby exposing such venues to selective price increases by
a hypothetical monopolist. 119 As a result, substitution by a even a modest number of
venues would render a small but significant price increase unprofitable, thereby
protecting any venues that may be less price sensitive. 120
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See Ticketmaster, 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (finding that “virtually all long term
contracts are awarded after some form of bidding competition” and that firms that
support and enable self-distribution are a “viable option” to firms like Ticketmaster that
distribute tickets for firms that choose to outsource this task).
118
Id. at 96,241-42.
119
Cf. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 36-49 (finding that prospect of selfdistribution by large drug store chains would not protect small “Mom and Pop” chains
from a hypothesized price increase).
120
See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is
possible for only a few customers who switch to alternatives to make the price increase
unprofitable. . . .”); SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (finding broader market even
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Equally important, antitrust principles and legal authority readily support the
treatment of such integration as a close substitute for outsourced ticket distribution
services. More than two decades ago, a leading jurist explained that “vertical integration
is a universal feature of economic life,” and that firms frequently take on the task of
distributing their own product to displace an inefficient supplier or threaten to do so as a
means of holding down the cost of outsourced inputs. 121 When it comes to market
definition itself, various courts have recognized that “captive production” resulting from
vertical integration can be a close substitute for outsourced production and might thereby
prevent independent producers from exercising market power. 122
Therefore, a properly defined market for “ticket distribution services” must
include not only outsourced ticket distribution services, such as those provided by
Ticketmaster and similar firms, but also distribution services that venues could provide

though “the demand of some customers [for the product identified by the government] is
inelastic”).
121
See generally Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir.
1984) (Posner, J.) (“A common type of vertical integration is for a manufacturer to take
over the distribution of his product.… [T]he option of vertical integration places
competitive pressure on the firm’s suppliers and buyers, who know that if they charge too
much for their services the firm may decide to perform them itself.”). Cf. R.H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 381 (1932).
122
Grumman Corp., 665 F.2d at 13-14 (holding that potential captive production of
aircraft subassemblies by Boeing and McDonald Douglas would properly be included in
relevant product market if such manufacturers would in fact bring such work in-house in
response to significant price increases by subcontractors); SunGard., at 172 (asking
whether customers who would switch in response to a hypothetical price increase were
truly representative of the customer population as a whole); Cardinal Health, 12 Supp. 2d
at 48 (declining to include potential captive production in the relevant market because
most customers would not, in fact, view such vertical integration as a plausible substitute
for their current practice of purchasing supplies directly from wholesalers). See also
Geraldine Alpert & Howard P. Kitt, Is Structure All?, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 255, 266-67
(1984) (contending that “do-it-yourself” or “make or buy” options are often plausible
substitutes for purchase of putative product on the open market and thus can be properly
included in the relevant market).
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for themselves by licensing or purchasing technology from firms that support such
distribution. 123 Given the current dynamic and rapidly evolving technological landscape,
including the ready availability of licensing technology and other support for such
vertical integration, one might therefore conclude that it would be difficult for any
hypothetical monopolist of outsourced ticket distribution services for any category of
venues or promoters to profitably maintain a significant, non-transitory price increase.
Unlike some industries, the ticket distribution industry is not characterized by network
effects that could entrench or protect a dominant firm in the face of vertical integration by
venues. Nor are we aware of any plausible exclusionary practices that could hamper
competitive challenges to incumbents. 124 Perhaps, then, the market is simply not
“monopolizeable,” and our inquiry need not proceed to the calculation of market
shares. 125 We nonetheless proceed with the complete horizontal analysis.
Identification of Market Participants and Calculation of Market Shares
Following the definition of the relevant market, a challenger to a merger must also
establish which firms participate in that relevant market and the relative market shares of
such firms. 126 Obviously firms such as Ticketmaster, Etix.com, Tickets.com, Frontgate,
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Testimony of Luke Froeb before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Competition
Policy, 5-6 (February 26, 2009) (treating firms such as Veritix and AudienceView as
participants in the same product market as Ticketmaster).
124
See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (explaining why exclusive
arrangements between venues and ticket providers are not plausible methods of raising
rivals’ costs and entrenching monopoly).
125
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 82-84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(per curiam) (ease of entry into browser market suggests the market is not
monopolizeable and supracompetitive pricing is not possible, even for a provider with an
extremely large market share). Cf. United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 510511 (1974) (declining to entertain government’s appeal of district court’s product market
definition because government’s case would fail under any such definition).
126
See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 1.3.
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Metrotix.com, TicketWeb.com, and Tele-charge, participate in the market as defined
because they each distribute tickets on behalf of venues that host large events and
outsource ticket distribution. 127 It is also clear that any venues that contract with other
venues to provide ticket distribution services also participate in the market. For example,
should Live Nation’s own ticket distribution operation service the ticketing needs of
venues managed by SMG, it would clearly be a market participant because it would be
providing ticket distribution services for venues that chose to outsource such distribution.
The more difficult market share determinations involve assessing the extent of selfticketing before the transaction, the dynamic responses to price changes by venues that
have already vertically integrated into ticket distribution, as well as the potential growth
of additional self-ticketing in the near future. 128
It is useful at the outset to distinguish between two categories of vertical
integration: (1) integration that has already occurred before the transaction that is under
review, such as the numerous examples listed above, and (2) integration that might
potentially take place after such a transaction. Ironically, venues that engaged in selfdistribution before this transaction, including those owned or operated by Live Nation,
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Some of these firms, of course, also distribute tickets for venues they own or control,
but this fact does not militate against their inclusion in the market for ticket distribution
services to the extent that they do, in fact, perform this function.
128
We pause here to note that our conclusions regarding market definition, the
identification of participants in the relevant market, and the (unlikely) prospect of
coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive effects do not turn on any determination that
technology companies that support self-distribution are properly treated as market
participants within the taxonomy employed by current merger law. Whether or not such
firms are technically “in” the relevant product market, they certainly provide inputs that
facilitate and encourage venues’ self-distribution of tickets, and such self-distribution
appears to be a reasonable substitute for outsourced ticket distribution services.
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are arguably less likely to be meaningful participants in the relevant market than those
venues that might so integrate in the future.
As the enforcement agencies have themselves emphasized, internal or captive
production should be included in the relevant market only to the extent that it is
economically meaningful, that is, could alter the competitive dynamics of the market in
response to collusive behavior or a monopolistic exercise of market power. 129 Moreover,
merger law has long recognized that a firm’s nominal output of a product does not by
itself establish the magnitude of the firm’s competitive significance. For instance, where,
before a merger, a firm’s future output is committed to particular customers by contract,
removal of that firm from the marketplace has no competitive significance, and a merger
of that firm with another does not, in fact, reduce competition, regardless of the nominal
level of concentration that results. 130
Here “captive production” generally consists of a venue’s distribution of tickets to
its own events, or a promoter’s distribution of tickets to events at venues it owns or
operates. It is not obvious how venues or promoters could divert such production to a
129

See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, §1.31 (vertically-integrated firms will be included
as participants in relevant market “to the extent that such inclusion accurately reflects
their competitive significance in the relevant market before the merger”); Brief for the
Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Cardinal Health, Nos. 98-595 & 98-596, at 14-15
(same). See also 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 2.23 (asking whether
vertically integrated firms would shift internal production to relevant market or
participate via downstream competition in response to a small but significant nontransitory price increase). The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines supersede the
corresponding portions of the 1984 Guidelines. Nonetheless, we believe that § 2.23 of
the 1984 Guidelines states the appropriate methodology for determining whether in fact
captive production is properly considered part of the relevant market. Indeed, the 1992
Joint Merger Guidelines employ such an analysis to identify firms outside the relevant
market that may “participate through supply responses.” See 1992 Joint Merger
Guidelines § 1.32.
130
See Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 501-510; Ball Mem’l Hosp. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins. Co.,
784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining rationale of Gen. Dynamics).
46

properly defined distribution market in response to a hypothesized price increase (the
Houston Rockets, for instance, will not suspend their home games so the Houston Toyota
Center can somehow divert its self-distribution of tickets to the open market!). 131 Thus,
because the pre-merger captive production of ticket distribution services is reserved by
definition for venues themselves, such production does not have the same competitive
significance as services available for purchase by venues that choose to outsource. Live
Nation, of course, is one firm with significant “captive production” of ticket distribution
services, given that it distributes tickets for events at the numerous venues it owns or
operates as well as events it promotes at independent venues. Indeed, many of the data
purporting to show that Live Nation is a significant participant in the ticketing
distribution market in fact refer to such captive production for internal use by venues the
firm owns or manages. 132 Because such production is not available in any economically
meaningful sense to third-party venues that seek to outsource the distribution of their
tickets, it is unlikely to significantly affect the relevant market and thus is not a
meaningful substitute for venues that outsource their ticket distribution. 133
Vertically integrated firms could, however, participate in the relevant market if
they would respond to a price increase imposed by a hypothetical monopolist of
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By contrast, one can certainly imagine, say, a vertically-integrated power company
that relies on plants fueled by natural gas and coal reducing its reliance on gas and
diverting such gas into the “spot” market in response to a significant price increase in that
market.
132
See Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (asserting that Live Nation “start[ed] a ticketing
business to compete with Ticketmaster (and as a result sold 5.8 million tickets in the first
four months of 2009). If the merger occurs, this direct competition will be lost.”).
133
Cf. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486.
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outsourced ticket distribution services. 134 For instance, such firms could expand the
scope of their distribution activities beyond their own venues, taking on the task of
distributing tickets for other venues as well. 135 Such firms could also expand their own
downstream output of entertainment services, which would necessarily entail increased
production of inputs to such services, including ticket distribution. 136
If vertically integrated firms respond to a hypothetical price increase in one or
both of these ways, then it would be appropriate to attribute such incremental, expanded
output to the relevant market for the purpose of determining overall market
concentration. However, such a finding might still not justify attributing a firm’s captive
production to that market due to that firm’s inability to “sell” its self-distribution to a
venue that outsources it ticket distribution. Although either of these responses is
possible, we think they are unlikely for any given venue in light of what appears to be the
motivation behind the vertical integration that has already occurred. As explained
previously, such integration appears to be an effort by promoters, venues, and artists to
capture efficiencies from marketing live entertainment directly to fans, by, for instance,
facilitating the production and synthesis of information about fans’ entertainment
134

See SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 186, n.14, quoting P. AREEDA, IIA ANTITRUST LAW,
¶ 535e (1995) (citing 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, § 1.31); 1984 Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines, §2.23 (“Captive production and consumption of the relevant product
by vertically integrated firms are part of the overall market supply and demand. Such
firms may respond to an increase in the price of the relevant product in one of two ways.
They may begin selling the relevant product [i.e., in the open market], or alternatively,
they may continue to consume all of their production but increase their production of
both the relevant product and products in which the relevant product is embodied. Either
kind of supply response could frustrate collusion by firms currently selling the relevant
product.”).
135
See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 2.23.
136
See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines,§ 2.23. See generally 1992 Joint
Merger Guidelines, § 1.11 (treating presence of downstream competition as a factor that
can defeat a hypothetical price increase).
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preferences. It does not appear to be an independent effort to profit from ticket
distribution in the same way that Ticketmaster or Tickets.com seek to profit from such
distribution. While there may be vertically integrated firms that, like Live Nation, have
endeavored to provide ticket distribution services for venues to which they are not
otherwise related, these firms appear to be the exception rather than the rule. It seems
similarly unlikely that venues would increase their output of live entertainment if the cost
of ticket distribution changes, especially because artists, more than venues or promoters,
are the primary drivers of output.
More significant is whether venues that currently outsource their ticket
distribution services would respond to a small but significant price increase by vertically
integrating and taking on the task of distributing tickets themselves, thereby meriting
treatment as participants in the relevant market. 137 This is a difficult determination to
make for any particular venue, especially because the trend towards vertical integration
appears to be accelerating independent of any hypothesized price increase (and, in fact, in
the face of reportedly steadily declining prices).138 We can, however, identify with
certainty the many firms that supply the technology and other inputs necessary to
vertically integrate in this manner, such as Veritix, AudienceView, Front Gate, Showare,
TicketReturn, Tessitura, and Tickets.com (Paciolan would otherwise belong in this list
137

See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, § 1.31. See also SunGard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 187
(“[W]hat is significant is not whether the companies that currently use internal solutions
have the capacity to enter the market as vendors for others, but whether the customers
that currently use [outsourced] hotsites would switch to an internal hotsite [i.e., vertically
integrate] in response to a SSNIP.”). Some may argue that such firms are better
characterized as “firms that participate through supply responses.” See 1992 Joint
Merger Guidelines, §§ 1.31, 1.321 & 1.322.
138
Alpert & Kitt, supra note 122, at 266-67 (noting difficulty of calculating market
concentration where “do-it-yourself” production is a meaningful substitute for purchasing
input on the open market).
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but is now owned by Ticketmaster). These firms could be included as participants in the
relevant product market as proxies for anticipated increases in vertical integration and
assign them market shares accordingly. Here again the central question is whether the
actual or potential captive production would be forthcoming in response to a
hypothesized price increase. 139 As widespread as vertical integration has become, and as
likely as it is to spread, it is difficult to determine the exact degree of additional postmerger vertical integration with any certainty.
Within these parameters, a current market share calculation—whether it includes
all or part or none of Live Nation’s captive production, whether it includes New Era’s
growth outside Comcast venues, etc.—would indicate that Ticketmaster has a market
share far larger than its rivals. There is no doubt that Ticketmaster has been hands-down
the industry leader, and historical measures of sales of ticket distribution services—or,
more precisely, the quantity of tickets distributed—have been used by opponents of the
proposed merger to assert that Ticketmaster dominates the relevant market. 140 But
arguably such data do not accurately reflect the underlying competitive and economic
realities in the industry. Both courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies have
repeatedly stated that reliance upon historical unit sales is merely one of several methods
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See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 2.23 (asking whether vertically
integrated firms would shift internal production to relevant market or participate via
downstream competition in response to a small but significant non-transitory price
increase). See also 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.32 (articulating similar test for
identifying “firms that participate [in the relevant market] through supply responses”).
140
See supra note 28 with TicketNews scores and other data sources approximating
market shares.
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of determining firms’ respective shares of the relevant market and may, in fact, result in a
misleading assessment of the competitive consequences of a transaction. 141
To begin with, historical sales ignore venues’ ability to switch to self-distribution.
Moreover, because the marginal costs of licensing Internet ticket distribution software (a
non-rival good) is obviously low, participants’ capacity and not their historical sales
provides a more accurate estimate of overall market concentration. Perhaps most
important, the competitive bidding process that venues use to solicit competition
following the expiration of distribution contracts creates moments of focused competition
that dull any advantages of incumbency or historical market share. In circumstances such
as these, in which all market participants have equal access to buyers, the merger
guidelines adopted by the antitrust enforcement agencies abjure reliance on historical
market shares and instead rely upon the capacity of individual firms to provide the
service in question as the appropriate market shares. 142 These Guidelines expressly
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Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.521 ("[R]ecent or ongoing changes in the market may
indicate that the current market share of a particular firm either understates or overstates
the firm's future competitive significance. . . . The Agency will consider reasonably
predictable effects of recent or ongoing changes in market conditions in interpreting
[historical] market concentration and market share data. "); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962) ("Statistics reflecting the shares of the market
controlled by the industry leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course, the primary
index of market power; but only a further examination of the particular market – its
structure, history and probable future – can provide the appropriate setting for judging the
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."); FTC v. Bass Bros., 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16122, *19 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 1984) (identifying "productive capacity" as "the
appropriate statistical basis for measurement of future industry competitive
performance"); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 128 (D.D.C. 2004)
(identifying reserves, loadout capacity, and production and practical capacity "all
informative to some degree, yet . . . imperfect" indicators of future ability to compete,"
and therefore, considering all measures together)..
142
See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, § 1.41 (“Calculating Market Shares: General
Approach”); id. (“Physical capacity or reserves generally will be used [to measure
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provide that, “[w]here all firms have, on a forward-looking basis, an equal likelihood of
securing sales, the Agency will assign firms equal shares.” 143 The Department of Justice
has even gone so far as to argue—successfully—that the presence of three bidders
suffices to ensure sufficient competition for the right to publish a state’s official legal
reports. 144 Firms such as Tickets.com can bid head to head with Ticketmaster to provide
outsourced ticket distribution services, 145 and at the same time, firms such as Veritix,
AudienceView, Frontgate, Tessitura, TicketReturn, and others can bid for the right to
provide technology that enables a venue to forgo outsourcing in favor of self-distribution.
As a result, a capacity-based approach in this context would result in an HHI much lower
than that derived from historical market shares, regardless of the number of venues that
would, in fact, vertically integrate into ticket distribution shortly after consummation of
this transaction.
Consequently, the identification of market participants and market shares brings
the inquiry back to the original question of how easily a venue can acquire the Internet
technology required to self-distribute tickets. Developments in the industry suggest that
vertical integration is becoming both increasingly inexpensive and otherwise desirable,
such that venues could counteract any monopoly pricing by pursuing such a strategy.
Ultimately, assessing the practicability of vertical integration is necessary both to
concentration] if it is these measures that most effectively distinguish firms.”). See also
United States v. Thomson Corp., 949 F. Supp. 907, 919 (D.D.C. 1996).
143
See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines, § 1.41 (“Calculating Market Shares: General
Approach”), n. 15.
144
See The Thomson Corp., 949 F. Supp. 907, 919 (approving consent decree that did
not order divestiture of publishing contracts for the state of Washington because presence
of two other publishers capable of bidding for the right to publish Washington official
reports would, as the government argued, “ensure vigorous competition in Washington”).
145
See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2003-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,013, at 96,240-41
(C.D. Cal.2003).
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properly define the market and to arrive at meaningful measures of market concentration
and power.
Potential Adverse Effects
Both courts and the enforcement agencies have repeatedly stated that calculation
of market shares and resulting concentration ratios is simply a “starting point” in
determining whether a merger will likely result in anticompetitive consequences. 146 The
enforcement agencies in particular have recently cautioned against “undue emphasis on
market share and concentration statistics” as opposed to application of merger analysis
“as an integrated whole to case-specific facts.” 147 That integrated approach, enshrined in
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and employed by both courts and the enforcement
agencies, involves investigating and assessing the risk of two particular potential postmerger harms: “coordinated interaction,” whereby remaining participants in the industry
“pursue parallel policies of mutual advantage,” 148 and “unilateral effects,” whereby the
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See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.0 (“Other things being equal, market concentration
affects the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of firms, could successfully exercise
market power. . . . However, market share and concentration data provide only the
starting point for analyzing the competitive impact of a merger.”); Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on Joint Merger Guidelines, at 15-16 (“The
agencies have often not challenged mergers involving market shares and concentration
that fall outside the [safe harbors] set forth in Guidelines § 1.51. This does not mean the
[concentration thresholds] are not meaningful, but rather that market shares and
concentration are but a ‘starting point’ and that many mergers falling outside these
concentration zones [i.e., in concentrated markets] nevertheless, upon full consideration
of the factual and economic evidence, are found unlikely substantially to lessen
competition. Application of the Guidelines as an integrated whole to case-specific
facts—not undue emphasis on market share and concentration statistics—determines
whether the Agency will challenge a particular merger.”).
147
See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on Joint
Merger Guidelines, at 15-16.
148
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964); FTC v. Heinz
Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Merger law ‘rests upon the theory that, where
rivals are few, firms will be able to coordinate their behavior, either by overt collusion or
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firm created by the merger itself exercises market power after the transaction, without
regard to the reaction of other participants in the marketplace. 149
We assume for the sake of argument a relevant market of “Ticket Distribution
Services for Large Venues” and also assume that, regardless of which participants are
included in that market, Ticketmaster has a substantial market share based on historical
sales as a clear market leader and, moreover, that the market would be characterized as
moderately or highly concentrated. We might proceed with the additional assumption,
again for the sake of argument, that Live Nation is a bona fide market participant (and
not, as we think more likely, far better viewed as an integrated producer with committed
output) and that Live Nation’s output is significant enough that a merger with
Ticketmaster would increase market concentration enough to raise a presumption under
the Merger Guidelines that the merger would facilitate the exercise of market power. 150
Even if one were to make these various assumptions, the structure of the market for ticket
distribution services and the nature of the rivalry that takes place within it make it
unlikely that the merger will facilitate either coordinated interaction or unilateral actions
that create market power to the detriment of purchasers.

implicit understanding, in order to restrict output and achieve profits above competitive
levels.’") quoting FTC v. PPG Indus., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Joint
Merger Guidelines, § 2.1 (describing theory of coordinated interaction).
149
See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.2.
150
See Joint Merger Guidelines § 1.51 (b) (mergers that increase HHI less than 100
points in moderately concentrated market “are unlikely to have adverse competitive
consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis”); id. at 151(c) (mergers that
increase HHI less than 50 points in highly concentrated market “are unlikely to have
adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis”).
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We are of course aware that some opponents to the transaction have claimed that
the combination of Live Nation and Ticketmaster is effectively a merger to monopoly. 151
Such arguments, however, ignore the availability of vertical integration and selfdistribution as substitutes for outsourced distribution, and thus narrowly focus on a
segment of the market—outsourced distribution of ticketing services simpliciter—that is
not economically meaningful for antitrust analysis. A more appropriate definition of the
market, which recognizes and incorporates the potential for vertical integration and selfdistribution, offers strong counterarguments to the claim that the proposed transaction
will produce market power. With this in mind, and recognizing that numerous
independent firms provide and support ticket distribution services, we follow the template
of the Merger Guidelines and turn first to examine whether the transaction will lead to
“coordinated interaction” in the market as we believe courts would likely define it.
1. Coordinated Interaction
To be successful, coordinated interaction requires participants in a collusive
scheme, at a minimum, to reach a mutual understanding regarding the price and output to
which parties to the understanding will purportedly adhere. Such an understanding is
easiest when the product or service provided by the parties is homogeneous and sold at a
standard price that is visible and known to all parties. Under these circumstances,
participants in such an arrangement can readily agree on price terms and monitor each
other’s compliance with the scheme. Where, by contrast, products or services are not
151

See, e.g., The Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger: What Does it Mean for Consumers
and the Future of the Concert Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
3 (2009), available at: http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm
?id=3674&wit_id=7624 [hereinafter Balto Testimony] (written testimony of David
Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action Fund).
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homogenous, and where price and related terms are not observable, reaching (and
enforcing) such an understanding becomes much more difficult. 152
As was noted above, providers of ticket distribution services vary widely and
include traditional distribution companies, such as Ticketmaster and Tickets.com, venues
that currently engage in self-distribution and also offer distribution services to other
venues, an unknown but substantial number of venues that could, with assistance from
sophisticated technology companies, establish their own system of distribution, and firms
that have already vertically integrated whose captive output may perhaps influence the
market even if not technically included within it. 153 Perhaps more significant, the venues
that purchase ticket distribution services, including those vertically integrated firms that
“purchase” from themselves, exhibit a wide diversity of needs. Some venues, for
instance, require upgrades to their computers and software, which ticket distribution
companies might provide for free or at a discount. 154 Others might require training of
box office personnel and/or assistance in developing fan profiles and resulting targeted
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See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.11 (“reaching terms of coordination may be
facilitated by product or firm homogeneity”); International Competition Network Merger
Working Group, Report on Coordinated Effects Analysis Under International Merger
Regimes, ch.4 at 13 (2004) (reporting consensus among enforcement agencies of various
nations, including the United States, that “[c]oordination is simplified when the level of
product differentiation is minimal. Markets characterized by relatively undifferentiated
products typically involve fewer terms of sale, making it easier for competitors to predict
the likely responses of their rivals.”).
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See 2006 DOJ And FTC Commentary on the Merger Guidelines, at 15 (noting that
the Agencies will consider the impact of rivalry from products that, while technically not
in the relevant marketplace, nonetheless still exercise some competitive influence on that
market).
154
See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,239-40 (reporting that, in some
cases, Ticketmaster provides venues with upfront cash payments to help pay for the
purchase and installation of new equipment).
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promotional strategies. 155 Accordingly, contracts between ticket distributors and venues,
for instance, are individually negotiated and presumably exhibit service expectations that
are particularized for each venue. 156 Moreover, these contracts are not public and
therefore not observable to rivals before other bids are placed, and vertically integrated
arrangements of course are completely hidden from view. 157
A market characterized by such heterogeneity and lack of disclosure is very
unfriendly to collusion. There is neither a single service nor a single price that can serve
as the focus and basis of a collusive agreement, and any meaningful details that underlie
the provision of that service are hidden from rivals’ view. Moreover, the process in
which competition plays out makes collusion additionally difficult. Large venues do not
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For instance, Kroenke Sports Enterprises recently announced it had selected Veritix's
patented Flash Seats technology to power Kroenke's TicketHorse primary ticketing
service, in part, because the Flash Seats technology allows teams and venues to "know
who is in each and every seat, making marketing and customer service far more focused
on the actual ticket holder." Press Release, Veritix, Kroenke Sports Enterprises Selects
Flash Seats as Exclusive Digital Ticketing Provider for Venues and Events (July 1,
2009), available at http://www.veritix.com/news/Kroenke_Flash_Seats_Release.pdf.
156
See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240 (explaining that such contracts
“are negotiated at arms length between the venue and [Ticketmaster] and do not follow a
standard form. There are no contracts of adhesion.”).
157
It should be noted that publicly-owned venues and public universities usually release
the results of a bidding process, but only after awarding the contract in question. Such ex
post disclosure of the terms of, say, a three to five year contract would not, in such a
dynamic industry, facilitate the actual or tacit negotiation of a collusive scheme. For
vertically integrated venues, it might even be impossible to specify the transfer price that
corresponds to the market price for distribution services. Moreover, comparing full
integration with self-distribution following the licensing of Internet technology is
difficult. This further illustrates the variation in how ticket distribution services are
provided and the difficulty of making meaningful comparisons. See generally Coase,
supra note 121, at 381 (equating complete vertical integration with “suppression of the
price mechanism” for allocating resources). See also Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.11
(“reaching terms of coordination may be facilitated by product or firm homogeneity”)
(emphasis added); (“Firms with similar capacity, similar cost structure, common aspects
of vertical integration, similar market share, or some combination of these factors are
more likely to coordinate.”).
57

simply purchase such services in small increments in a spot market but instead seek bids
for the long-term exclusive provision of such services from possible suppliers, comparing
the results of such bids to the cost of self-distribution enabled by providers of software
and expertise that support such vertical integration. 158 These conditions provide
purchasers with the requisite incentive to structure bidding processes in a manner that
protects themselves from collusive bids. The prospect of winning a bid for such a longterm arrangement may itself cause firms to deviate from putative terms of coordinated
interaction. 159 At the same time, the prevalence of long-term contracts that guarantee
firms a fixed amount of business may protect firms that do deviate from immediate
retaliation by firms seeking to enforce the tacit arrangement. 160

One federal court

concluded that such a bidding process, especially against the backdrop of the possibility
of vertical integration by venues themselves, “is a powerful deterrent” of the exercise of
market power by ticket distributors. 161 Other courts have also recognized that the
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See Ticketmaster Corp. 2003-1 Trade Cas., at 96,239-41 (elaborating on process of
bidding for venues’ ticket distribution business and noting that Tickets.com bid against
Ticketmaster on all 140 contracts that had become available between 1998 and the time
of the litigation). Michael Rapino, Live Nation’s CEO, testified that when it decided to
contract with an alternative to Ticketmaster, Live Nation “had a line-up of companies
around the world that wanted to be our ticketing company.” See Michael Rapino
Tesimony, supra note 67, at 36-37.
159
See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.12 (“Where large buyers likely would engage in
long term contracting, so that the sales covered by such contracts can be large relative to
the total output of a firm in the market, firms may have the incentive to deviate [from any
collusive agreement].”).
160
See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.12 (“Where detection or punishment [of deviation]
is likely to be slow, incentives to deviate are enhanced and coordinated interaction is
unlikely to be successful.”).
161
See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (“The bidding nature of the
competition is a powerful deterrent against the existence of monopoly power so long as
there are competitors to bid so as to give the customer an alternative.”); id. (citing cases
for the proposition that “the use of a bidding system is an indication of lack of power to
exclude competitors from the market”).
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existence of a bidding process can protect customers from the creation and exercise of
market power. 162 This result is consistent with economic theory, which suggests that
properly structured bidding among a small number of potential sellers can prevent an
exercise of market power, even in the face of a relatively concentrated marketplace. 163
2. Unilateral Effects
The enforcement guidelines employed by the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission articulate two scenarios under which a merger that does not lead to a
monopoly may nonetheless cause a unilateral exercise of market power, that is, market
power that the merged firm can profitably exploit without regard to reactions by
consumers and competitors. The first is a merger between firms that produce very close
substitutes, thereby empowering the new entity unilaterally to raise the price of one such
product. 164 The second is a merger in a market where the merged firm’s rivals do not
have sufficient capacity to promptly meet a rise in demand prompted by an increase in
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See Nat’l Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir.
1985) (no dangerous probability of obtaining a monopoly for court reporting services
where court adopted single vendor for such service after competitive bidding); Owens
Illinois, 681 F. Supp. at 48, vacated as moot, 850 F.2d 694 (explaining how customers
protected themselves from potential price increases by adopting a bidding process and
negotiating contracts requiring cost-justification for price increases); Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v.
PAC ORD, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168, 1171-72 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (no dangerous probability
of obtaining monopoly over government repair and maintenance contract where
defendant obtained such contract after competitive bidding which set a fixed price, and
any renewal of such agreement would require a new round of bidding).
163
See Mary Sullivan, The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm Mergers on the
Market for Audit Services, 45 J.L. & ECON. 375 (2002) (finding that two mergers by Big
Eight accounting firms did not injure purchasers of such services but instead produced
significant efficiencies).
164
See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.21.
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price or reduction in output by the new entity. 165 Neither scenario appears to be a
plausible result of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster transaction.
The first scenario is inapt because Live Nation and Ticketmaster do not appear to
offer substitutable services to a common set of purchasers. The majority of
Ticketmaster’s ticketing business consists of distributing tickets for venues that have
chosen to outsource their ticketing distribution, with the balance taking the form of
licensing technology to firms that choose to vertically integrate and engage in selfdistribution via the firm’s Paciolan subsidiary. By contrast, Live Nation primarily
distributes tickets on behalf of venues that it owns or operates. While Live Nation
appears to now offer ticketing services to some firms with whom it has no affiliation, we
are aware of no evidence that venues consider the Live Nation offering to be particularly
similar to that produced by Ticketmaster, especially when compared to the market’s other
offerings. This could be because Live Nation (unlike Ticketmaster and its other
competitors) might not yet tailor its services to meet the specific needs of the venues it
aims to service. Indeed, the paucity of contracts between Live Nation and unaffiliated
venues makes it particularly difficult to determine whether purchasers of ticketing
services view the services offered by the merging parties to be close substitutes.
Nor would a challenge based on rivals’ capacity limitations fare any better. For
one thing, such a challenge would depend upon proof negating the presence of product
differentiation within the ticketing industry. Moreover, even if one were to stipulate the
absence of product differentiation, this theory requires demonstrating that rivals cannot
promptly respond to supracompetitive prices. However, the spread of Internet
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See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 2.22.
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technologies, the non-rival nature of distribution software, and the industry’s practice of
soliciting bids for term contracts suggest that rival ticket distributors could quickly
replace any reduction in output. And more significantly, recent developments in the
industry suggest that venues would have little difficulty to vertically integrate and selfdistribute their own tickets. 166
Therefore, determining how the merged entity might unilaterally aim to capitalize
on market power raises the same question, oft-repeated in this document, of how easily
venues can acquire the requisite technology to self-distribute their tickets. If such selfdistribution alternatives are as inexpensive and attractive as recent market changes
indicate—and most venues have the capacity, by partnering with a technology partner
such as Veritix, AudienceView, Front Gate, or TicketReturn to assume ticket distribution
itself—then that would negate any opportunity for a distributor to exercise market
power. 167
One alarm raised by some critics of the merger is that even if the technology for
self-distribution is widely available, Ticketmaster “controls” the business of the nation’s
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See infra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining how bidding nature of ticket
distribution market undermines reliance upon historical market shares as indicators of
market concentration).
167
Even some critics of the merger concede that the technology required for selfdistribution is easily acquired and available from many market participants. See e.g,
Robert W. Doyle, Jr., Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy (Feb. 26, 2009)
(stating that “[s]ome venue will explain that they have been able to set up their own
systems. The venue operators that have been successful in setting up their own system
did so by licensing software, hiring telephone operators, and opening a local box office . .
.”). To be sure, Mr. Doyle also suggested that self-ticketing is only likely when a venue
sells a large number of tickets, such as when a firm controls more than one venue or more
than one sports team. See id. at 16. Nonetheless, we have identified numerous venues
with relatively modest sales that currently distribute their own tickets. See supra notes
90, 100, 106 and accompanying text.
61

largest venues with exclusive, long-term contracts. 168 Ticketmaster’s merger with Live
Nation, these critics fear, would further enshrine Ticketmaster’s current market position.
If rivals and potential entrants are unable to challenge Ticketmaster’s industry leadership,
then these exclusive contracts could endow the merged firm with anticompetitive market
power.
Although exclusive contracts appear to be commonly employed throughout the
ticketing services industry, and venues in exclusive contracts are bound to particular
distributors by contracts of varying lengths, it is easy to overestimate the impact of such
contracts on the future market shares of market participants. 169 Where venues are bound
by express contracts, the terms of such agreements are generally for more than three and
are for an average of six years, with the result that hundreds of such agreements with
large venues (approximately 20 percent) expire each year. 170 Before the expiration of
such agreements, the venue typically invites proposals from several different ticketing
service and technology providers, initiating a competitive bargaining process for a new
contract. When Live Nation, for example, decided to seek an alternative to Ticketmaster,
it entertained a competitive bidding process and found many suitors with attractive
proposals before settling on vertical integration employing technology supplied by
CTS. 171 AEG is now reportedly holding a similar bidding process in anticipation of the
expiration of its contract with Ticketmaster. This competitive bidding process is pitting
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Balto Testimony, supra note 151.
Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Raising Rivals Costs:
Anticompetitive Exclusion to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 267 (1986)
(“Certainly in most industries exclusionary rights contracts cannot be profitably
employed for anticompetitive ends.”).
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See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶74,013, at
96,240-41 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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Michael Rapino Testimony, supra note 158, at 36-37.
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distributors both against each other and also against AEG’s alternative vertical
integration strategies. 172
Indeed, over the past three years, Ticketmaster has itself lost several bidding
contests upon the expiration of contracts with large venues and several others with
smaller venues. For instance, Veritix recently announced that it will take over all
ticketing operations for Salt Lake City’s EnergySolutions Arena, home of the Utah Jazz
and until now a Ticketmaster client.173 Ticketmaster loses many such contests to the
venue itself, which chooses to take on the task of distributing its own tickets instead of
renewing its distribution contract with Ticketmaster. Because Ticketmaster’s exclusive
agreements with venues expire on a regular basis, the nation’s ticket distribution business
is subject to a regular and ongoing competitive process, with some reports indicating that
perhaps all such business will be available for bidding at some point over the next six
years. Because there are no apparent scale economies that would cause a large market
share to reduce the costs of ticket distribution, nor would any other externalities give
advantages to incumbents with large market shares, there is no reason to believe that
Ticketmaster has an undue advantage in that bidding process over rival bidders.
Consequently, there is little reason to conclude that the exclusivity that is typical to ticket
distribution agreements would enshrine or facilitate any meaningful market power.
Perhaps more significant, and as is discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, the
exclusivity of such agreements often have procompetitive purposes and effects, and
antitrust scholars, enforcement officials, and courts have historically overestimated the
172

Bloomberg.com, supra note 111.
See Veritix Signs Exclusive Ticketing Contract for Utah Jazz, EnergySolutions
Arena, TicketNews (Sept. 9, 2009), available at: http://www.ticketnews.com/Veritixsigns-exclusive-ticketing-contract-for-Utah-Jazz-EnergySolutions-Arena9929188
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prospect that such agreements would produce competitive harm. One reason that recent
scholars and policymakers have applied less scrutiny to such vertical exclusive
arrangements is that they have easily recognizable efficiency explanations, such as, for
instance, encouraging investment in and financing of improvements to the venue.
Moreover, a court expressly ruled on specific efficiencies and mutual benefits stemming
from exclusive agreements used by ticket distributors, which also enable desirable
features such as “best seat available” searches and coordination of multiple marketing
efforts. 174 Any apparent “exclusionary” impact, then, is likely to be incidental to the
creation of economic benefits.
Entry
Even if the proposed transaction were found to enhance market concentration and
pose a plausible risk of anticompetitive harm, the prospect of new entry could deter and
defeat any efforts by incumbent firms to exercise market power. 175 The entry analysis
would turn on many of the same industry-wide conditions and trends that have been
central to our analysis to this point. Our market definition section squarely asked
whether technology companies and other forms of technological progress would enable
venues to self-distribute and thus become part of the relevant market. Our market
participants section asked a similar question when determining whether venues that
currently outsource ticket distribution might become market participants in the face of
supracompetitive prices. And our examination of the proposed merger’s unilateral effects
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Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,013, at
96,241 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
175
See United States v. Waste Mgmt., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that prospect
of new entry rebutted government’s prima facie case that merger producing highly
concentrated market would result in anticompetitive effects).
64

inquires whether vertical integration and new technologies would counteract any effort
by a market leader to assert market power.
All of these sections turn on the ability of Internet software companies, promoters,
and venues to spread the capacity to sell tickets for live performances at large venues,
either to venues themselves or to outsourced distributors. As has been noted above, there
is substantial evidence that venues are pursuing self-distribution strategies, that
technology companies are increasingly available to facilitate self-distribution, and that
there are a growing number of competitive options to venues seeking to contract for
distribution services. 176 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines focus attention to the
timeliness, the likelihood, and the sufficiency of entry to counteract market power. 177
Our sense is that the industry’s recent developments indicate that such entry has already
occurred and that venues will continue to adopt self-distribution strategies so as to realize
efficiencies resulting from the integration of the production, promotion, and ticketing of
live entertainment. Thus, such entry would certainly be “likely” if incumbent firms were
to attempt to exercise market power.
A review of entrants’ success suggest that the threat of additional entry is both
real and imminent. For example, Tessitura, a not-for-profit enterprise, entered the market
in the late 1990s by developing its own software de novo and was operational within two
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See supra notes 79-111 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets). See also
Ticketmaster Corp 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,241 (explaining that the option of selfdistribution via reliance on outside technology providers prevents Ticketmaster from
exercising market power).
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See 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines § 3.0. See also Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at
54-58 (applying this taxonomy to evaluate defendants’ claim that prospect of new entry
should rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case).
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to three years. 178 Given technological developments since then, including the rapid
diffusion of Internet ticketing technology, we would expect that de novo entry could
occur much more quickly today. Indeed, opponents of the transaction claim that Live
Nation entered the ticket distribution market just a few short months after it decided to do
so, and there is no reason that other participants in the entertainment business could not
do the same. 179 AEG, for instance, owns or manages dozens of venues, including the Los
Angeles Staples Center, Miami’s American Airlines Arena, the Target Center in
Minneapolis, Charlotte’s Time Warner Cable Arena, Portland, Oregon’s Rose Quarter,
Kansas City’s Sprint Center, and San Antonio’s AT&T Arena, among others. 180 The
firm recently partnered with Kroenke Sports, the owner of TicketHorse, to manage a
venue in Colorado. Currently AEG outsources the distribution at most of its venues to
Ticketmaster, 181 but it reportedly is preparing to seek alternative distribution
arrangements 182 (indeed, the firm had earlier suggested that it might take its business
elsewhere if the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger is approved). 183 If, contrary to our
expectations, the merger were to result in an exercise of market power, AEG and other
adjacent market players are likely to create their own ticketing technologies or license
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See http://www.tessituranetwork.com/en/About/Timeline.aspx (reporting that the
New York Metropolitan Opera authorized entry in 1996 and that the project was
completed in 1998-1999).
179
Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 2.
180
See http://www.aegworldwide.com/01_venues/venues.php (listing numerous venues
owned by AEG) (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
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The Portland Rose Garden, however, self distributes with Paciolan technology.
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See supra, note 111.
183
See Ticketmaster Client May End Contract if Merger OKed, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNewsConsumerGoodsAndRetail/
idUSTRE51P7W820090226 (reporting AEG letter advising Ticketmaster that approval of
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would release AEG from its ticket distribution
agreement with Ticketmaster).
66

such technology from others and entering the distribution market (and they may do so
even if the merged Live Nation Entertainment does not exercise market power). One
critic of the proposed transaction has argued that entry by Live Nation would, all by
itself, lower ticket prices. 184 If so, then presumably entry by AEG would have the same
effect and thus be “sufficient” to counteract any purported antitcompetitive effects from
the transaction. 185
Nor is AEG the only likely entrant. At least one major record label—Warner
Music Group—has predicted that it will soon enter the ticket distribution market, using
its relationships with artists as a segue. 186 Other major promoters could follow in the
steps of AEG and Live Nation. Indeed, in August 2009, Cablevision announced that it
would be spinning off Madison Square Garden, currently a Ticketmaster client, along
with Radio City Music Hall and other assets. The leading ticket industry newsletter
opined that the spin off, creating a new entity worth $1.5 billion, would “instantly
creat[e] a possible future competitor to proposed entertainment partners Ticketmaster and
Live Nation.” 187 Presumably such rivalry would include rivalry in ticketing.
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Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 3.
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See Transcript of Warner Music Group Call, Addressing Fourth Quarter 2008
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It is difficult to credit the claim made by some that exclusive contracts entered by
Ticketmaster, Tickets.com, and other providers of distribution services prevent the sort of
entry that would be necessary to counteract any exercise of market power. 188 With the
spread of ticketing technologies, there remains the potential for entry by full-service
outsourced ticket distributors with the business model popularized by Ticketmaster. For
firms aiming to enter the market with this business model, exclusive contracts can
actually facilitate this category of entry by providing upstart firms with the assurance that
any sunk investments will pay off before a customer switches to a different supplier. 189
More significantly, recent technological developments have permitted entry to
take place through alternative mechanisms. Firms that market “enabling” technologies
that facilitate self-distribution strategies, such as Veritix and AudienceView, have found
a growing demand among venues to pursue cost-effective self-distribution, and it might
be said that these enabling firms represent two different kinds of entry: entry by venues
into self-distribution, and entry by technology firms that enable self-distribution.
Accordingly, the emergence of even a small number of enabling firms has the potential to
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The Department of Justice in the 1990s investigated allegations of illegal
monopolization, which charged that Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracts restricted entry
and caused anticompetitive harm. The Antitrust Division ultimately declined to pursue
these claims. See U.S. Ends Ticketmaster Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at
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entering the ticket distribution business. See Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 1-2.
See also Ticketmaster Corp v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas.(CCH) ¶ 74,013 (C.D.
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See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 3.3 (explaining that “forward contracting” can help
new entrants divest sales from incumbents).
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significantly shape the economic impact of new sources of output. 190 Should
Ticketmaster or any market participant raise prices, we would expect acceleration in the
trend toward self-distribution and perhaps the addition of new species of entrants. At the
very least, it appears that currently available technology empowers entrants to counter
any SSNIP by Ticketmaster with comparable services at competitive prices.
Concerns About a Purported Loss of “Future” or “Potential” Competition
Some critics argue that, regardless of the transaction’s impact (or lack thereof) on
the firms’ current rivalry, combining Live Nation and Ticketmaster will prevent
competition that would have occurred had the parties remained separate entities. That is,
these critics claim that, before the announcement of this merger, Live Nation was poised
to become a particularly effective rival in the non-captive segment of the ticket
distribution market, distributing millions of tickets for venues with whom it had no prior
affiliation. By merging with Live Nation, these critics claim, Ticketmaster would thwart
Live Nation’s impending substantial and procompetitive expansion in a market segment
where it now barely participates. More colloquially, it might be said, the merger
eliminates “potential competition” in addition to whatever actual rivalry might exist
between Ticketmaster and Live Nation.
The antitrust laws do not by their terms prevent transactions or practices that
reduce competition that never in fact existed. Still, it is perhaps possible to accommodate
this sort of concern within the existing framework of merger doctrine. For instance, just
as a firm’s apparent market share might overstate its actual competitive significance, so
too might its apparent market presence understate its competitive influence, influence
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See Joint Merger Guidelines, § 3.3 (likelihood of new entry depends upon availability
of sales and the minimum viable scale of production).
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that a proposed transaction could eliminate. 191 That competitive influence could be
tangible, such as when a recent entrant or a firm outside the market altogether poses a
credible threat of sudden output increases or new entry and thus deters exercises of
market power by established market participants. 192 Or the influence could be nascent
and potential, resting merely on a prediction that a competitive challenge would have
occurred absent the transaction. 193
At the same time, any potential competition claim should not serve as a vehicle
for circumventing and avoiding the rigorous principles that ordinarily guide merger
analysis. Every merger that eliminates a “nascent competitor” does not violate the
antitrust laws. The antitrust laws do not smash the economy into individual atoms and
require courts to undo productive cooperation to ensure the maximum amount of putative
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Cf. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498-99, 503-10 (concluding that market
concentration statistics significantly overstated competitive impact of merger).
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See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533-37 (1973) (relying on
this theory to remand decision for reconsideration by lower court); id. at 559 (Marshall, J.
concurring in the judgment) (“From the perspective of the firms already in the market,
the possibility of entry by such a lingering firm may be an important consideration in
their pricing and marketing decisions. When the lingering firm enters the market by
acquisition, the competitive influence exerted by the firm is lost with no offsetting gain
through an increase in the number of companies seeking a share of the relevant market.
The result is a net decrease in competitive pressure.”) (citation omitted); Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 24-25 (March 2006) (discussing enforcement actions premised on theory that
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anticompetitive output reductions by other market participants); Joint Merger Guidelines,
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Cf. Tenneco Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 355-58 (2d Cir. 1982) (articulating standards
governing application of actual potential competition doctrine); FTC v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 549 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); 1984 Department of Justice Non-Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, § 4.112 (same).
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rivalry that is possible. 194 Moreover, as Yogi Berra put it, “prediction is very hard,
especially about the future,” and government agencies and courts have no special wisdom
allowing them to forecast how a dynamic and rapidly evolving marketplace would have
unfolded but for a voluntary transaction under review. 195
Banning otherwise beneficial integration based on an incorrect prediction that it
would eliminate meaningful competition that has not yet occurred can deprive the public
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See White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 781 F.2d 1224, 1233 (6thCir.
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For instance, recent testimony about this transaction by a noted authority on mergers
recalled that, more than forty years ago, the Supreme Court ordered Procter and Gamble
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would then enter the household bleach market. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 580-81 (1967) (sustaining FTC’s determination that Procter and Gamble was
the “most likely entrant” into the household bleach market). Four decades later, Procter
still does not participate in the household bleach market. Luke Froeb, Testimony Before
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of beneficial integration and deter future beneficial transactions as well.196 Indeed, this
concern may well explain why courts are so reluctant to sustain challenges to mergers
based upon a “potential competition” theory. 197 This concern is particularly salient here,
where the trend toward vertical integration raises the inference that the vertical aspects of
this transaction will create efficiencies that society would forgo if the transaction is
scuttled. 198
Even if we assume that a potential competition doctrine applies here, we do not
believe that Live Nation’s future influence on the marketplace changes the more
conventional analysis of this transaction. One reason is that our horizontal effects
analysis—evaluating actual, as opposed to potential, competition—already assesses the
possibility of Live Nation possessing captive production, which would suggest that its
market share overstates its competitive significance. A claim based on a theory of
potential competition suggests that Live Nation is likely to expand in its non-captive
ticket distribution capabilities. No such specific plans have been announced. But even if

196

Cf. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Commentary on the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1 (March 2006) (“Mergers between competing firms, i.e.,
‘horizontal’ mergers, are a significant dynamic force in the American economy. The vast
majority of mergers pose no harm to consumers, and many produce efficiencies that
benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, higher quality goods or services, or
investments in innovation. Efficiencies such as these enable companies to compete more
effectively, both domestically and overseas.”); 1992 Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 0.1 (“the agency seeks to avoid
unnecessary interference with the larger universe of mergers that are either competitively
beneficial or neutral.”).
197
See infra notes 210-212 (collecting numerous authorities in which courts rejected
such challenges). See also Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1317-18 (1965) (describing various benefits of
mergers the existence of which counsels against overbroad rules prohibiting such
transactions).
198
Specific efficiencies related to the vertical integration of Ticketmaster and Live
Nation are discussed infra Part IV.3.
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Live Nation had such a credible plan, any showing that Live Nation would have
exercised procompetitive influence on the market but for its merger with Ticketmaster
requires a threshold showing that the market is less than competitive and thus is
susceptible to procompetitive influence. 199 However, our evaluation of the ticket
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Thus, by analogy, courts and the enforcement agencies have repeatedly held that both
a “perceived potential entrant” and an “actual potential entrant” cannot exercise a
procompetitive influence on the marketplace unless concentration and other indicia
establish that the market is otherwise susceptible to coordinated or unilateral
anticompetitive behavior. There is no reason to reject this logic simply because Live
Nation is already present in the marketplace. The Supreme Court has itself made it plain
that there can be no concern about a loss of potential competition if the market in
question is already competitive.
The [actual and perceived] potential-competition doctrine has meaning
only as applied to concentrated markets. That is, the doctrine comes into
play only where there are dominant participants in the target market
engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with the capacity
effectively to determine price and total output of goods and services. If
the target market performs as a competitive market in traditional antitrust
terms . . . . there would be no need for concern about the prospects of
long-term deconcentration of a market which is in fact genuinely
competitive.
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,630 (1974). Accord e.g.
Tenneco, 689 F. 2d at 352-53 (sustaining Commission finding that “market was not
genuinely competitive,” a necessary element for application of the doctrine). See also
United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499, 505 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980) (“As Professor
Turner points out the perceived potential competition doctrine is only available to the
Government if the market is oligopolistic. If the market is sufficiently competitive to
enforce competitive behavior on existing sellers, their behavior will not be influenced by
the threat of new entry, thus making the loss of a perceived potential entrant
insignificant.”) (citing Donald Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1363 (1965)); United States v. Consol. Foods
Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108, 139-140 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (rejecting application of the perceived
potential entry doctrine where there was “no evidence of oligopolistic behavior” and
levels of profitability were “indicative of competitive, rather than oligopolistic practices”)
(alternate holding); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 645 (C.D. Cal.
1976) (rejecting application of perceived potential competition doctrine because “the
relevant market here is not highly concentrated and is freely competitive”); In re B.A.T.,
104 F.T.C. at 923, n.22 (collecting authorities for the proposition that the doctrine does
not apply where nominally high concentration statistics present a misleading picture of
competition in the relevant market); 1984 Department of Justice Non-Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, § 4.111 (application of perceived potential competition doctrine depends
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distribution market suggests that it is an increasingly dynamic and competitive market,
such that Ticketmaster’s current significant market share, even when included with Live
Nation’s output, is unlikely to translate into market power. It would seem that the
potential competition claim would have significant difficulty overcoming this initial
requirement and would thus fail. 200 The antitrust laws do not empower courts to thwart a
merger merely to add yet another rival to an already competitive market. 201
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that Live Nation—as opposed to any
number of other firms that could enter the distribution market or expand their presence in
it—is uniquely well-suited to be the source of potential competition in the outsourced
ticket distribution segment and thereby deter anticompetitive conduct. That is to say,
even assuming Live Nation would have rapidly expanded its presence in this segment but
for the merger, there are other firms that are well suited to enter the market or rapidly
expand their presence within it. If this is the case, then eliminating Live Nation’s

upon the “economic theory of limit pricing” and assumption that potential competition
encourages “monopolists and groups of colluding firms” to “restrain their pricing in order
to deter new entry”). See also Tenneco Inc., 689 F.2d at 355-58 (rejecting application of
the “perceived potential competition” doctrine where market had recently become
significantly competitive independent of any influence exercised by putative potential
entrant). It should be noted that Professor Turner, cited in the Siemens decision above,
served as head of the Antitrust Division during President Johnson’s administration and
was a preeminent authority on antitrust doctrine and policy.
200
Moreover, there need to be meaningful limits on any potential competition doctrine,
otherwise it would swallow the whole of merger law. See AMAX, Inc., 402 F. Supp. at
959 (noting that the argument that internal expansion would be more competitive than a
merger could be made “against any horizontal merger” and thus does not justify
preventing such a transaction). See also BMI, 441 U.S. at 23 (explaining that numerous
mergers between competitors and other competition-reducing transactions properly
withstand antitrust scrutiny).
201
See White Consol. Indus., Inc., 781 F.2d at 1233; AMAX, Inc, 402 F. Supp. at 959.
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competitive influence cannot produce anticompetitive harm and cannot serve as a basis
for disallowing the merger. 202
As admirers of Yogi Berra, we hesitate to predict which firms will, in fact, enter
the market or expand their presence within it. Nonetheless, two prime candidates
emerged in the previous section discussing market entry. The first is AEG, the world’s
second largest promoter of live music and entertainment (after Live Nation) and the
world’s largest owner of sporting teams and events. If Live Nation, having entered the
market just a few months ago after obtaining technology from a third party, is poised
rapidly to expand its presence in a segment in which it now participates only for its
internal business needs, then presumably AEG could do the same by pursuing its reported
plans to acquire self-distribution technology. 203 A second likely candidate is Veritix.
Given the trend toward ticket self-distribution, Veritix is likely to continue expanding its
client base, both independently and via its downstream relationship with Kroenke Sports
and its TicketHorse subsidiary, particularly as contracts between Ticketmaster and
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See Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d at 300 (declining to ban merger that purportedly
reduced potential competition because there were several other possible entrants);
Hughes Tool, 415 F. Supp. at 646 (same). See also In re B.A.T. Indus. Ltd., 104 F.T.C.
852, 924 (1984) (“[E]liminating one of many potential entrants could not be expected to
eliminate substantial future competition.”). Here again one finds a ready analogy in the
“perceived potential competition doctrine,” the application of which requires a showing
that the alleged potential entrant is one of very few likely entrants such that elimination
of the entrant would in fact eliminate or substantially reduce the overall threat of entry
into the relevant market. See Siemens, 621 F.2d at 509 (rejecting application of the
perceived potential entry doctrine where there were various other potential entrants into
the market in question); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729,771-773 (D. Md. 1976) (same); Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Toehold
Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 156, 169 (1972)
(“If there are many potential competitors, the removal of one of them cannot be
important, because the continued presence of the remaining firms will discipline the
market to the same extent.”).
203
See suora, note 111.
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various venues expire. 204 Any claim that an independent Live Nation, and not AEG or
Veritix, will make sizeable market inroads over the next few years rests on additional
speculation.
Some speculation is an inevitable part of merger analysis, which by its nature
requires courts and enforcement agencies to make predictions about the state of
competition after the transaction. 205 Nonetheless, courts, including the Supreme Court,
have repeatedly ruled out the imposition of liability based upon “uncabined
speculation” 206 “ephemeral possibilities,” 207 or “remote possibilities.” 208 Instead, as the
Supreme Court said more than four decades ago, Section 7 bans only those mergers
where the anticompetitive effect is “probable.” 209 Not surprisingly, courts have placed
particular emphasis on these considerations when assessing claims that mergers eliminate
competition that has not yet occurred. 210 Indeed, at least one court has relied on these
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See supra note 170 and accompanying text (explaining that most distribution
agreements between Ticketmaster and various venues will expire over the next three to
six years). Cf. 1992 Joint Merger Guidelines § 3.3 (providing that downstream
integration can facilitate entry into a new market).
205
See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 (concern of Section 7 of the Clayton Act is with
“probabilities, not certainties”).
206
See British Oxygen Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1977).
207
See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323; FTC v. Tenet Health Care, 186 F.3d 1045, 1051
(8th Cir. 1999); British Oxygen, 557 F.2d at 28.
208
See Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 623, n. 22 (“[R]emote possibilities are not
sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in § 7.”) (quoting United States v. Falstaff, 410 U.S.
526, 555 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring)).
209
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 (“[N]o statute was sought for dealing with ephemeral
possibilities. Mergers with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be proscribed by
this Act”); id. at n. 39 (citing legislative history to this effect); Tenet Health, 186 F.3d at
1051 (Clayton Act “deals in probabilities, not ephemeral possibilities”). See also
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §
0.1 (“Throughout the Guidelines, the analysis is focused on whether consumers or
producers ‘likely would’ take certain actions.”).
210
See Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 354 (rejecting government’s invocation of the actual
potential competition doctrine for reliance upon “speculation” and “ephemeral
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admonitions when rejecting the claim—like that made here—that a merging party’s
market share understated its competitive significance because it had pre-merger
expansion plans. 211 Some courts have even suggested that claims based on the
elimination of “actual potential competition” require a showing that future entry by one
of the merging firms was “almost certain.” 212
The claim that Live Nation would have become a particularly and irreplaceably
influential competitor but for this merger rests on the sort of unjustified speculation that
courts have rejected. Given Live Nation’s very limited track record in this segment, the
established records and capabilities of other participants, the prospect of other entrants,
and the lack of apparent structural features conferring unique advantages on Live Nation,
any prediction that Live Nation would pose a unique and substantial competitive
challenge to Ticketmaster seems to lack the factual grounding in objective reality that
courts have repeatedly required (and often found wanting) when evaluating analogous
claims. 213

possibilities”); British Oxygen, 557 F.2d at 28-30 (rejecting government’s reliance upon
“uncabined speculation” and “wholly speculative . . . 'eventual entry' test”).
211
See AMAX, Inc., 402 F. Supp. at 960 (rejecting government’s reliance on pre-merger
expansion plans to inflate merging parties’ competitive significance because such an
approach would “ask that this court adopt ‘ephemeral possibilities’ rather than the
‘probability’ which § 7 requires”) (citations omitted).
212
See Siemens, 621 F. 2d at 506 (requiring “at least” a reasonable probability and
“preferably clear proof”); Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d at 294-95, 300 (requiring “clear
proof”). See also Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1384 (arguing for requirement of “clear proof that the firm
would in fact have entered” such that preventing merger will lead to future entry “[g]iven
the less than overwhelming case for prohibition to begin with”); id. at 1386 (advocating
requirement that such future entry was “certain”).
213
See Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 354; British Oxygen, 557 F.2d at 28-30; Atl. Richfield Co.,
549 F.2d at 300 (declining to ban merger that purportedly reduced potential competition
because there were several other possible entrants as well); Hughes Tool, 415 F. Supp. at
646 (same). See also Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
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Horizontal Efficiencies Resulting from the Merger
Although Live Nation and Ticketmaster claim that their merger will create many
efficiencies, these efficiencies will likely result from the vertical elements of the merger,
discussed in Part IV, infra. It is less certain whether the horizontal elements would yield
any substantial efficiencies that are directly attributable to the consolidation of their
ticketing distribution services, but some efficiencies might be possible.
Like most information technology services, there are probably some scale
economies in ticket distribution. If scale efficiencies are nontrivial, then consolidation
would avoid duplicative investments and could yield some savings. A more interesting
possibility for horizontal efficiencies is that the merger would enable Ticketmaster, the
accomplished technology company, to handle ticket distribution and provide services of
higher quality and at lower costs than what Live Nation could build and operate on its
own. Certainly, it is possible that Ticketmaster, a historically successful distributor, has
certain capabilities that Live Nation, a relative a newcomer to ticket distribution, does
not. 214 However, this argument is in tension with the growing evidence that Internet
technologies are easy to acquire. If the underlying technology really is widespread and
commoditized, then any one company’s technological advantage would be limited.
We suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Accomplished technology
companies are likely to have capabilities that other companies cannot duplicate, even

78 HARV. L. REV. at 1382 (“Unless a firm possesses unique capabilities, its preparation to
enter a market by internal expansion suggests that the market presents attractive
opportunities that at least one other firm will be likely to seek, also by internal expansion
if necessary.”).
214
Because Ticketmaster is the recognized industry leader and purportedly enjoys these
efficiencies already, these particular efficiencies would be “merger specific.” Live
Nation could not realize them by, say, merging with a different entity.
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when the market’s technological demands are not great, and this suggests that ticket
distribution for Live Nation events would occur more efficiently with the merger than
without it. However, the proliferation of self-distribution strategies by diverse venues,
most of which do not have track records as technology companies, reveal that the venues’
vertical integration strategies generate efficiencies that exceed whatever costs they
encounter (and otherwise could save from outsourcing) by pursuing the technologies
themselves. Accordingly, if any horizontal efficiencies are possible, they either are
modest or they are easily swamped by the efficiencies from vertical integration.
Summary
We close this analysis of the horizontal elements of the proposed merger with the
following preliminary conclusions:
1. Venues that purchase ticket distribution services vary in size, sophistication,
and needs, and service providers accordingly present a menu of offerings.
Service providers also range from full-service ticket distributors to providers
of technology that enables self-distribution. Subsequently, although we lack
sufficient information to conduct the required cross-elasticity tests for market
definition, we observe that there is wide variation in services offered and that
defining a distinct product market is a difficult determination. .
2. The technology required for large and smaller venues to self-distribute their
tickets is becoming increasingly available, and venues are increasingly
vertically integrating into ticket distribution.
3. Under most characterizations of market participants and market shares,
Ticketmaster enjoys a large market share, such that the market appears to be
moderately or highly concentrated. Live Nation, under some market
characterizations, has a much smaller but still sizable market share, but most
or all of its output is captive and thus is unlikely to be competitively
significant.
4. Even under narrow market definitions in which Ticketmaster and Live Nation
enjoy large market shares, the ease and attractiveness of vertical integration as
well as the nature of rivalry within the ticketing market prevents Ticketmaster,
or any other ticket distributor, from exercising market power and charging
supracompetitive prices. This critical determination hinges on precisely how
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easy and attractive vertical integration is for large venues. Moreover, because
venues appear to solicit bids from multiple providers, there are moments of
focused competition that dull any advantage of incumbency or historical
market share.
5. The elimination of Live Nation as a potential competitor to Ticketmaster and
other ticket distributors is unlikely to produce anticompetitive harm
cognizable under the antirust laws because the market is apparently behaving
in a competitive manner.
6. Any horizontal efficiencies produced by this merger appear to be modest.

IV. Analysis of Merger’s Vertical Consequences
Although the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger has some important
horizontal elements, the companies’ core businesses lie in different market segments.
Accordingly, the transaction is more accurately described as a primarily vertical merger,
resulting in the integration of successive stages of the process of producing and
delivering entertainment to the consumer. There is a broad consensus among economists
and legal scholars that vertical mergers only very rarely pose competitive risks. Indeed,
over the past three decades, the antitrust enforcement agencies have challenged only a
handful of the thousands of vertical mergers that have occurred in the United States, and
very few private challenges during this period have been successful. 215 Such consistency
among scholars, policymakers, and courts reveal a recognition that vertical mergers are
motivated primarily by efficiency concerns, rather than efforts to acquire or protect
market power.

215

See, e.g, Alberta Gas Chems. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 826 F.2d 1235, 1244-46
(3d Cir. 1987) (summarizing law governing vertical mergers); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC,
603 F.2d 345, 351-359 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting challenge to vertical merger); CrouseHinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 428-34 (same); Crane Co. v. Harsco
Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115, 125-26 (D. Del. 1981) (same).
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Nonetheless, some critics of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger claim that
vertical integration between these two particular firms will produce various
anticompetitive consequences. In reviewing the vertical aspects of this merger, we
identify many reasons to believe that the merger will more likely result in substantial
transactional efficiencies. Indeed, the efficiency considerations that have convinced Live
Nation and Ticketmaster to now seek vertical integration are analogous to the
procompetitive motivations that underlie the use of exclusive contracts between ticket
distributors, as the Department of Justice apparently concluded after investigating those
practices during the 1990s. Furthermore, the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger
reflects the industry’s general trend towards vertical integration, including but not limited
to the integration of venue ownership and ticket distribution. We lastly review the major
arguments that vertical aspects of the transaction will produce anticompetitive harm, and
we find them to rest on speculative predictions of harm that are generally implausible in
light of the industry’s structure.
The Evolving Economic and Legal Treatment of Vertical Integration
Broadly conceived, “vertical integration” entails any conscious coordination, by
contract or ownership, of two or more successive stages of the production process, where
“production” can include the provision of services or goods. By definition, all business
firms are “vertically integrated,” in the sense that they perform tasks by two or more
actors who might otherwise operate as independent market actors and cooperate together
by contract. Even the child’s corner lemonade stand can exemplify such integration–if
the child produces the lemonade (instead of buying lemonade on the market) and then
distributes it at retail. Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase first famously observed that markets
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and firms are merely alternative mechanisms to organize economic activity, 216 and this
analytical lens has deeply penetrated the fields of both law and economics. When
Richard Posner stated that “[v]ertical integration is a universal feature of economic
life,” 217 and Frank Easterbrook, shortly before his appointment to the bench, remarked
that “[t]he dichotomy between cooperation inside a ‘firm’ and competition in a ‘market’
is just a convenient shorthand for a far more complicated continuum,” 218 they were
repeating Coase’s prescient insight.
Still, several decades ago, courts, the enforcement agencies, and legal scholars
were quite hostile to vertical integration, despite its ubiquity, whether such integration
occurred by merger, internal expansion, or long-term contract. By taking control of a
new stage of the process of production or distribution, it was said, such integration could
“foreclose” rivals from particular upstream inputs or downstream channels for
distributing their products, thereby creating a “clog on competition” to the ultimate
detriment of downstream consumers. 219 A classic example was the merger between the
Brown Shoe Company—a shoe manufacturer—and Kinney Shoe Co., which

216

See Coase, supra note 121, at 389 (“It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing
mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.”).
217
See generally Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.
1984) (Posner, J.) (“Vertical integration is a universal feature of economic life . . . . A
common type of vertical integration is for a manufacturer to take over the distribution of
his own product.”); id. at 698.
218
Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). To be fair,
this remark (like Bork’s, supra note 230) embraces an approach that began with Ronald
Coase’s seminal article, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 121, and predated TCE.
219
See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (invoking these metaphors when condemning a
vertical merger); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1940) (invoking
these metaphors when condemning exclusive dealing agreements).
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manufactured shoes and also owned four hundred shoe stores throughout the country. 220
After purchasing Kinney, the government argued, Brown would presumably “force”
Kinney stores to stock Brown Shoes, thereby foreclosing its rivals from access to
Kinney’s stores, which had, before the merger, stocked shoes from various
manufacturers. 221 This approach dominated antitrust analysis by courts and the
enforcement agencies, giving rise to what subsequently became known as the
“inhospitality tradition,” in which vertical arrangements, including vertical mergers, were
suspected to have monopoly motivations and anticompetitive consequences. 222
Although judicial and administrative hostility, or inhospitality, to vertical
integration might have made sense given the state of economic science at the time, 223

220

See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 302-304 (reporting that Kinney owned 400 shoe stores
which sold about 1.6 percent of the nation’s shoes).
221
See id. at 304 (finding that, after the merger, Brown supplied 7.9 percent of the shoes
sold at Kinney stores); id. at 334 (banning merger because of “trend toward vertical
integration in the shoe industry, when combined with Brown’s avowed policy of forcing
its own shoes upon its retail subsidiaries, may foreclose competition from a substantial
share of the markets for men’s, women’s and children’s shoes, without producing any
countervailing competitive, economic or social advantages.”). See also FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966) (finding that a quasi-exclusive dealing agreement
involving 1% of the nation’s shoe retailers offended the “central policy of the Sherman
Act” and thus constituted an “unfair trade practice” in violation of Section 5 of the FTC
Act); Dictograph Prod, Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1954) (“It is the policy of
the Congress that [the defendant’s] merchandise must stand on its own feet in the open
market . . . without the competitive advantage to be obtained by the use of prohibited
exclusionary agreements.”).
222
Donald Turner, then head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, was
famously quoted to have said, “I approach territorial and customer restrictions not
hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.”
Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals’ Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 241, 260 (2003). n.98 (quoting Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections
on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. St. B.A. Antitrust L. Symp. 1, 1–2 (1966)).
223
See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 381 (1959) (“The trained observer
tends to form a considerable suspicion from casual observation that there is a good deal
of vertical integration which, although not actually uneconomical, is also not justified on
the basis of any cost savings. This is apparently true in particular of the integration of
83

economic theory has advanced significantly since the 1950s and views the causes and
consequences of vertical integration much more sympathetically. In what one prominent
economist has properly characterized as a scientific revolution, the profession has
completely reconceptualized the theoretical rationale for the business firm and other
forms of vertical integration. 224 Building on Coase’s original insight, economists and
others have recognized that vertical integration (“making” a product or service) is best
understood as an effort to economize on what Coase dubbed “transaction costs.” 225 By
making instead of buying a product, Coase said, a firm could avoid these costs and might

distributive facilities by manufacturing firms. In most cases the rationale of the
integration is evidently the increase of market power of the firms rather than a reduction
in cost.”). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Technology and Transaction Cost Economics,
10 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 355, 356 (1988) (asserting that under, price-theoretic paradigm
extant in the 1940s, 50s and 60s, “the ‘natural’ boundaries of the firm were thought to be
defined by engineering considerations.”); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM, at 7-8 (“The prevailing orientation toward economic organization [under
price theory] was that technological features of firm and market organization were
determinative.”); id. at 23-26, 86-89; George Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited By
the Extent of the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185, 185 (1951) (stating that economic theory
has “generally treated as a (technological?) datum the problem of what the firm does –
what governs its range of activities or functions.”). Even the Chicago school shared the
belief that vertical integration produced only technological efficiencies. See Robert H.
Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 200 (1954)
(describing the benefits of vertical integration as “bypassing a monopoly at one level, or .
. . enabling the achievement of internal efficiencies”). The stock example of such
technological efficiencies was the integration of iron-making and steel production, which
supposedly produced efficiencies by eliminating the need to reheat iron before feeding it
into a steel furnace. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 70 (1970); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 156-57 (1959);
CARL KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, 120 (1959). Indeed, as early as
1942, George Stigler would refer to this as a “stock” example of a technological
determinant of vertical integration. See George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of
Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (1942) (“[T]he stock example [of vertical
integration producing economies] is the hot strip mill.”).
224
See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 274 (1986)
(contending that Transaction Cost Economics and resulting reconception of the economic
origins of vertical integration was manifestation of a “genuine scientific revolution”).
225
See Coase, supra note 121, at 390-92.
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reduce its overall cost of production. 226
Several decades later, scholars rediscovered Coase’s insight and proceeded to
identify a much wider range of “transaction costs” that might induce economic actors to
forgo reliance on market organization in favor of firms. 227 For example, some scholars
argued that committed vertical arrangements, including vertical integration, are efficiency
responses to transacting in the presence of relationship-specific investments and the
resulting vulnerability to post-transaction opportunism. 228 Others additionally
recognized that vertical integration enabled coordinated adaptation and production that
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See id. at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to
be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”).
227
Major contributions include: OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM (1985); Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, & Armen Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373
(1965); Lester G. Telser, Why Do Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86
(1960).
The instant authors have also contributed to this literature. See e.g. Barak
Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and
Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325 (2009); Barak D. Richman & Jeffrey T.
Macher, “Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the
Social Sciences,” Business and Politics (2008); Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and
Reputation Mechanisms: Towards A Positive Theory of Private Ordering 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 2328 (2004); Alan J. Meese, Exclusive Dealing, Raising Rivals Costs and the
Theory of the Firm: Toward a New Synthesis, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 371 (2005);
Monopolization, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 743 (2005);
Price Theory, Competition and the Rule of Reason, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 77.
228
See Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, And The Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
297 (1978); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, 20-40, 82-105 (1975).
See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 65 (1988) (articulating mainstream view regarding rediscovery of Coase’s insight);
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, at 31-32 (explaining
that, where asset specificity is absent, discrete market contracting functions well despite
bounded rationality and opportunism).
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market relationships could not produce. 229 All of these arguments rested upon the
assumption that transacting in atomistic markets can invite certain market failures that
vertical arrangements arise to correct.
Antitrust doctrine has properly followed suit. Prodded by leading antitrust
scholars (Robert Bork once remarked that “[w]hat antitrust law perceives as vertical
merger, and therefore as a suspect and probably traumatic event, is merely an instance of
replacing a market transaction with administrative direction because the latter is believed
to be a more efficient method of coordination” 230 ), the Supreme Court and lower courts
have relaxed numerous doctrines from the inhospitality era that were hostile to partial and
complete integration. 231 Beginning in the late 1970s, courts have repeatedly rejected
arguments that challenged mergers injure competition by “foreclosing” rivals from access
to inputs or channels of distribution. 232 Instead these courts have adopted a much more
flexible and multi-factored approach that focus the inquiry on whether the vertical
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See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985).
230
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 227 (1978). Bork is significantly more
expansive than Williamson, remarking that “Antitrust’s concern with vertical mergers is
mistaken. . . . The vertical mergers the law currently outlaws have no effect other than the
creation of efficiency.” Id. at 226.
231
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (reversing
96 year ban on minimum resale price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3
(1997) (reversing 28 year ban on maximum resale price maintenance); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1985) (significantly increasing nature and
quantum of market power necessary to establish requisite element of tying case); Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (reversing per se ban on exclusive
territories and location clauses).
232
See Alberta Gas Chems., 826 F.2d at 1244-46; Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345
(2d Cir. 1979); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, 518 F. Supp. 416 (N.D.N.Y 1980); Crane
v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115, 125-26 (D. Del. 1981). See also United States v.
Loew’s, Inc., 882 F. 2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989).
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arrangements meaningfully enshrine or expand market power. 233 Applying this test,
courts have routinely rejected challenges to vertical mergers, even in cases in which the
vertical foreclosure was several times that which had, in previous decades, supported,
along with other factors, a finding that the merger would probably produce competitive
harm. 234 At the same time, government enforcement guidelines governing vertical
mergers reflected this new learning as well, expressly noting that “non-horizontal
mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems.” 235
Courts have similarly declined to condemn vertical integration in evaluating claims that a
single firm has “monopolized” the market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 236
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See Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 353 (instructing courts to examine, among other factors,
the “nature and economic purpose of the arrangement, the likelihood and size of market
foreclosure, the extent of concentration of buyers and sellers in the industry, the capital
cost required to enter the market, the market share needed by a buyer or seller to achieve
a profitable level of production (sometimes referred to as ‘scale economy’), the existence
of a trend toward vertical concentration or oligopoly in the industry, and whether the
merger will eliminate potential competition by one of the merging parties. To these
factors may be added the degree of market power that would be possessed by the
enterprise and the strength of competing suppliers and purchasers.”); see also HTI Health
Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1997)
(articulating the same factors).
234
See Fruehauf, 603 F. 2d at 358-59 (rejecting FTC challenge to vertical merger that
foreclosed rivals from selling 5.8% of the market’s output to one of the merging parties);
Crane Co., 509 F. Supp. at 125 (rejecting claim that vertical merger violated Section 7
despite 8.8% foreclosure).
235
See Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.0. This paragraph continued
“they are not invariably innocuous.” See also “Roundtable Submission,” available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/07RoundtableonVerticalMergers.pdf (noting
that “vertical mergers merit a stronger presumption of being efficient than do horizontal
mergers, and should be allowed to proceed except in those few cases where convincing,
fact-based evidence relating to the specific circumstances of the vertical merger indicates
likely competitive harm”).
236
See Belfiore v. N.Y. Times, 826 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim that vertical
integration by a monopolist offended Section 2 of the Sherman Act despite negative
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These are not, it should be emphasized, recent or untested developments, but
instead principles that are now fundamental to how courts and the enforcement agencies
approach vertical integration. Indeed, it was more than twenty-five years ago that Judge
Richard Posner summarized the state of scholarship and antitrust law by noting:
Vertical integration is not an unlawful or even a suspect category under
the antitrust laws: ‘Firms constantly face ‘make or buy’ decisions—that is,
decisions whether to purchase a good or service in the market or to
produce it internally—and ordinarily the decision, whichever way it goes,
raises no antitrust question.’ . . . .When a corporation that has been using a
law firm to handle a particular type of litigation hires a lawyer to do the
litigation in house, it is vertically integrating into litigation services.
When a law firm that has been buying a billing service from a computer
time-sharing firm buys its own computer to perform the service, it is
vertically integrating into computer services. Vertical integration is a
universal feature of economic life and it would be absurd to make it a
suspect category under the antitrust laws just because it may hurt suppliers
of the service that has been brought within the firm. 237
Scrutiny of Ticketmaster’s Vertical Agreements
Although vertical integration is often used to denote the merger of two economic
entities in sequential markets, it more accurately refers to a spectrum of relationships that
spans a diverse array of organizational arrangements. Complete vertical integration—
which includes mergers and acquisitions—is at one end of this spectrum with spot-market
transactions at the other, and a variety of intermediate forms, or “hybrid” 238
arrangements that reflect assorted levels of partial integration, occupy the middle. The
impact on firm’s dealer); Paschall v. Kan. City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (same).
237
See Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner,
J.) (quoting Univ. Life Ins. Co. of America v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir.
1983)).
238
Oliver Williamson employed this term to describe arrangements that lie between the
“polar modes” of atomistic markets, on the on hand, and “hierarchy,” (complete vertical
integration), on the other. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE, 104 (1996) (“hybrid” modes of economic organization include “various
forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising, and the like”).
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category of partially integrated hybrids includes long term contracts, exclusive contracts,
repeated interactions with reputational effects, joint ventures, cross-ownership, and an
assortment of other arrangements.
Ticketmaster (as well as, we believe, other outsourced providers of ticket
distribution services) sells its ticket distribution services to venues under exclusive
contracts, 239 which are a species of partially integrated hybrid arrangements. Both in the
past and recently, the exclusivity of these contracts has drawn some antitrust ire from
commentators and attention from some antitrust enforcers. Exclusive contracts of this
kind, especially if extended for long periods of time, can sometimes secure incumbent
firms with monopoly power against competitive entry by rivals and thus have
anticompetitive consequences. 240 Some Ticketmaster critics have alleged that the
company’s use of exclusive contracts has enshrined its leading market share and stifled
entry possibilities from potential and smaller competitors.241 Such critics therefore argue
that Ticketmaster’s use of exclusive contracts is anticompetitive and amounts to an
antitrust violation.
Accusations of anticompetitive conduct, most notably from Pearl Jam, caused the
Department of Justice to launch an investigation into Ticketmaster’s contracting practices
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See supra, Part II.
See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). Exclusive
vertical agreements by a market leader were also found to violate Section 2 in United
States v. Microsoft, Inc., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam), but the
Microsoft court was particularly concerned about how exclusive agreements might
combine with the network externalities of the operating system market to lock in an
inferior technological standard. Network externalities of this sort do not appear to be
present in the market for ticket distribution services.
241
Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 1 (“Ticketmaster’s monopoly power is preserved
through a series of exclusionary arrangements that diminish the potential for rivals to
arise and challenge the monopoly.”)
240
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in 1994, but the investigation was closed the following year without any finding of
anticompetitive conduct. 242 It seems likely, as one opponent of the transaction has
claimed, that the investigation was closed at least in part because the Antitrust Division
recognized that exclusive contracts can yield identifiable efficiencies when used for ticket
distribution. 243 Like other forms of vertical integration, contracts that designate a single
ticket distributor as a venue’s exclusive distributor provide the necessary assurances to
induce the distributor to make valuable investments in performing its services without
fear that a follow-on distributor would exploit those investments. Consequently,
Ticketmaster is able to provide certain services that it otherwise would be unwilling or
unable to provide. For example, exclusivity enables distributors to offer “best seat
available” searches, which are only possible if the distributor sells—and therefore knows
the availability of—all of a performance’s tickets. 244 Exclusive arrangements have also
enabled Ticketmaster (and other distribution companies) to finance investments in
upgrading a venue’s ticketing facilities. Without an exclusive distribution period, which
also tends to appear in contracts negotiated by Ticketmaster’s rivals, the distribution
companies would be unwilling to sink upfront investments in improving a venue’s
ticketing infrastructure. 245 Courts, in conjunction with a renewed appreciation for the
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U.S. Ends Ticketmaster Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at C14. See also
Antitrust Division Statement, (July 5, 1995)
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1995/0264.pdf.
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See Balto Testimony, supra note 151, at 1-2.
244
See John Seabrook, The Price of the Ticket, NEW YORKER MAG., Aug. 10 & 17 2009,
at 34, 39 (with the exclusive right to sell tickets to a particular event, “Ticketmaster could
offer fans the best available seats, no matter where they purchased tickets”).
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See Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298302, 302-307 (1978). Cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (fact that
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efficiencies of restrictive vertical contracts and vertical integration, have long recognized
that exclusive dealing arrangements can produce these and similar efficiencies. 246
Despite the efficiencies from exclusive contracts, such arrangements do limit a
potential competitive threat from rivals, so a complete evaluation of any body of
exclusive contracts would have to weigh the efficiencies against the anticompetitive
consequences. There is reason to believe, however, that Ticketmaster’s current array of
exclusive contacts does not cause antitrust harm. A significant number of such contracts
expire each year, and venues regularly invite bids from alternative ticket distributors
before considering renewing with Ticketmaster. Moreover, there appears to be a
relatively modest minimum viable scale for providing distribution services, so small
entrants do not require large volumes to offer profitable services. Consequently, it is
likely difficult for any monopolist in ticket distribution to employ exclusive arrangements
to block entry to the market. 247 Although a venue might encounter some switching costs
when initiating a new contract with a different ticket distributor, there do not appear to be
any network externalities that would enable a hypothetical monopolist in the ticketing
business to enjoy cost advantages over entrants, nor are there interoperability concerns

smaller performing rights societies had also adopted so-called blanket licenses militated
against their automatic condemnation).
246
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 287 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.),
aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (explaining that railroad could confer upon sleeping car
company the exclusive right to provide railroad such cars and that such exclusivity was
necessary “to secure the necessary investment of capital in the discharge of the duty”).
247
See IIA P. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 421f at 68 (1995) (“[A]ll customers
might contract to buy exclusively from incumbents and yet allow effective entry if 20
percent of the contracts expire monthly or even annually.”). Cf. Gilbarco, Inc. v. Omega
Envtl., Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 1997) (no chance that exclusive dealing
contracts could foreclose competition among manufacturers for distributors where
contracts were of relatively short duration and manufacturers could offer dealers better
terms upon expiration).
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that create an industry-wide lock-in effect. 248 Perhaps most significant, switching and
negotiation costs evidently did not prevent a number of venues, including Live Nation
itself, from leaving one distributor and selecting a new one or choosing selfdistribution. 249 Ticketmaster regularly loses clients as the exclusive contracts expire, and
the exclusive contracts—either individually or collectively—do not appear to have
deterred entry by firms hoping to wrest ticket distribution business away from
Ticketmaster and its rivals. 250 For these reasons, a court evaluating a rival’s claim that
Ticketmaster’s use of exclusive agreements foreclosed competition ruled that providers
of ticket distribution services use “the long term exclusive contract to accommodate their
customers’ desires, to their mutual benefit…. [the] exclusive contract is not for the
purpose of excluding competition, but for the mutual economic benefit of both
competitors. It is a mutually desired reasonable business practice from which no antitrust
inferences may be drawn.” 251
However important it might be that Ticketmaster’s current use of exclusive
contracts does little to stifle entry and competition, the more important observation is that
these exclusive contracts generate identifiable efficiencies. This use of partial integration
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Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34, 54-56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(per curiam) (affirming district court’s finding that the benefits of interoperability
contributed to Microsoft’s operating system monopoly and erected barriers to entry for
new technological paradigms).
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See Ticketmaster Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. at 96,240-41 (describing vigorous
competition between providers of ticket distribution services); id. at 96,241(explaining
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See supra notes 79-111 and accompanying text (listing numerous examples of venues
that have recently taken on the task of distributing their own tickets).
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Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,013, at
96,241 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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hints at some additional benefits that might accompany the firms’ complete vertical
integration.
Efficiencies from Vertical Integration
Even though current antitrust law no longer views vertical mergers with
suspicion, it still inquires into the “nature and purpose of the agreement” to determine
whether efficiency motivations underlie a particular merger. The centrality of this
inquiry highlights that while some mergers are little more than shortcuts towards
extracting market rents, others are motivated by innovative possibilities and pursuing
efficiencies, and antitrust demands distinguishing one from the other. Even if economic
theory tells us that vertical mergers are presumptively in this second category, an
efficiency analysis is still a routine element of any antitrust analysis.
An application of institutional economics and organizational theory suggests that
many efficiency motivations underlie the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger. It might
even be said, as a preliminary matter, that the companies were partially integrated by
contract, when exclusive contracts fixed Ticketmaster as Live Nation’s ticket distributor.
The efficiencies of that partial integration, discussed above, illustrate how exclusivity
facilitated valuable investments and the development of useful features and services. 252
A similarly motivated analysis suggests that the complete integration of Ticketmaster
with Live Nation is likely to create several additional efficiencies that might not be
realized in their entirety without complete vertical integration. These merger-specific
efficiencies, all of which are consistent with economic theory, by themselves offer a
compelling endorsement of the proposed merger.
252

See supra notes 244-246and accompanying text (discussing efficiencies achieved
from exclusive contracts).
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1. Investments in Promotion and Information
It is well understood that vertical integration achieves efficiencies when it can
organize behavior that is effectively beyond the reach of arms-length contracts. 253 One
element that frequently is listed as a “noncontractible” is effort, especially effort that is
invested to enhance the value of already-sunk investments. Parties, in the typical
collective action problem, routinely undersupply effort and other marginal investments
that would enhance the value of collective assets when the rewards from those marginal
investments are shared by others. In other words, when team effort among separate
economic actors is required to maximize value, value is rarely maximized. 254
This is precisely the situation that currently confronts concert promoters. The
several players along the value chain, including artists, promoters, venue managers, and
ticket distributors, all benefit from maximizing revenues from ticket sales and other
products, but each party only receives a fraction of the revenue from each ticket sale.
Accordingly, each party is not optimally incentivized to invest the resources and effort to
maximize value for the team. To be sure, Ticketmaster and other outsourced ticket
distributors enjoy a commission for each ticket sold, but this fee is only a fraction of the
overall cost of the ticket, and thus the distributor (like every other actor along the value
chain) is underincentivized to invest in the promotion required to sell remaining tickets
and maximally utilize capacity. Vertical integration is one efficiency response to this
coordination problem. If a single firm is responsible for promotion, venue management,
and ticket sales, then it would be incentivized to make appropriate investments that would
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improve efficiency, thus increasing both revenue for the performers and the collective
welfare of all those in the value chain.
The live entertainment industry currently shows evidence of inefficiencies that
could be reduced by improving incentives to make value-enhancing investments. One
significant and growing industry-wide challenge, for example, is the unfilled capacity in
concert halls. 255 These empty seats and unpurchased tickets represent significant
unutilized capacity and lost income to the venues, promoters, and artists. One potential
solution to reducing excess capacity is to make additional investments in advertising and
publicity, especially in the form of targeted promotions for specific shows. If the returns
from such targeted promotion are diffusely allocated, parties are unlikely to invest the
requisite effort and resources. Alternatively, an integrated promoter would reap greater
returns and is more likely to seek greater capacity.
Similar coordination problems might be responsible for impeding valuable
innovations along the value chain. For example, intensified advertising is only one
potential solution to the problem of unsold tickets, described above. Others might
include investing in marketing research or acquiring information on a fan base, such that
promotional activities could be directed at specific consumer segments. Investments in
this sort of research, and any investments in acquiring or distributing information that
increases capacity, also are vulnerable to a collective action problem that could be
mitigated by vertical integration. The same principle also applies to other revenue
sources, such as merchandise sales, that could be enhanced by obtaining better
information about a fan base. Because investments in the effort and resources necessary
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Krueger, supra note 9, at 12.
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to obtain and disseminate new information are so difficult to specify by contract, vertical
integration arises as a useful mechanism to increase efficiency along a value chain. Peter
Luukko, Chairman of vertically integrated Comcast-Spectacor, attested to these same
efficiencies in his testimony before Congress. 256
Decreasing the excess capacity and pursuing new sources of revenue have been
described as two central challenges that currently confront the live entertainment
industry, and the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger has been characterized as an effort to
pursue both opportunities. Economic theory confirms that vertical integration is one
mechanism that can overcome collective action problems that prevent parties from
making the necessary investments to appropriate these revenue opportunities.
2. Cooperative Adaptation to Meet Artists’ Demands, Respond to Market
Changes, & Pursue Innovations
Another organizational feature that vertical integration exhibits is the capacity to
pursue cooperative adaptation. That is, when unforeseen changed circumstances,
including those that are common in a rapidly evolving industry, necessitate adjustments
by numerous co-venturers, integration with within a single entity can facilitate the
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Peter Lukko, President and Chief Operating Officer, Comcast-Spectacor, L.P.,
Statement Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Courts and Competition, at 2-3 (Feb. 26, 2009) (“By being part of a
company that owns, manages, and/or operates venues, owns several sports teams and
other content, and provides its own ticketing solution and food and beverage services to
arenas, stadiums and amphitheatres throughout the country, we have the ability to crosspromote among these different levels in the vertical distribution chain and to touch the
fan directly at multiple points in his or her sports/entertainment experience. Additionally,
because we have more assets in some cities like Philadelphia, we have the ability to
create unique packages to offer to sponsors and fans alike. This is where the industry
trend is clearly moving—in large part because content providers want to have more direct
control of the connection to their fans.”).
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required adaptation. For these circumstances, vertical integration serves as a more
efficient organizational form than alternatives.257
Given the growing number of parties involved in producing live performances,
coordination might be especially valuable to artists who find themselves increasingly
separated from fans as new market segments enter the production chain. A vertically
integrated infrastructure would give artists access to communication and other media that
would help them shape their image and disseminate their music. Such coordinated efforts
to promote merchandise, concerts tickets, and other reputational goods might be
especially important for artists who target certain distinctive fan bases or who place value
in managing a particular brand image. The coordination of concert promotions,
merchandise sales, and other initiatives would enhance artists’ abilities to manage these
activities that are commonly so important to performers.
Coordinated adaptation would also facilitate a collective reprioritization of
promotional effort, and thus could also mitigate lost revenues from underutilization of
capacity in concerts. Outsourced ticket distributors generally make comparable sums for
selling tickets of any sort, so they might not be incentivized to promote ticket sales for
performances with substantial capacity remaining. Under these contractual
arrangements, promoters—who feel most of the pain from unsold tickets 258 —would have
difficulty directing distributors to promote sales for certain concerts. This is because
promoters, at the time ticket distribution contracts are signed, do not know and therefore
cannot specify how ticket distributors should direct consumer inquiries. Vertical
257
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integration enables the coordination of promotion efforts along the value chain and could
therefore respond effectively to unanticipated market developments and consumer
behavior. Vertically integrated promoters can flexibly adjust to initial sales by targeting
shows that have substantial numbers of available tickets, especially through mechanisms
that give promoters direct contact with ticket purchasers. Such coordinated adaptation,
which responds to changing circumstances after activities already commence, is a central
economic benefit to vertical integration.
The ability to coordinate the many actors in the live entertainment value chain
could also lead to innovations that might generate new revenue opportunities. For
example, Ticketmaster has said that consumers would prefer “end-price ticketing,” in
which ticket purchasers are quoted a single end price rather than a face value for a ticket
upon which taxes, service fees, and other additions are added. However, securing an
innovative pricing scheme, which would require new contractual relationships between
artists (and their managers), promoters, venues, and ticket distributors, might require
coordination and collective investments that may be difficult to engineer with multiple
parties. This is especially true if any one party could extort the others by resisting change
and holding out for a disproportionate share. Innovations that require such coordinated
investments and collaborative information sharing from multiple parties are accordingly
often pursued by vertically integrated entities. Although the literature regarding how
organizations spur innovation is extensive, complicated, and replete with different
conclusions, certainly it is plausible that innovations such as end-price ticketing and other
creative reorganizations of ticket pricing would be pursued more effectively by a
vertically integrated value chain.
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3. Targeted Linkages Between Venues, Entertainers, and Fans
The CEOs of both Ticketmaster and Live Nation have stated repeatedly in public
that the merger’s objective is to develop new and better avenues to link artists with their
fans. 259 These statements of “linkages,” and other statements suggesting the possibilities
of creating “new content,” 260 reflect the perception that connecting the creators of live
entertainment with their fans can create desirable activities that are very costly, and
perhaps impossible, to achieve under the current fragmented industry structure.
Firms that offer ticket distribution technology advertise that self-distribution
empowers venues with a complete and thorough understanding of their fan base. 261 This
is even truer for promoters like Live Nation that own numerous venues and serve a
diverse and increasingly mobile fan base. The information garnered about ticket
purchasers from Internet sales can facilitate the development of targeted and thus less
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Michael Rapino, President & Chief Executive Officer, Live Nation, Written
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy of the House
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data to increase sales.").
99

costly marketing strategies. Such information about the demands and preferences of a
fan base also lays the ground work for the promotion of complementary goods and
services such as recorded music, apparel, and other merchandise. 262 Promoters would be
able to selectively market products to fans who have expressed specific interest in the
promoted artists. Artists too can communicate and interface with their fan base such that
they can both receive fan feedback and disseminate communications that would
complement their performances. These interactions not only amount to new goods and
content; they also create complementarities to the concert experience that enhance the
quality of live performances.
Information on ticket purchasers would likely enhance the value of other sources
of consumer information, such as data on music or merchandise sales that many
promoters have. The synthesis of multiple sources of consumer information would seem
to enable a valuable business platform for marketing multiple sources of content, goods,
and services. Perhaps an important question is, if joining these sources of information
could be so valuable, why Ticketmaster and Live Nation have not already entered
information-sharing agreements to learn from each other’s consumer data and jointly
launch an e-commerce platform. Although a merger of the distributor and promoter is
one way to unite the complementary commercial interests, antitrust law generally
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requires parties (before claiming merger-specific efficiencies) to first entertain whether
an alternative that is less restrictive to a merger would achieve the same efficiencies.
It does seem possible that careful contracts between Ticketmaster and the venues
it services—contracts that carefully define property rights and privacy policies that would
govern the consumer information for particular fan bases—could enable Ticketmaster’s
clients to pursue these revenue opportunities absent a merger, and if the merger were
prohibited it is possible that these contracts would emerge. 263 However, Internet
marketing has consumed e-commerce for nearly a decade, and it is surprising that a
successful technology company like Ticketmaster has not developed such an Internet
platform for clients that are highly tuned to emerging markets. Perhaps defining property
rights and privacy policies are either noncontractible or extremely costly to contract for,
or perhaps there is a collective action problem (similar to the general problem, described
above, that results in suboptimal promotion) that deters the complete development of a
useful database of fan preferences and consumer behaviors.
Another potential explanation for the lack of an e-commerce platform is that a
Ticketmaster client might fear being beholden to Ticketmaster after proprietary
information on its fans is assembled, or conversely, Ticketmaster might fear making sunk
investments in acquiring such information only to see a client will then leave for an
alternative distributor. Mitigating the hazards of such exposure is often difficult to do by
contract given that a contractual solution would have to anticipate a great many risks that
are difficult to anticipate. Under such circumstances, vertical integration offers a reliable
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solution. An integrated entity would not suffer from imprecise property rights or
proprietary concerns over consumer information, and it would assuredly capitalize on the
complementarities of, and the optimal incentives to produce and acquire, such consumer
information.
In any event, it is curious that two highly successful companies have not yet
managed to construct an e-commerce platform that current technology would permit, and
one ready explanation is that contracts could not provide both companies the necessary
security from expropriation of property rights or sunk investments. The promise of new
content and fan-oriented complementarities seem to be compelling motivations, and
perhaps more than any other factor are the primary motivation behind the merger, so one
would expect that the companies would have previously pursued these opportunities if
they could have. Vertical integration certainly would enable them to pursue these new
markets, and there is good reason to suspect that without complete integration they might
be unattainable.
4. Industry-wide Vertical Integration
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of efficiencies from vertical integration is
that vertical acquisitions and integration strategies appear to be spreading across the
industry. Antitrust law and the enforcement agencies have recognized that such an
industry-wide trend can constitute prima facie evidence that vertical integration generates
substantial efficiencies. 264 When, as here, firms without any chance of obtaining or
protecting market power are pursuing such integration strategies, this trend is especially
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suggestive that the organizational shift reflects the realization of efficiencies not
otherwise obtainable via traditional methods of ticket distribution. 265
As is discussed extensively in Section III, self-distribution is becoming an
increasingly popular mechanism for venues to sell tickets to their events. Selfdistribution strategies are being pursued by small and large venues alike, and companies
advertising the merits of self-distribution offer compelling efficiency (not market power)
justifications. But recent years have also witnessed an assortment of vertical integration
strategies that have brought venues, promoters, sports teams, and other producers of live
entertainment closer to their respective fan bases, not just through ticket distribution but
also through broadcasting and an assortment of Internet-based products. Some examples
include:
1. Kroenke Sports Entertainment (“KSE”) owns and operates the NHL Colorado
Avalanche, NBA Denver Nuggets, MLS Colorado Rapids, Dick’s Sporting
Goods Park stadium, Paramount Theatre, Opera Shop theatrical company, and
the Denver’s Pepsi Center. In 2004, Kroenke dropped the Fox Sports
Network, which had delivered games of KSE teams to more than 2 million
households across the mountain west and created its own network called
Altitude Sports & Entertainment. In 2007, KSE unveiled TicketHorse
(powered by Veritix) as to service all events at KSE’s soccer stadium, a year
later KSE announced that the Pepsi Center, Nuggets, and Avalanche would
begin utilizing Veritix’s ticketing platform beginning in July 2009. 266
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Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 39-40
(1988) (competition between economic actors will result in optimal degree of vertical
integration).
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See Kroenke Sports Enterprises Extends Deal with Vertix, TicketNews (July 31,
2008), available at http://www.ticketnews.com/node/3411; Greg Griffin & Robert
Sanchez, A Look Inside Kroenke’s Empire, Denverpost.com (July 8, 2007), available at
http://www.denverpost.com/null/ci_6318716. Kroenke Sports Executive Vice President
Paul Andrews noted the value of vertical integration when he remarked, “[u]ltimately, we
want the success or failure of that fan’s experience to begin and end with us . . . . We can
get you that ticket to the Rapids game; we can get you inside a great stadium; we can get
you out of the parking lot quickly after the game; and when you get home, you can watch
the highlights on TV.” Id.
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2. Comcast-Spectacor is a growing sports and entertainment venture that
includes the Philadelphia Flyers, the Philadelphia 76ers, the AHL Philadelphia
Phantoms, the Wachovia Center, and a 24-hour regional sports programming
network, Comcast SportsNet. In 2003, Comcast-Spectacor used Paciolan's
enablement solutions to develop New Era Tickets, a full-service ticketing
company. In addition to these ventures, Comcast-Spectacor also operates two
marketing services companies – Front Row Marketing Services (corporate
sponsorships) and 3601 Creative Group (full-service marketing
communications agency). 267
3. Major League Baseball Advanced Media (“MLBAM”) was created by Major
League Baseball in 2000 to operate baseball's digital assets. In February
2005, MLB announced MLBAM had reached an agreement to purchase
Tickets.com, which two years later introduced mobile ticketing, allowing fan's
to receive ticket bar codes on their cell phones. MLB.com also offers livestreaming of all regular season games and other MLB-related content,
including services that send content directly to subscribers’ cell phones. 268
4. OCESA Entretenimiento is a strategic alliance, formed in October 2002, by
Grupo Televisa, the largest media company in the Spanish-speaking world,
and Corporacion Interamericana de Entretenimiento, the leading live
entertainment company in Latin America, Spain, and the Latin U.S. market.
The deal vertically integrates the ticketing and promotion for concerts for
Televisa's roster of Latino stars. 269
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See http://www.comcast-spectacor.com/CompanyHistory.asp. Comcast-Spectacor’s
annual summary notes that “the resources of other Comcast-Spectacor companies create[]
a synergy that greatly benefits Global Spectrum clients. Whether it’s by creating events,
finding and developing naming rights and evaluating sponsorship opportunities (Front
Row Marketing Services), establishing new revenue sources through concessions
improvements and upgrades (Ovations Food Services) or engaging in out-of-the-box
thinking about new ticketing and technology breakthroughs (New Era Tickets), Global
Spectrum maximizes revenue potential and attracts a greater number of visitors at the
venues it manages.” Comcast Spectacor: Providing a Total Entertainment Experience,
Annual Summary (2009), at 11.
268
Jorge L. Ortiz, MLB’s Advanced Media Arm Pulls in Profits, USA TODAY, Dec. 5,
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-12-04-baseballonline_N.htm; Tim Gray, MLB Acquires Tickets.com: Major League Baseball Agrees to
Purchase the Ticket Seller to Make the Ticket-Buying Process Easier for Fans,
InternetNews.com, Feb. 15, 2005, available at http://www.Internetnews.com/ecnews/article.php/3483356.
269
Simeon Tegel, Televisa's CIE stake OK'd, Deal joins ticketing, live entertainment
businesses, VARIETY, June 26, 2003, available at http://www.variety.com/index.asp?
layout=print_story&articleid=VR1117888535&categoryid=1237. The companies state
that the merger was motivated the prospect of developing new content and
complimentary products. See Press Release, Grupo Televisa and CIE Form Strategic
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5. Edgar Bronfman, Jr., CEO of Warner Music Group, suggested recently the
record label will expand into downstream markets in an expanded effort to
market and sell music and music products. Bronfman said the company is
taking steps to offer ticketing services, touring, merchandising, fan club
management, sponsorship, and artist management. Warner Music also has
adopted a “360 strategy” that acquires all revenue streams for an artist’s music
rights, including ticketing, touring, merchandise, and sponsorship. 270

It is difficult to determine how accurately these developments represent the industry at
large, but at minimum they illustrate that the Live Nation-Ticketmaster transaction is one
of several similar organizational developments in the vertical integration of live
entertainment. It is significant that this trend has included companies in both vibrant and
struggling economic sectors, companies that might plausibly enjoy market power and
companies that in all likelihood have little-to-no market power, and an assortment of
strategies that bring performers and content to end-users. Yet despite the diversity of
players moving towards vertical integration, they all seem to state parallel motivations
and seek the same category of efficiencies in their organizational strategies.
Consequently, they strongly hint at some of the efficiencies that are likely to result from a
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger.
Addressing Critics of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster Transaction
On July 27, Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on

Alliance for Live Entertainment In Mexico (Oct. 18, 2002) (“CIE and Televisa will
benefit from the advantages of the live entertainment vertical integration model, the
production and promotion of the best quality concerts, theatrical, family and cultural
events, as well as the operation of entertainment venues, the sale of entrance tickets, food,
beverage and souvenirs, and the organization of special, and corporate events.”).
270
Warner Music Group Corp F1Q08 (Qtr End 12/31/08) Earnings Call Transcript,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/118835-warner-music-group-corp-f1q08-qtr-end-12-3108; Caroline McCarthy, Warner's Bronfman, MySpace's DeWolfe Talk Music,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-10084715-36.html.
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Antitrust, sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney to convey his
belief that the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger “presents serious competition
concerns.” 271 That same day, Congressman Bill Pascrell sent a similar letter to Assistant
Attorney General Varney, signed by fifty of his colleagues in the U.S. House of
Representatives, that “urge[d] the Justice Department to analyze this proposed transaction
closely and with great skepticism” and concluded that “[c]onsumers, business managers,
artists, independent promoters, and music fans in every state are likely to suffer if the
merger is allowed to occur.” 272 These letters were reflections of recent opposition to the
proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger and articulate the most common arguments
predicting that the merger will lead to anticompetitive consequences.
This is not the first time that congressional politics has intervened in agency
merger review and not even the first time congressional politics has focused its ire at
Ticketmaster. In 1994, congressional hearings featured Pearl Jam’s testimony decrying
Ticketmaster’s pricing policies. These events illustrate the interesting tension between
proper applications of antitrust law and popular (and often politicized) demands made on
the enforcement agencies.
Most of the arguments that the letters—and other critics—articulate are addressed
in the sections above. Both letters, for example, express fears that the consolidation of
two current and future competitors will reduce horizontal competition in the market for
ticket distribution services. Both letters also fail to recognize the efficiencies created in
this industry by vertical integration, with one letter using “vertically integrated
271

See Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (asserting that Live Nation “start[ed] a ticketing
business to compete with Ticketmaster (and as a result sold 5.8 million tickets in the first
four months of 2009). If the merger occurs, this direct competition will be lost.”).
272
Pascrell Letter, supra note 4.
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entertainment giant” as a pejorative term. 273 This section focuses on two arguments that
are conveyed in the letters and by other critics yet are not addressed directly by the
previous sections. Importantly, these two particular arguments are also iterations of
common—and mistaken—fears that vertical mergers will enable a new entity to exploit
its presence in one market to create unfair advantages in another. Current economic
theory refutes these typical claims, and it similarly undermines the two arguments we
address here.
1. Leveraging Market Power from Ticket Distribution to Concert Promotion
Critics of the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger have claimed that the
transaction will empower the merged entity to leverage its monopoly position in the
market for ticket distribution services to anticompetitively expand its position and harm
competition in the market for concert promotion. 274 After the transaction, it is said, the
new entity will condition access to Ticketmaster’s ticket distribution services on venues’
agreement also to book only Live Nation-promoted acts, thereby foreclosing other
promoters from doing business with these venues. 275 Put another way, these critics
predict that the new entity will be in a position to force venues to replace promoters they
currently retain with Live Nation.
Such conduct would essentially amount to what one might call “a theory of
prospective tying.” Tying, of course, is already regulated under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, and while most ties are lawful, courts have held parties liable for arrangements that
273

Kohl Letter, supra note 4.
Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (“[I]ndependent concert promoters may find it very difficult
to attract artists who could otherwise use the vertically integrated Live
Nation/Ticketmaster for its range of services.”). See also Balto Testimony, supra note
151.
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See Balto Testimony, supra note 151.
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create an undue risk of anticompetitive harm. 276 So-called “anticompetitive forcing,” that
is, the use of the seller’s economic power over the tying product to coerce purchase of the
tied product, is one such tying violation. 277 If the evidence indicated that the merged
entity creates a high probability of such tying, then perhaps it would be appropriate to
challenge it on that basis. 278
However, as is explained in Part III, supra, it is doubtful that the new entity will
possess economic power in the ticket distribution market, and therefore is unlikely to be
able to coerce purchasers of live entertainment promotion. 279 To be sure, the merged
entity would be entitled to reap the benefits flowing from such integration, such as crossmarketing products, and many of the stated purposes of seeking the merger was to bundle
goods and services such that multiple revenue streams would accrue to artists and
promoters. 280 Such bundling of goods is permissible so long as it does not coercively use
market power to force purchases for reasons unrelated to the quality and price of the
276

See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). Some tying
arrangements are still deemed to be per se violations. Id.
277
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14-16 (describing purported harm from such tying
contracts in this manner). See also Fortner Enter. v. U.S. Steel, 429 U.S. 610 (1977)
(same).
278
Cf. FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (affirming FTC’s determination
that merger violated Section 7 because it resulted in probable reciprocal dealing between
the remaining firm and its customers, thereby disadvantaging other potential suppliers to
these same customers). See also Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416,
442-43 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying such a framework to determine whether vertical
transaction would result in a propensity of tying that would justify its condemnation).
279
See On the Case: DOJ Quizzes Live Venues about Ticketmaster-Live Nation Merger,
BILLBOARD, Aug. 22, 2009 (reporting confidence of several small venue operators that
Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would not suppress competition in promotion market
and that promoters would still bring live entertainment to small venues); cf. Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29 (holding that 30 percent share of the relevant market did not
constitute economic power sufficient to establish per se tying violation).
280
See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (describing the heightened economic
significance of developing, and the corresponding plans to develop, Internet platforms to
jointly market and distribute concert tickets with accompanying merchandise).
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products offered. 281 But the mere prospect of bundled sales does not implicate the
Clayton Act. A violation is possible only from the exercise of coercion that the merged
entity does not seem to have. 282
More fundamentally, the sort of conduct these critics describe would make little
economic sense. Assuming the merged entity has monopoly power in the ticket
distribution market, it would be diluting the profitability of that monopoly by subsidizing
inefficient entry into the promotion market. Rudimentary industrial organization
economics instruct that a monopolist’s profit-maximizing strategy is to market its
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See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[A]
large firm does not violate § 2 [of the Sherman Act] simply by reaping the competitive
rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business offend the
Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association with a division
possessing a monopoly in its own market. So long as we allow a firm to compete in
several fields, we must expect it to seek the competitive advantages of its broad-based
activity – more efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products,
reduced transaction costs, and so forth. These are gains that accrue to any integrated
firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot by themselves be considered uses of
monopoly power.”). This even applies to monopolists, who may make package sales so
long as the purchaser’s purchase of the package is voluntary. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (“Where the buyer is free to take either product by
itself there is no tying problem even though the seller may offer the two items as a unit at
a single price.”); Marts v. Xerox, Inc., 77 F. 3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
282
It is worth noting that even if Ticketmaster and Live Nation did intend on
implementing a coercive tying arrangement, they would not have to merge to do so.
Instead, they could simply pursue such a strategy via contractual cooperation, in which
Ticketmaster would only provide ticket distribution services to firms that use the
independent Live Nation as a promoter. Some firms have pursued tying arrangements by
contract, see, e.g., Atl. Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (banning as unfair trade
practice arrangement whereby oil company coerced its dealers into stocking and
promoting tires, batteries and accessories manufactured by Goodyear), and even the
leading tying decision in the past three decades involved a contract-based tying
arrangement, Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 5-8 (holding liable a hospital that allegedly
required its surgery patients to employ anesthesiologists employed by an independent
firm selected by the hospital). Such a policy would have the very same effect (or lack
thereof) on competition in the promotion market as would the consummation of this
merger.
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monopolized product independently. 283 Moreover, this strategy also is vulnerable to
common sense scrutiny. Requiring venues to deal with an unwanted promoter as a
condition of employing the new entity’s ticket distribution services would alienate many
venues and effectively increase raise the price of its distribution services. A likely
consequence would be a migration of business to competitors or the significant spread of
additional self-distribution. 284 And because many venues are subject to medium term
contracts, either with ticket distribution firms or suppliers of software that support selfdistribution, such a tying strategy would face a temporal problem, as it would require the
new entity to enforce promises made today several years from now, when conditions
facing venues may well have changed. In the most basic sense, it would not be a wise,
profit-maximizing strategy.
The congressional hearings examining the proposed merger included several
regional promoters and operators of small-to-midsized venues who feared being
continually outbid by an industry giant. Of course, outbidding competitors is part of the
competitive process and translates into greater revenues for artists. More important, a
competitive bidding process means that promoters who win bids are the ones who can
generate the greatest revenue from those live performers. If Live Nation’s merger with
Ticketmaster or its access to upstream markets and creators of entertainment content
enables it to outbid its competitors, then such bidding success is evidence of efficiencies
that accrued from vertical integration and is a product of a procompetitive—not
anticompetitive—advantage over its rivals. Smaller venue operators and promoters
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JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION §8.4 (1997).
See Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 355 (rejecting FTC’s conclusion that entity would favor its
own downstream purchaser in time of shortage because such tactics would risk customer
retaliation that would cause the new entity “greater economic harm”).
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might be advised to seek similar vertical integration strategies to obtain comparable
efficiencies, and pursuing such strategies would make them part of the industry-wide
trend towards vertical integration. But seeking to block an efficiency-enhancing merger
because it might enhance a rival’s competitiveness is antithetical to the aims of the
nation’s antitrust laws. 285
2. Foreclosing Competition in Ticket Distribution
Congressional critics of the transaction have also claimed that a Live NationTicketmaster merger will reduce competition and thus produce harmful effects in the
market for ticket distribution, separate and apart from any impact on the market for
concert promotion. These critics suggest that harm to the market for ticket distribution
will occur through two mechanisms. First, they argue that the integrated firm will force
285

Live Nation’s competitors—and Senator Kohl’s letter to Assistant Attorney General
Varney—expressed a related concern about how a Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger
might affect competition in the promotion market. See Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (“Live
Nation/Ticketmaster will automatically have valuable information about independent
promoters' business, such as customer email addresses, demographics of concertgoers,
and pricing of tickets, which they can use to directly compete for concert promotion
business.”); see also Hurwitz Testimony,supra note 2. Many of these smaller promoters
and venues had previously contracted with Ticketmaster as a ticket distributor, and
Ticketmaster consequently acquired information on these venues and their fan base over
the course of providing distribution services. These promoters and venue operators, who
are competitors with Live Nation, now fear that a merged Live Nation Entertainment will
have access to give proprietary information to their competitor and damage fair
competition in the market for live entertainment promotion.
We have no evidence suggesting whether these fears are well-founded, though we
suspect that violating the trust of former clients would not help Live Nation
Entertainment’s commercial success as it aims to acquire new information on artists and
fans throughout the country. We do suspect that an expropriation of this data would
violate the terms of the service contract that Ticketmaster signed when agreeing to
provide distribution services, and thus the merged company would be prohibited from
improperly exploiting the data. Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection monitors business use of private information, and any misuse of
data by Live Nation Entertainment would invite appropriate scrutiny from that office. In
short, there appear to be other legal means to prevent the misappropriation of private data
in addition to preventing an otherwise efficient merger.
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Ticketmaster services upon independent concert promoters, consequently reducing
opportunities for competing ticket distributors,286 and second, that the merger will
effectively commit Live Nation to using the distribution services of the merged entity,
thus depriving other distributors of that substantial business.
This first theory might be considered the flip-side of the previous argument:
whereas some critics fear that the merger will enable the leveraging of market power in
ticket distribution to harm competition in the promotion market, this argument suggests
that the merged firm will leverage market power in the promotion market to harm
competition in ticket distribution. At the risk of being repetitive, we note again that a
theory of “prospective tying” is colorable only if market power enables anticompetitive
forcing that coerces purchases of a tied product or service. Thus, as a preliminary matter,
that this theory requires a showing that Live Nation has market power in a properly
defined market for promotion. Because Ticketmaster does not currently participate in the
market for promotion of live entertainment, the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would
not change that market’s concentration, and therefore the merged entity will be no more
capable of coercive bundling than Live Nation is now. Since there have been no
allegations that Live Nation currently attempts to tie its ticket distribution services to its
promotional offerings (and, indeed, its market share in ticket distribution remains very
small), then there is little reason to fear competitive harm after the merger.
Moreover, for the same reasons it makes little economic sense to bundle
promotion with ticket distribution, it makes little economic sense to bundle ticket
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See Kohl Letter, supra note 4 (“In addition, independent concert halls will likely be
under strong pressure to use Ticketmaster's ticketing services if these venues wish to get
booking from the leading acts promoted by Live Nation.”).
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distribution with promotion. Such attempts at coerced tying would not be in the merged
company’s best interest unless it harbored a hope that it could soon monopolize the
market for ticket distribution services, but that market instead has exhibited declining
margins and, due to widespread Internet technologies, might be unmonopolizeable.
Again, difficulties in achieving coercive bundling does not mean that product and service
bundling will not occur, and all suggestions from the merging parties indicate that they
intend to offer clients and fans a menu of bundled products, merchandise, and other
services. Without the possibility that this bundling is coercive, the presumption is that it
reflects procompetitive efficiencies.
The second theory, that Live Nation’s needs for ticket distribution services will be
captured exclusively by the merged company, thus depriving Ticketmaster’s rivals and
potential entrants from that share of the market, is motivated by Live Nation’s past as a
large purchaser of ticket distribution services. In other words, the theory goes, the new
venture will refuse to deal with competitors and entrants in the business of ticket
distribution, and the remaining venues would not supply adequate demand to fuel a
competitive threat to Ticketmaster. These critics conclude that for any firm to challenge
the new entity’s leadership in ticket distribution, it must enter the market at two levels–
venue ownership and ticket distribution. 287
There are several faults to this theory. First, the theory rests upon the assumption
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Id. (“[V]enues can now [sic] be expected to solely utilize Ticketmaster’s ticketing
services. Being locked out of these concert halls is likely to make it difficult for any new
significant ticketing service to emerge after the merger.”); Pascrell Letter, supra note 4
(“The vertically integrated firm can withhold these critical inputs, and its rival will suffer.
To avoid such problems, an entrant would need to enter the industry on several levels at
once….). See generally 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.221
(describing how a vertical merger’s propensity to raise barriers to entry by creating a
market structure that requires two level entry can facilitate the exercise of market power).
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that the market for ticket distribution is concentrated and that the merger enshrines
Ticketmaster in a position of market power. The evidence detailed in Part III, however,
indicates that the market for ticket distribution services currently appears to be quite
competitive. The technology for ticket distribution is becoming increasingly widespread,
with a number of new entrants in recent years as well as a growing number of venues that
are pursuing self-distribution strategies. Because anticompetitive consequences in this
market appear unlikely, it is unnecessary to scrutinize whether the merger forecloses
entry because entry is not necessary to maintain competitive conditions.288
Second, the theory ignores the implications of Live Nation’s recent decision to
self-distribute the tickets to events at the venues that it owns or operates, a decision made
before and independent of this transaction. Given Live Nation’s self-distribution,
pursuant to a long-term contract with CTS Eventim, potential entrants already lack
access to the business of distributing tickets for venues owned or managed by Live
Nation. Thus, even if the transaction somehow causes Live Nation eventually to abjure
self-distribution, in favor of distribution by Ticketmaster (an eventuality about which we
can only speculate), such substitution of Ticketmaster for CTS Eventim will have no
impact whatsoever upon the opportunities for entry by possible rivals in the ticket
distribution business and thus cannot for the basis for a finding that the transaction
violates Section 7. 289 This would have been the case even if the merger had been
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See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.213 (“Barriers to entry are
unlikely to affect performance if the structure of the primary market is otherwise not
conducive to monopolization or collusion.”).
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See Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc, 386 F.3d 485, 511 (2d Cir. 2004)
(Section 7 did not forbid merger that itself had no impact on parties’ ability to exercise
market power, where any such power existed before the transaction and was not
enhanced by it). Cf. Alberta Gas Chems., 826 F.2d at 1245 (plaintiff did not suffer injury
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proposed before Live Nation began self-distribution, when it enlisted the services of
Ticketmaster. Those services were provided under exclusive contracts, so any fears of
future foreclosure cannot be more severe than what was previously foreclosed under
those contractual relationships. In fact, it was during Live Nation’s exclusive ten-year
agreement with Ticketmaster when new technologies began changing the landscape of
the ticketing business and helped usher in several new market entrants, many of which
have since challenged Ticketmaster in its traditional business. Consequently, the ticket
distribution market is unlikely to be altered by the merger and should be expected to
continue its recent dynamism.
Third, this theory of anticompetitive harm assumes that competitors and entrants
in the ticket distribution market require access to Live Nation’s venues in order to
maintain competitive profitability. This vastly overstates the significance of Live
Nation’s control over America’s venues. Some ticket distributors cater to niche markets
and rely on sales to small or specialized venues to recapture a portion of their fixed costs,
thereby reducing the number of large venue customers they would have to acquire to
enter the market profitably. 290 For instance, Tessitura tailors its services to the needs of

cognizable under the antitrust laws as the result of a vertical merger where a perfectly
lawful transaction and subsequent conduct would have produced the very same harm);
Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1983). See also United
States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1282 (W. D. Pa. 1977) (declining to
count as “‘foreclosed” output that had already been sold to merger partner before the
transaction and thus was not available to the open market in the first place).
290
See Fruehauf, 603 F. 2d at 358 (finding that FTC overstated minimum viable scale by
ignoring fact that facilities could produce various forms of output in addition to products
in the relevant market).
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non-profits that produce artistic performances. 291 Additionally, experience in recent
years has shown that ticket distribution companies or firms that provide the software
supporting self-distribution can enter the market and remain profitable at relatively
modest scale. 292 Thus, this is a case in which, to quote the Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, a secondary market—venues—is “sufficiently large and diverse [that] new
entrants to the primary market [are] able to participate without simultaneous entry into
the secondary market.” 293 Any case against the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger based
on this “two-level entry” theory would fail for this reason alone. 294
Summary
We close this analysis of the vertical elements of the proposed merger with the
following summarizing remarks and preliminary conclusions:
1. Vertical arrangements, including vertical integration, arise to mitigate the
costs of transacting in atomistic markets. Economists therefore broadly view
vertical integration as a manifestation of organizational efficiencies, rather
than as the exercise of market power. Antitrust doctrine has properly followed
suit, with the enforcement agencies and courts generally taking a very lenient
view towards vertical agreements and vertical mergers.
2. Economic theory predicts that the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger
is likely to produce certain efficiencies that would not be attainable without
complete integration.
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Note that a firm could simultaneously enter the market for distribution to large venues
and the market for distribution for small venues, thereby reducing the minimum number
of large venues a firm would have to serve in order to recoup its investment.
292
Cf. Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 353 (stating that minimum viable scale of possible entrant
is relevant consideration when determining impact of vertical transaction).
293
1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.211 & n.31; id. at § 4.211 (“If
there is sufficient unintegrated capacity in the secondary market [here, the venue market]
new entrants to the primary market would not have to enter both market
simultaneously.”).
294
See 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, § 4.21 (requirement of two level
entry a necessary condition for a vertical merger to create harm under a “two level entry
theory”).
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3. The live entertainment industry appears to have exhibited a broad trend
towards vertical integration over the past decade, with many providers of
entertainment—including those that are unlikely to enjoy any appreciable
market power—internalizing ticket distribution, live broadcasts, and other
services that create a direct interface with fans. The proposed Live NationTicketmaster merger appears to be part of this larger trend.
4. Critics suggest that a Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger would enshrine
Ticketmaster with market power in the ticket distribution market and enable
Live Nation to leverage such market power to anticompetitively harm rival
promoters. A careful examination of the industry structure and rudimentary
economic logic, however, indicate that the vertical aspects of the merger
would have no impact on either firm’s market power.

V. Conclusion
In reviewing the proposed Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger, we observe that it is
emerging out of a rapidly changing industry in which important technological
developments are precipitating significant organizational transformations. These
technological developments—especially the spread of software platforms that enable
large and small venues to self-distribute tickets to their events—appear to have placed a
check on any market power that Ticketmaster, or a merged Live Nation-Ticketmaster,
would have to impose supracompetitive prices. Ultimately, whether the merged entity
can exercise market power depends heavily on the ease of self-distribution and the
general availability of ticketing technologies.
These and other technological developments (including the rise of pirated music
and the evident growing reliance by artists on revenue from concerts) have induced
performers, promoters, and venues to establish closer linkages with their respective fan
base. These organizational changes appear able to generate sizable efficiencies. Vertical
integration mitigates a coordination problem that hinders investment in acquiring and
disseminating information, facilitates the cooperative adaptation necessary to respond to
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unforeseen market changes and tailor responses, and enables creators of live
entertainment to develop and market new content. We do not find convincing concerns
expressed by critics that the vertical integration of these companies will foreclose
possibilities for efficient entry. To the contrary, and consistent with advances in
institutional economics and antitrust law over the past three decades, the vertical aspects
of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger will more likely lead to efficiencies that will
benefit both consumers and the competitive process.
Our analysis does not offer balm to all of those who have expressed fears for this
merger. We should be clear that even though most evidence suggests that the Live
Nation-Ticketmaster merger is procompetitive and therefore should not require
intervention by enforcement agencies, there is no evidence indicating that the merger’s
efficiencies will slow the steady rise in the face price of concert tickets. It is hard to
determine how the mechanisms underlying recent price increases would be affected by
this merger, and the efficiencies we anticipate are perhaps more likely to translate into the
creation of new markets, improved concert quality, and greater capacity utilization than
in lower prices.
Moreover, the merger, along with the other forces that appear to be reshaping the
industry, will probably be detrimental to certain parties. Some have feared that the
merger—and probably the general trend towards vertical integration—will negatively
impact the secondary ticket market. Certainly innovations such as paperless ticketing
will reduce opportunities for secondary sellers, and perhaps other direct linkages between
venues and fans will shut out those who seek to purchase and resell tickets. However,
any such pain inflicted on secondary sellers is the competitive process at work and should
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be compared, for example, to ills suffered by travel agents when airlines popularized and
reaped efficiencies from Internet ticketing.
We also find no evidence to suggest that the merger will mitigate the difficulties
that smaller venues currently have in securing marquee performers. In fact, their
difficulties might be exacerbated. If the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger produces the
efficiencies we anticipate, the merged entity might be in the position to make even more
attractive offers to artists. While the vertical efficiencies are clearly good for artists and
fans, they do place more competitive pressures on Live Nation’s competitors. Our
analysis, however, does suggest that ticketing and other technologies should bring
benefits to smaller venues as well (and we predict that many small venues will soon
distribute their own tickets and construct their own Internet platforms) and they, like
other parties in the industry, will have to retool to reap new opportunities.
Finally, our analysis offers no comfort to those who fear that the combination of
two industry leaders creates a company so large and far-reaching that smaller competitors
will be unable to effectively compete. This per se fear of size and economic power
appears to be the source of most of the anxiety and ill will towards the proposed Live
Nation-Ticketmaster merger. To these critics, antitrust has tersely and squarely said that
the nation’s antitrust laws “were enacted to protect competition, not competitors.” 295 If
the merged entity generates efficiencies such that they can produce live entertainment and
serve artists and consumers alike at lower costs and with higher quality than their
competitors, such that their competitors suffer economically, then the antitrust laws
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See Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1979).
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should provide no relief. 296 And if the proposed merger does not create efficiencies, then
it necessarily creates market opportunities for these competitors. Mere size, whether
resulting from internal expansion or a merger, does not offend the antitrust laws. 297
To be sure, the live entertainment industry—and the entire music industry—is
undergoing significant structural change that will require developing new business
models and bracing for adjustments, but times of transition are not exemptions from
competition. To the contrary, such times are often when competition is most critical. But
whatever one’s beliefs about the merits of competition, the antitrust laws are the law of
the land and should be applied with discipline (as we aim to do here) and without secondguessing the deep-rooted statutory policy of maintaining competitive markets. 298

296

See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[A]
large firm does not violate § 2 [of the Sherman Act] simply by reaping the competitive
rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business offend the
Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association with a division
possessing a monopoly in its own market. So long as we allow a firm to compete in
several fields, we must expect it to seek the competitive advantages of its broad-based
activity – more efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products,
reduced transaction costs, and so forth. These are gains that accrue to any integrated
firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot by themselves be considered uses of
monopoly power.”).
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Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at passim (government must prove that merger will likely
produce anticompetitive effects); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920)
(mere size is not an offense under Section 2).
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In 1898, then circuit judge William Howard Taft famously warned against relying on
“the vague and varying opinion of judges as to how much, on principles of political
economy, men ought to be allowed to restrain competition.” United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898). Although antitrust enforcers necessarily
exercise some discretion in allocating their resources, their priorities have generally not
reflected their policy views about the wisdom of fostering competition in a particular
sector. Those who lament recent increases in concert prices, or who wistfully recall days
of attending inexpensive and spirit-lifting concerts, see, e.g., opening statements, House
Committee Hearings, and question antitrust enforcement in the live entertainment
industry because of their own policy preferences are subversive in a way that those who
advocate rigorous enforcement of laws already on the books are not.
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